This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO IV FR
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE:  FRENCH VIEWS ON PRETORIA 
AGREEMENT, UNOCI 
 
REF: A. STATE 54558 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. PARIS 2200 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. PARIS 2201 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt for reason 1.4. (b./d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Foucher 
on April 20 reviewed developments in Cote d'Ivoire.  South 
African President Mbeki's mediation efforts were a positive 
development but it remained to be seen how and whether 
Ivoirians would follow up to their advantage.  Foucher said 
the GOF was concerned about two issues:  eligibility for the 
presidential elections and disarming all parties to the 
current conflict.  On UNOCI, Foucher thought there would be a 
second technical rollover of the mandate.  France supported 
SYG Annan's call for increasing UNOCI by 1,200 and supported 
an additional increase of 2,000 beyond that; these increases 
would allow UNOCI to expand both in scope and tasks, which 
might include assisting in disarmament and providing security 
for elections.  Foucher said that Gbagbo and Ouattara could 
defuse the eligibility issue by Gbagbo's agreeing to allow 
Ouattara to run and Ouattara's agreement not to do so once 
being named eligible, but Foucher wondered whether either 
trusted the other sufficiently to allow for such a 
development.  Foucher said the GOF had no evidence indicating 
that arms were being clandestinely brought into Cote d'Ivoire 
from Burkina Faso.  He noted that the one-year anniversary of 
French-Canadian journalist Kieffer's disappearance in Cote 
d'Ivoire has prompted new interest in the case, which the 
French judiciary is actively investigating.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA DAS-equivalent Bruno Foucher met with Africa 
Watcher on April 20 to discuss several issues (septels).  On 
Cote d'Ivoire, Foucher said that South African President 
Mbeki's efforts to mediate the crisis had been positive and 
yielded an opportunity for Cote d'Ivoire to move toward 
ending its turmoil.  However, Foucher said it was important 
for Ivoirians to take concrete steps to move forward now that 
they had the chance to do so. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Foucher noted two concerns.  The first involved the 
elections eligibility issue, where Mbeki's recommendations 
had "put Gbagbo's feet to the fire."  Foucher said that 
Gbagbo's wisest course would be to comply and to declare 
everyone eligible to run.  Foucher cautioned, however, that 
Gbagbo was relatively inexperienced in dealing with political 
issues with an international scope.  He might travel abroad, 
engage in serious discussions, and make certain commitments, 
as he had in this case, but once home, he was very much 
influenced by his entourage, whose sole interests were its 
own and not Cote d'Ivoire's larger interests.  Foucher said 
that, faced with such pressures, Gbagbo might not live up to 
the commitments he had made in Pretoria. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Foucher said the GOF's other concern involved 
disarmament.  How would disarmament take place, and in what 
time frame, he wondered.  He noted that setting target dates 
and the like might prove futile unless all parties agreed to 
disarm.  Speaking more generally, Foucher said that the stage 
had been well set following the Mbeki-sponsored talks, and 
the proper political will seemed to exist.  Foucher's concern 
was over whether the parties would now take the necessary 
steps to transform the current positive environment into 
meaningful action. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On the issue of peacekeeping, Foucher referred to 
MFA A/S-equivalent Joubert's recent trip to the U.S. during 
which he discussed peacekeeping with UN and USG officials, 
including in Congress.  Foucher said there would likely be 
another "technical" rollover of UNOCI following the 
expiration of the current mandate early in May.  France 
favored augmentation of UNOCI, in keeping with SYG Annan's 
request in December for an increase of 1,200 peacekeepers. 
Foucher also said that France would support UNOCI's expansion 
by another 2,000 peacekeepers.  These increases would allow 
the mission to expand in scope and also take on new tasks, 
such as possible roles in assisting in disarming the various 
camps and providing security for eventual elections, roles 
that Foucher said France would support for an expanded UNOCI. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Foucher said the GOF was well aware of the 
possibility that the U.S. Congress might examine closely the 
need for UNOCI to be extended or expanded, which was one 
reason Joubert discussed the issue with Congressional staff. 
He noted also that another rollover might prove useful in 
moving the next cycle of UNOCI expenses into the next U.S. 
fiscal year, which could make Congressional agreement easier 
to obtain.  Joubert said that his talks on Capitol Hill went 
well, Foucher commented. 
 
