This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MASS IN PK NSSP

SUBJECT: INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH  ASIA INITIATIVE 
  REF: NEW DELHI 2348 
  Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Most Indian strategic commentators have  endorsed the Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative,  and there is an emerging consensus within the GOI that India  should capitalize on this opportunity to ensure close ties to  the US.  India's Communist parties remain adamantly opposed,  however, and are trying to convince the Congress Party to  reject it.  Some leaders from the Congress' left wing agree  with the Communists that India should reject the military  components of the Initiative.  Until the party arrives at a  workable consensus, party leaders like FonMin Natwar Singh  and DefMin Pranab Mukherjee will move cautiously, looking for  political cover to support their moves ahead with the US.  Some observers speculate that Natwar will use his influence  within the Left to weaken its opposition to closer bilateral  relations.  Some within Congress but outside decision-making  circles have suggested that India reject American fighter  aircraft purchases to win Left Front (LF) approval for other  aspects of the initiative.  The LF cannot compel Congress to  reject the Initiative outright, as it does not control  foreign policy.  It places a higher priority on its domestic  agenda, and will not risk bringing down the government on  this issue.  However, their inherent nuisance value could  become more of a problem if we have difficulty translating  the Secretary's Initiative from rhetoric to reality.  End  Summary. 
  Communists Speak Out 
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¶2.  (U) Predictably, India's Communists rejected the  administration's South Asia Initiative almost immediately  after it was announced on March 25.  On March 28, the  Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) called on the GOI  to ""outright reject the proposal to join the infamous  national missile defense system,"" noting that ""it suits the  US to fuel an arms race between India and Pakistan with the  sale of sophisticated weapons to both countries,"" and ""it  provides a good market for its arms manufacturers.""  On March  29, the Communist Party of India (CPI) General Secretary AB  Bardhan warned the GOI not to accept the US offer of fighter  aircraft, maintaining that the US ""wants to start an arms  race in the region.  They don't want peace.  They don't want  the region to become economically stable."" 
  And Stick to their Guns 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In a series of recent meetings with Poloff, Communist  leaders and leftist journalists insisted that the US  initiative was ""unacceptable,"" that the Left was determined  to stop it, and would not change its position.  They were  also confident that they had enough support within Congress  to oppose the Indian purchase of US fighter aircraft.  On  Apri 5, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Deputy Editor of the leftist  fortnightly ""Frontline,"" claimed that while the Communists  want good India/US relations, they find the South Asia  initiative too high a price to pay, and are looking for a way  to scuttle it.  Ramakrishnan asserted that the Congress left  wing agrees with the Communists that India should reject  closer strategic ties with the US, and would Convince the GOI  to adopt a ""wait and see"" position, using various stratagems  to delay a decision on defense cooperation as long as  possible. 
 
¶4.  (C) Leaders of three LF parties insisted to Poloff that  they would not relent on GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft. 
 All-India Forward Bloc General Secretary G. Devarajan  emphasized on April 4 that the LF has told PM Singh that GOI  acceptance of the American arms package would be an  ""impediment"" to its India-Pakistan peace initiative, and that  it should reject the American offer and let Pakistan acquire  F-16's to ""placate"" Pakistan and ""prevent an India/Pakistan  arms race.""  He insisted that the GOI should reject the  entire US Initiative and not separate the defense and  civilian cooperation components. 
Defense Minister Mukherjee in the Spotlight 
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¶5.  (C) Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) General Secretary  Abani Roy reiterated to Poloff that the LF was angered by the  US initiative, which it views as ""patronizing.""  Roy claimed  that the Pakistan F-16 sale was dropped on India as a ""fait  accompli,"" despite repeated Indian objections, and that the  USG was using it to ""browbeat"" India into accepting a  relationship with the US on American terms.  Roy described  the offer of multi-role combat aircraft to India as a ""waste  of money"" and ""dumping"" of American products.  He claimed  that the LF has told DefMin Mukherjee not to accept US  attempts to lock India into expensive arms packages. 
Instead, the GOI should scale back defense purchases and  channel more money into social spending.  Mukherjee  purportedly responded that since the US initiative was ""a  question of national security,"" he could ""not take a decision  lightly."" 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Roy, the LF leadership is worried that  Mukherjee is not fully with them.  Noting that ""Mukherjee  can't behave one way when he is in West Bengal and another  way in New Delhi,"" Roy maintained that the Defense Minister  is ""pursuing a two-faced policy,"" trying to placate the  Communists while at the same time working with Congress  moderates who favor closer relations with the US.  Roy  claimed that the LF is confident that India will never  purchase US fighter aircraft.  Alleging that Congress leaders  are only interested in large ""commissions"" from military  sales, he predicted that the GOI would reject the F-16 or  F-18 in favor of a European aircraft, as ""there is money in  it for them.""  Roy insisted that American aircraft purchases  were ""non-negotiable,"" but conceded that the Communists might  be willing to look at the civilian components of the US  Initiative if they ""meet India's needs."" 
 
