This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETRD CN IN
SUBJECT: WEN VISIT: UNSC, SIKKIM, ECONOMY STEAL THE SHOW 
 
REF: A. CHENNAI 695 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 2677 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's April 9-12 
visit to India produced a dozen documents, and plenty of 
positive commentary, but the highlights were confusion over 
China's position on India in the UNSC and agreement on a 
roadmap to resolution of the border dispute.  New Delhi-based 
China-watchers, declaring the trip a resounding success, 
initially seized on an April 11 Chinese statement and MEA 
descriptions of Beijing's support for India in the UNSC, only 
to be disappointed by Wen's April 12 reiteration of the more 
ambiguous language of the Joint Statement.  Of the many 
agreements and MOUs, the highlights were the border roadmap, 
a joint statement in which China acknowledged Sikkim as an 
Indian state, a protocol for military presence along the Line 
of Actual Control (LAC), and the release of the India-China 
Joint Study Group's report on Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
 This message reports the highlights of the bilateral 
documents.  A detailed assessment of the visit will follow 
septel.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The MEA announced on April 11 that during Wen's 
visit, India and China signed or released a dozen documents. 
Among them were the: 
 
--Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's 
Republic of China; 
--Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles 
for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question; 
--Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on 
Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation; 
--Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in 
the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the 
India-China Border Areas; 
--Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance and 
Cooperation in Customs Matters; 
--MOU on the Launch of the India-China Financial Dialogue; 
--MOU on Civil Aviation; and 
--MOU on Provision of Hydrological Information of the 
Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo River in Flood Season by China to India. 
 
Upgrade to Strategic Partner 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) During his April 9-12 visit to New Delhi and 
Bangalore, Wen met with PM Manmohan Singh, President APJ 
Abdul Kalam, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, and Leader of the 
Opposition LK Advani.  The Joint Statement, signed on April 
11, declared India and China's intention to establish a 
"Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity."  The statement spoke of the "incremental 
progress" that Wen and Singh made, in contrast to more 
ecstatic initial commentary in the media. 
 
Lost in Translation? 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) While these dozen agreements broke almost no new 
ground, the Guiding Principles, the LAC Military Protocol, 
the Economic Cooperation report (septel), and Wen's comments 
on India and the UNSC are more significant.  In the 
seven-page joint statement, India noted its aspirations for 
permanent UNSC membership, and China acknowledged that "India 
is an important developing country."  Stopping short of 
offering Beijing's support, the document said that China 
"understands and supports India's aspirations to play an 
active role in the UN." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Despite the non-committal language in the official 
statement, Indians, including Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, 
on April 11 seized upon a comment Wen reportedly made that 
China would be "happy" to see India as a permanent member of 
the UNSC.  Highlighting the Premier's remarks, Saran told the 
media that this was a major step forward.  The reports that 
followed reflexively pointed out that the US was now the 
"significant holdout" among the P-5 that had not come out to 
support India's UNSC candidacy.  Prior to his departure on 
April 12, however, Wen dashed these hopes when, in response 
to an AP reporter's question, he spoke of India and the UNSC 
in the ambiguous terms of the Joint Statement.  He also 
reportedly stated that Japan should "face up to history" and 
reconsider its UNSC bid, highlighting an issue that may 
resurface when PM Koizumi follows Wen to New Delhi at the end 
of April.  Our media contacts, speaking on April 12, were 
bitterly critical of the perceived Chinese flip-flop on the 
UNSC. 
 
Border Roadmap 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Laying a long-term plan for future resolution of 
their border dispute, Singh and Wen signed off on an eleven 
article agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding 
Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary 
Question" and a paragraph in the joint statement 
acknowledging the "Sikkim State of the Republic of India." 
The document called for China and India to find a peaceful 
solution, make "mutually acceptable adjustments," continue 
the Joint Working Group and Special Representatives meetings, 
and observe the LAC in reaching a settlement that follows 
"easily definable natural geographic features," and takes 
into account the interests of the settled populations. 
 
¶7.  (U) Some observers hailed the principles, along with the 
new Chinese map that Foreign Secretary Saran waved at a press 
conference showing Sikkim as part of India, as "melting" the 
border.  Others, such as the "Hindustan Times" commentator 
and National Security Advisory Board member Manoj Joshi, 
concluded that there was "still a long way to go," and called 
attention to the lack of understanding on where the LAC, on 
which the Guiding Principles are based, actually is located. 
 
In the Meantime 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Pending resolution of the border dispute, Wen and PM 
Singh signed a Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation 
of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along 
the Line of Actual Control.  Based on "strict observance" of 
the LAC, the agreement: 
 
--prohibits "large-scale military exercises" of more than 
15,000 troops in "close proximity" to the line; 
--requests notification for activities in excess of 5,000 
troops 15 days in advance; 
--provides for a meeting and investigation by the offended 
party of any alleged air intrusion by military aircraft; 
--establishes two border meetings annually at each of three 
locations on the border; and 
--outlines procedures for the treatment of personnel who may 
cross the border. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) While generally light on immediate results, Wen's 
stay in Bangalore (ref A) and New Delhi produced much-needed 
momentum on the border dispute and highlighted the potential 
for, and interest in, economic cooperation (septel).  The 
MEA, which spun Wen's remarks into a solid thumbs-up for 
India at the UNSC, may find itself countering the initial 
enthusiasm following Wen's pre-departure step back.  With 
this deflationary move we can expect a more sober assessment 
of the visit which we will report septel.  The other notable 
aspect of this visit was the obvious effort that the Chinese 
are putting into the cultivation of their India relationship, 
after years in which the PRC regarded New Delhi with thinly 
disguised disdain. 
MULFORD