¶7.  (C)  When asked about Alassane Ouattara, Foucher said 
that the French had heard that Ouattara had indicated that he 
might not run for President even if Gbagbo were to accede to 
Mbeki's suggestion that those in Ouattara's position be 
allowed to run.  Foucher said that such an arrangement might 
be a way of defusing the eligibility question without 
requiring either Ouattara or Gbagbo to lose face.  However, 
Foucher said that arriving at such an arrangement would 
require both to trust that the other would not do a 
double-cross, and he was not certain that this was possible, 
given the past history between Ouattara and Gbagbo. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  We described briefly our limited recent contact 
with Ouattara in connection with the delivery of the 
Secretary's letter to him, in response to his letter 
 
SIPDIS 
congratulating her on her appointment (reftels).  When asked 
whether the GOF maintained contact with Ouattara, Foucher 
said that it did not.  Asking that his comments be treated in 
confidence, Foucher (protect strictly) said that the reason 
the GOF did not maintain contact with Ouattara was President 
Chirac's disapproval of Ouattara's "wedding in Paris" to "la 
femme" of Houphouet-Boigny.  Foucher repeated this comment 
when we asked whether we had understood him correctly. 
Foucher indicated that Chirac's views of Ouattara were such 
that no one in the MFA or the Presidency sought contact with 
Ouattara.  Contact, he said, was maintained through "other 
channels" (NFI).  (NOTE:  Our research of open sources 
indicates that Ouattara's wife Dominique is French, has 
extensive political contacts and influence, and once managed 
some of Houphouet-Boigny's interests in France.  There is no 
indication that Mrs. Ouattara was once married to 
Houphouet-Boigny.  Thus it is not clear, based on Foucher's 
comment, whether Chirac disapproves of some aspect of 
Ouattara's relationship with Ouattara's wife because of a 
prior (non-marital) relationship she may have had with 
Houphouet-Boigny, of a relationship that Ouattara may have 
had with Houphouet-Boigny's widow, or of some other 
relationship among the parties.  In contrast to what Foucher 
said about Ouattara's contacts with the GOF, we note the 
interview Ouattara gave to Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent (Jan 
9-15, 2005, edition), in which Ouattara states that he has 
good relations with Chirac and frequent contact with Elysee 
Africa advisor Bonnecorse.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  When asked about possible shipment of arms into Cote 
d'Ivoire from Burkina Faso, a subject we had discussed with 
him before, Foucher acknowledged that the GOF had had 
concerns about this subject.  He said that he had conducted 
inquiries with various elements of the GOF and that, 
presently, there was no evidence that such trafficking was 
taking place.  He said that he could not rule out that arms 
were being introduced from Burkina Faso, but said the GOF had 
no information that would confirm this. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Foucher noted that the French media had focused 
on the one-year (April 16) anniversary of the disappearance 
in Cote d'Ivoire of French-Canadian journalist Guy-Andre 
Kieffer.  The French judicial investigation of the case had 
produced considerable work for Foucher's office in terms of 
four sets of letters rogatory that the GOF had prepared at 
the investigating judge's direction for delivery to the GOCI, 
and in preparing responses to press inquiries.  Foucher did 
not comment on the substance of the investigation but noted 
the independent nature of the French judiciary, which French 
judges protect strenuously enough that the MFA was often 
reluctant to provide even friendly intra-government advice on 
specific cases.  Any intervention by a government agency, 
Foucher suggested, was interpreted as pressure or 
interference by the judiciary, and such was the case in the 
Kieffer affair.  Foucher said that it was difficult to 
convince other governments of the independence French judges 
enjoyed, which made investigations involving other countries 
more complicated. 
WOLFF