This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL EAIR CN IN UNSC
SUBJECT: WEN VISIT WRAP-UP: "SIGNIFICANT BOOST," NO 
PARADIGM SHIFT 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2758 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Two weeks after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's 
"historic" April 9-12 visit to New Delhi (ref A), the initial 
breathless commentary has given way to a more sober and 
realistic assessment that no paradigm shift occurred, that 
Beijing did not exactly endorse India's UNSC bid, and that 
there is a long way to go in settling the border dispute. 
The Indians, however, have sensed a new-found respect from 
Beijing, reflected in China's acknowledgment of India as 
globally significant, a development for which the MEA credits 
growing US-India engagement.  The MEA told us they pointedly 
rejected Wen's strong advice that India should disassociate 
itself from Japan's UNSC bid.  End Summary. 
 
Reality Check: No Paradigm Shift 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) MEA Joint Secretary Ashok Kantha (China, Japan) told 
PolCouns and Poloff on April 22 that while Wen and the PM 
took important steps, "there has been no paradigm shift, no 
jump" in relations with China.  He noted that there was 
"complete continuity," in GOI policy, adding that the 
government has kept former PM Vajpayee, former NSA Mishra, 
and Opposition Leader Advani fully informed of the border 
negotiations. 
 
¶3.  (C) New Delhi is looking for Beijing to be sensitive to 
India's security concerns as the relationship develops, 
Kantha continued, noting that China was still in a "state of 
denial" with regard to its relationship with Pakistan and 
responsibility for that country's leaky nuclear and missile 
programs.  The J/S remarked that the GOI is comfortable with 
Beijing's ties with Islamabad, as long as they do not 
adversely affect India.  Taking a realistic view of Beijing's 
motivations, Kantha added that China's new willingness to 
engage India was to a considerable extent a function of how 
Beijing sees the US-India relationship evolving. 
 
UNSC: Play on Words 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) India's goals during the talks focused on tangible 
results in New Delhi's UNSC campaign and Sikkim, while 
China's were Indian recognition of its positions on Taiwan 
and Tibet, Chinese DCM Zheng Qingdian told PolCouns on April 
¶20.  Three of the four were accommodated in the April 11 
Joint Statement (ref A), while the fourth (UNSC) remains 
elusive, notwithstanding MEA J/S Kantha's optimistic 
statement that China had "fairly categorically" offered its 
support for India's UNSC bid.  The Indian PM was more 
cautious in his remarks to Parliament on April 20, quoting 
the slippery language of the Joint Statement that Beijing 
"understands" India's aspirations, and "supports" a larger 
Indian role in the UN (not the UNSC) and international 
affairs. 
 
¶5.  (C) Zheng went further, confirming that China 
"understands" India's ambition but that it is not ready to 
"support" it.  Zheng did not endorse the line we had from an 
Indian journalist, that Wen had offered a firm, private 
assurance of PRC support for India's candidacy.  While Zheng 
cited the interest of many other countries in a permanent 
UNSC seat as one of the reasons for China's reluctance to 
endorse India's bid, Kantha explained that India having 
thrown its lot in with Japan is the stumbling block for 
Beijing.  The J/S recalled that during Wen's meeting with the 
PM, the Chinese leader warned India of damaging its 
credibility for a seat by supporting Japan so unequivocally, 
speaking on the issue with great passion, at some length. 
Kantha said PM Singh pointedly refused to accept this PRC 
advice.  Zheng characterized India as "reluctantly accepting" 
of China's position on UNSC reform, adding that China and the 
US' positions on the issue seemed "similar." 
Inching Along on the Border 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Kantha, who was the primary GOI negotiator for the 
agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for 
boundary settlement (ref A), noted that his mandate was to 
arrive at a political solution, and not a technical one, as 
that has proven a "dead-end" in negotiations from 1998-2003. 
He underscored that each of the Guiding Principles had 
"operational significance," citing for example the provision 
for "safeguarding" settled populations which, he argued, 
boosts India's claim to Tawang, and the decision to use 
"easily identifiable geographic features," for which the two 
countries will conduct joint surveys.  Asked about the next 
phase of the negotiations, Kantha flagged the strong GOI 
expectation that progress will come quickly -- months, not 
years. 
 