¶7.  (C) CPI Secretary D. Rajan also confirmed to Poloff on  April 6 that the Communists ""will not compromise"" on the  military aspects of the American initiative.  While he would  not comment on the civil components, Rajan was confident that  India would never purchase American combat aircraft.  He  claimed that not only are many within Congress opposed, but  many senior Indian military officers (who have long-standing  ties to Russian suppliers) see no value to the US offer and  would recommend that the GOI reject it. 
  Congress's Detractors 
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¶8.  (C) Poloff spoke with two Congress leaders with access to  the party leadership and journalists who follow Congress  party internal developments.  They confirmed that some within  the Congress hierarchy remain opposed to the defense  components of the administration's strategic initiative. 
 
¶9.  (C) In an April 1 meeting, Congress MP Rashid Alvi  pointed out that the Communists are pressuring Congress, that  the party is divided, and has not yet decided how to respond. 
 Alvi advised that DefMin Mukherjee will play a key role in  the GOI's decision and has not yet come out in favor of the  US fighter offer.  He noted that Mukherjee is from West  Bengal, wants to become Prime Minister one day with Communist  support, owes his political position in his home state to the  Communists, and cannot afford to openly defy them.  Alvi  claimed that the Left is in no mood to compromise and wants  Mukherjee to use his influence to convince the GOI to reject  the purchase of F-16 or F-18 aircraft.  Noting that the US  military partnership was ""no go,"" for the Communists, Alvi  claimed there was some leeway regarding nuclear energy and  space. 
 
¶10.  (C) On March 31, Congress insider NK Sharma insisted to  Poloff that despite strong support for the US Initiative from  New Delhi's strategic elite, the USG should not take GOI  acceptance for granted, as Congress grassroots cadres remain  deeply suspicious of the United States and have not bought  into the logic of the US partnership.  According to Sharma,  elements within the Congress leadership still believe the US  favors the BJP, and does not want Congress to gain enough  strength to remain in power for a full five year term. 
Sharma maintained that the announcement of F-16 sales to  Pakistan compounded the considerable ""anger"" within Congress  regarding US handling of AQ Khan, and perceived US objections  to the Indo-Iran pipeline.  Sharma maintained that DefMin  Mukherjee was so dependent on the Communists that he had to  oppose the F-16 offer. 
  ¶11.  (C) ""Hindu"" political editor Harish Khare noted to  Poloff that there was ""no enthusiasm"" for the US arms offer  among his Congress contacts, and asserted that Congress is  looking at the possibility of satisfying both the US and the  LF by separating the military and civilian components, and  declining the arms offer.  It could also tell the USG that  Congress ""must seek a political consensus"" and then drag out  the process for many years.  Khare confirmed that the  advanced fighter offer to India did not placate the universal  anger in Congress ranks regarding the offer of F-16's to  Pakistan. 
  ¶12.  (C) Former ""India Today"" editor Zafar Agha told Poloff  on April 8 that his Congress contacts believe that India will  become a world power, but some want India to ally with the US  ""for now,"" while others believe it is not necessary.  He was  confident that if Congress decides to accept the US offer, it  would bring the Communists along by reminding them of the  need for ""secular unity"" to meet the ""BJP threat."" 
  Comment 
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  ¶13.  (C) As in the past, the Communists are determined to  oppose the forging of closer US-India strategic ties, as they  think they are in a position to veto the GOI purchase of US  fighter aircraft.  There has always been some ideological  overlap between the left wing of Congress and the Communists  when it comes to relations with the US, and the LF remains  confident that Congress proponents will fail to convince  skeptics in their own party to accept the initiative that  Washington has proposed.  In their leftist view the fighter  sale is a ""non-starter"" as it is a ""high visibility""  component, which is widely opposed by a cross-section of  Indians, including some within the military, who would prefer  to stick with existing suppliers.  These left leaders are  eager to claim credit for stopping what they see as a program  doomed to failure.  For now, these leftist critics are a  nuisance factor in GOI decision-making.  They could become a  much bigger problem, however, if Washington is perceived as  failing to deliver on the bold rhetoric of the March 25  presentation and the soaring vision of US-India partnership  that the Secretary presented in Delhi. 
MULFORD  "