This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER IN PK INDO PAK

SUBJECT: INDO-PAK MINI-SUMMIT BURIES ""GHOST OF AGRA"" 
  REF: NEW DELHI 2866 
  Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: India and Pakistan exorcised the ghost of  the (failed) 2001 Agra Summit during President Musharraf's  April 16-18 visit to New Delhi, with a solid list of CBMs,  muted discussion on Kashmir, and very positive personal  interactions (with more high-level visits possible this  year).  Both sides' use of common terms and complimentary  language, particularly regarding a ""soft border"" on Kashmir,  was new.  Agreeing that the two sides had an historic  opportunity to create a durable peace, they declared that the  process of rapprochement was ""irreversible.""  Taking place  with the backdrop of a successful nine-city tour by the  Pakistan cricket team (which trounced India in the one-day  match that Musharraf attended) and a legion of positive  people-to-people stories centered on the visiting Pakistani  cricket fans/tourists, this mini-summit was a significant  milestone in Indo-Pak relations and a testimony to the PM's  commitment to normalization with Islamabad.  End Summary. 
  More Deliverables Than Originally Expected 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) Exceeding the cautious expectations that the GOI set  in the run-up to the summit (Reftel), PM Manmohan Singh and  Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf agreed on a number of new  CBMs in addition to advancing other issues that have been on  the table for some time.  Building on the two Indo-Pak recent  summits (January 6 and September 24), PM Singh listed the  following agreements in the joint statement released on April  18, after an overnight delay to resolve differences: 
 
-- Increasing the frequency of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus  service (to an unannounced level) and adding additional  trans-Kashmir routes to include Poonch-Rawalkote; 
 
-- Expanding cross-LOC transit to include trade, pilgrimage,  and cultural exchanges; 
 
-- Creating a mechanism to allow ""divided families"" (i.e. 
with members living on both sides of the LOC to meet (details  are unclear, but a reference to meeting points along the LOC); 
 
-- Pushing for an ""early start"" on the proposed  Lahore-Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus links (particularly  relevant to Sikhs who wish to visit a shrine located in  Pakistani Punjab); 
 
-- Committing to open the Khokhrapar-Munnabao rail link by  January 1, 2006 (pushing back the expected date of completion  from the original October 2005 target); 
 
-- Setting a January 1, 2006 deadline to open  consulates-general in Mumbai and Karachi; 
 
-- Agreeing to continue the Composite Dialogue talks, with  the foreign ministries to work out the schedule; 
 
-- Seeking to alleviate the situation of Indian and Pakistani  prisoners who have served their sentences in each other's  jails but have not yet been repatriated; 
 
-- ""Immediately"" convening ""the existing institutions"" to  ""expeditiously"" resolve the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek  issues; 
 
-- Directing the two Petroleum Ministers to meet by May to  discuss common issues including gas pipelines  (Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Pakistan-India); and 
 
-- Setting up a private sector Joint Business Council to  intensify trade ties and reviving the official Joint Economic  Commission, which last met in 1989, in order to stimulate  economic exchanges to cooperation. 
 
-- The PM also accepted in principle Musharraf's invitation  to visit Pakistan.  In addition, BJP Leader of the Opposition  LK Advani accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan in June. 
Musharraf also invited Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi. 
 The details and timings are to be worked out by the  respective foreign ministries. 
 
