This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL SY LE FR
SUBJECT: APRIL 29 BARNIER-AOUN MEETING 
 
REF: A. STATE 78006 
     ¶B. PARIS 2162 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This message contains an action request for Washington 
in para 5. 
 
¶2. (C) During an April 29 meeting with visiting NEA DAS 
Elizabeth Dibble, MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle 
East Jean-Francois Thibault offered a brief readout of FM 
Barnier's meeting earlier that day with former Lebanese Armed 
Forces Commander General Michel Aoun.  Thibault said Barnier 
stressed the need for Aoun to put his personal ambitions 
aside and work to support the common goals and unity of the 
opposition.  Barnier also emphasized that Syria was looking 
to complicate the situation in Lebanon and that Aoun's return 
gave an opportunity to the pro-Syrian loyalists; Aoun had to 
be careful to avoid being used by Syria or its supporters. 
Aoun responded that he was a uniter, not a divider, and that 
while he had been approached by the Syrians, he would never 
give them anything or allow himself to be manipulated. 
 
¶3. (C) Thibault commented that Aoun appeared old and somewhat 
out of touch with current realities in Lebanon, viewing 
himself as a "Lebanese de Gaulle."  The GoF was unsure as to 
Aoun's real influence or power base in Lebanon, but 
considered it weakened since his departure into exile from 
Lebanon 15 years ago.  Most of the young Lebanese assembling 
on Martyr's Square, for instance, were too young to remember 
Aoun as a political force in Lebanon.  Thibault noted that 
Aoun's staff had told him, on the margins of the Barnier 
meeting, that Aoun had a following among young people in 
Lebanon, and they claimed that Aounists had prevailed in 
recent elections in Lebanese universities.  Thibault was 
skeptical of the claim, and opined that if true, it was 
likely limited to a few, but not most, universities in 
Lebanon. 
 
¶4. (C) In a conversation with poloff April 28, MFA 
DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian Jouret described the 
Barnier decision to meet with Aoun as resulting from Aoun's 
repeated requests for a meeting with President Chirac, which 
the GoF had turned down, citing French neutrality.  He said 
Aoun found that explanation unconvincing, and cited Chirac's 
prior meetings with Walid Jumblatt, Patriarch Sfeir, and Sa'd 
Hariri. Jouret said Aoun was not enthusiastic about meeting 
Barnier, since everyone knew French Lebanon policy was being 
made at the Elysee. The GoF wanted to keep the meeting 
discreet and insisted on having no journalists, 
photographers, or press statements as a condition of the 
meeting taking place.  Jouret summed up that the GoF decided 
that it was only right to say farewell to Aoun after France 
saved his life, he spent 15 years here, and he fought Syria 
for so long.  In short, Aoun was not the GoF's enemy, 
although the GoF remained concerned about the potential for 
his return to undermine opposition unity. 
 
¶5. (C) Action request: Aoun's staff here in Paris contacted 
us recently to suggest another meeting with Aoun before his 
planned May 7 departure.  We believe it could be useful to 
doubletrack the French message of moderation and the need to 
maintain opposition unity with Aoun before his arrival in 
Beirut.  We would appreciate guidance from Washington on 
whether to seek another meeting with Aoun, and, if so, 
talking points for the discussion.  End action request. 
 
ROSENBLATT