¶7.  (C) Zheng observed that the Guiding Principles came about 
after years of disagreement because of the changed nature of 
the countries' relationship and the economic growth that both 
are experiencing.  The discussions included "hard talk" on 
Sikkim, while the next step would be to conclude a framework 
for the resolution of their boundary dispute, followed by an 
actual demarcation of the boundary.  While the MEA's Kantha 
characterized the principles as a milestone, he cautioned 
that the next phase, which will be negotiated at the Special 
Representatives level, would be far more difficult, and will 
require sustained engagement at the senior political level. 
Lamenting the Chinese tendency to want to put off border 
settlement while developing other aspects of the India 
relationship, he noted that although India does not have a 
specific timeframe in mind, the GOI will push for early 
resolution. 
 
Shades of Partnership 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) In public discussion of the Joint Statement's 
"Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity," the Indian 
focus was more on the "strategic partnership," without 
clarity on what the new level of engagement it would be.  The 
PM, in his April 20 speech to Parliament, described the 
partnership as "not in the nature of a military pact or 
alliance, but reflect(ing) a congruence of purpose."  Kantha 
explained further that in January, China had proposed a 
"Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Amity."  New Delhi, 
however, sought not simply hollow phrases, but Chinese 
acknowledgment of India's "global role."  Two days before 
Wen's New Delhi meetings, Beijing accepted this formulation, 
which DCM Zheng characterized as the result of an evolution 
in the India-China relationship over the past few years from 
bilateral to "global and international in focus."  The 
Observer Research Foundation's Ambassador MK Rasgotra 
observed recently that China has begun to recognize India's 
importance, whereas ten years ago, "they had nothing but 
contempt." 
 
¶9.  (C) Defining this new level of understanding, Kantha 
underscored that from India's perspective, the relationship 
with China should not be limited by their differences, had to 
have a "global" element, could not progress while postponing 
settlement of the border dispute, and did not imply a 
military alliance or "ganging up."  While this was 
significant, Kantha did not ascribe too much importance to 
the partnership, noting that China has such "partnerships" 
with everyone from ASEAN to Mexico and even the US.  Kantha 
added that with respect to China, New Delhi and Washington 
have a similar interest in "ensuring Beijing remains honest." 
 
¶10.  (C) With regard to the dozen agreements listed in the 
Joint Statement, Zheng said that the texts were not made 
public at the request of China, while India had supported 
their release.  The full text of two of the most important 
documents, the "Guiding Principles" and the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) military protocol, was publicly available on 
the day they were signed, and is viewable on the Indian MEA 
website. 
 
People-to-People Falls Flat 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) For their proximity and colossal size, the level of 
interaction between China and India is quite low.  Only 
40,000 Indians received visas to go to China in 2004, which 
is still larger than the number of Chinese traveling south 
(many to go to Buddhist pilgrimage sites in UP and Bihar). 
In an attempt to fix this imbalance, and to accommodate the 
kind of economic ties the two leaders predicted, DCM Zheng 
said Chinese Eastern Airlines will start operating its 
Beijing-Shanghai-New Delhi flight three times per week, Air 
China has proposed a Beijing-Mumbai route, and that a 
Xinjiang-Srinagar connection as well as South China Airlines 
service to Calcutta are under consideration.  The 
Xinjiang-Srinagar air link is particularly important, as it 
could revive the ancient Kashgar trade route, but could also 
be construed as acknowledging Indian sovereignty over the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) For the Indian political class, the most important 
outcome of the Wen visit may be the newfound seriousness with 
which China is now approaching India.  The GOI is very much 
aware that deepening US-India relations are a factor in 
Beijing's calculus, and can be expected to use this to New 
Delhi's advantage, which is a benefit to the United States. 
While New Delhi is open to these new approaches from Beijing, 
we note a definite sense of caution in GOI assessments of the 
Wen visit which reflects lingering historical mistrust, 
concern over the PLA build-up in India's periphery, and 
uncertainty over where exactly Beijing stands with respect to 
India and the UNSC.  Wen's visit tipped off a triangular 
Security Council drama between India, Japan and China, the 
next act of which will be played out during Japanese PM 
Koizumi's visit to New Delhi April 28-30 (septel). 
BLAKE