¶3.  (C) Notably absent from this list, and opening the PM to  potential BJP criticism, was the omission of an explicit  reaffirmation of earlier Pakistani assurances on cross-border  terrorism.  The joint statement stated simply that the  leaders ""would not allow terrorism to impede the peace  process.""  This Indian climb-down on the language regarding  cross-border infiltration is one more data point for those  who are skeptical of Manmohan Singh's willingness to make  concessions in furtherance of the peace process.  We will  report septel on the story behind this language, which  reportedly was the reason for the overnight delay in  releasing the joint statement. 
  Keeping Kashmir Quiet 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) As expected, President Musharraf dwelled at some  length on Kashmir, but the tone was by all accounts positive  and absent of rancor.  The PM reportedly couched his response  in terms of what he cannot (vice will not) deliver (""I cannot  offer you any adjustment of the border, I have no mandate to  do that,"" restating his position at their September 2004  meeting on the sidelines of the UNGA).  Musharraf seems to  have accepted this position, as reflected in the Joint  Statement which referred merely to continued discussions on  J&K.  The CBMs were heavily Kashmir-oriented and a testament  to the success of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus in enabling  spin-off CBMs. 
  Consolidating the Personal Touch 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The two leaders exchanged numerous gifts, which  highlighted the unusually strong personal connections between  the PM and the Pakistani President.  Singh presented  Musharraf with a painting of the President's pre-Partition  family home in Delhi and birth certificates for Musharraf and  his siblings who were born there.  In return, Musharraf  presented an engraving to the PM and, to Opposition Leader LK  Advani, a book of photographs of Advani in Pakistan from his  school days in Karachi (at St. Patrick's, which Musharraf  also attended) through adulthood.  Similar bonhomie was  visible during the Advani meeting, and was particularly  useful in burying the ghosts of Agra, as Advani was blamed by  some for having helped scuttle that summit. 
  Common Vocabulary Emerging 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Of particular interest was the GOI's and GOP's use of  a similar vocabulary to describe their policy objectives for  Kashmir.  Echoing terms such as ""soft borders,"" using the LOC  as a ""bridge,"" and seeking ""out-of-the-box ideas,"" Musharraf,  in the eyes of the GOI and the Indian public, presented  himself as a far cry from the man obsessed with Kashmir when  he met PM Vajpayee in Agra in 2001.  The April 18 joint  statement went even further than Musharraf's pre-summit  interview by defining the peace process, in the eyes of both  the GOI and the GOP, as ""irreversible"" (on April 14, he had  termed it ""fairly irreversible""). 
  Saying (and Not Saying) the Right Things 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Both Musharraf and Singh displayed skill at making  each other comfortable over the weekend with friendly  comments and compliments: 
-- Musharraf reiterated his Reuters interview comment that  the Delhi meeting was ""180 degrees"" from the failed 2001 Agra  Summit; 
 
-- He telegraphed his commitment to the dialogue process  before he arrived by declaring that ""the period of conflict  management is over, we have entered an era of conflict  resolution."" 
 
-- He also reiterated his April 6 condemnation of attack  against the Indian passengers for the inaugural  Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus trip and labeled it as ""terrorism."" 
 
-- His references on TV to ""Jammu and Kashmir,"" rather than  the more vague ""Kashmir,"" were viewed by some as an implicit  acceptance that Pakistan would move away from claiming the  entire state for itself. 
-- Singh appealed to Musharraf's personal side by remarking  that he found the Pakistani President's mother ""utterly  charming"" and ""your son was quite a hit with young people  here."" 
 
¶8.  (C) As important to the atmospherics were the comments  left unsaid.  Accusations of Islamabad promoting cross-border  terrorism and of human rights abuses in J&K fell by the  wayside.  Musharraf lobbied India to act ""magnanimously"" as  the larger country, on the grounds that when smaller  countries compromise, their leaders are accused of knuckling  under pressure.  The joint statement reflected an unusual  attempt at compromise. 
  Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) This interaction made no progress on a number of key  issues (for example, the Baglihar Dam impasse and the final  shape and identity of ""Kashmir""), but the constructive and  incremental approach is now delivering benefits to Kashmiris  while simultaneously building and strengthening the ""peace  constituency.""  On Baglihar the GOI reportedly restated its  call for bilateral dialogue.  We will follow up with MEA.  Indians have grown more comfortable accepting Musharraf as a  partner in the peace process -- his public statements here  immeasurably improved his stature -- although a hard core of  skeptics remain who continue to anticipate the next Kargil  will scuttle the current bonhomie.  This mini-summit was well  organized to deliver results, and is a testimony to the PM's  personal leadership on Indo-Pak rapprochement. 
BLAKE  "