This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT AND EAP/PBMS 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/DSS/DO/PETERSON, DS/ICI/RFJ/SCHINDEL 
GOMBIS 
ASD/ISA/AP FOR BG ALLEN 
NSC FOR GREEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: MOPS PTER MASS PREL PINS RP
SUBJECT: AFP NARROWLY MISSES JI/ASG TERRORIST TARGETS 
 
REF: MANILA 1614 
 
Classified By: (U) Political Officer Paul O'Friel 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY. Light reaction companies of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) narrowly missed capturing the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) terrorist Dulmatin and senior Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) leaders Khaddafy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman during a 
tightly compartmented April 15-16 raid on the terrorists' 
hideout.  The attack achieved strategic and operational 
surprise, and involved the AFP's first night movement and a 
nighttime helicopter insertion, both directly resulting from 
specialized US training and equipment.   We are pushing the 
AFP to keep up its operation tempo against these targets. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
ANOTHER NARROW MISS 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) The AFP's Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) 
missed capturing JI operative Dulmatin and senior ASG leaders 
Khaddafy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman during a 
compartmentalized operation on April 15-16.  Composed of the 
JSOG's 2nd and 3rd Light Reaction Companies (LRCs), the 
raiding force attacked a camp on the edges of the Liguasan 
Marsh in central Mindanao in which Dulmatin, Janjalani, and 
Abu Solaiman were sheltering, but lost contact with the 
fleeing terrorists, who managed to escape. 
 
¶3.  (S) The operation involved the first use of the JSOG 
against ASG/JI targets in Mindanao, and had been planned 
since early April in close coordination with Military 
Intelligence Groups (MIG) 21 and 11, which had pinpointed the 
terrorists' location.  To prevent any leak and to protect 
operational security, AFP Chief of Staff General Efren Abu 
directed SOUTHCOM Commander LTG Alberto Braganza to bypass 
the 6th Infantry Division, whose area of operations includes 
central Mindanao. 
 
WHILE US SUPPORT PROVED KEY... 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Coordinated multi-agency US support proved key.  The 
AFP had US assistance throughout all phases of the raid.  A 
10-member Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines 
operations/intelligence fusion team was present at the JSOG 
commander's operations center during the engagement to advise 
him.  This team also provided intelligence support from P3 
surveillance aircraft and UAVs.  RMAS separately provided 
locational data. 
 
...THE AFP RAN OUT OF STEAM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Although the LRCs came close on several occasions 
during the course of the raid to capturing the fugitive 
terrorists, after more than 24-hours of continuous combat in 
difficult terrain they could no longer sustain operations. 
Additionally, the AFP command structure -- with 6th Infantry 
Division Commander MG Raul Relano once again evidently 
playing a dilatory role at a critical moment -- hesitated for 
four key hours when the MILF's 104 Base Command threatened to 
counterattack what MILF commanders labeled a violation of the 
GRP/MILF ceasefire.  Without a coherent back-up plan or 
sufficient follow-on forces or reserves, the AFP broke off 
contact and withdrew on April 16. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶6.  (S) This operation is the latest in a series of 
near-misses for the AFP.  On November 19, 2004 and January 
27, 2005, in  combined arms daylight attacks using aircraft 
and artillery units, 6th Infantry Division forces narrowly 
missed Dulmatin's and Janjalani's hideouts.  But the most 
recent engagement demonstrated improvement in the AFP's 
operations, notably with commanders paying better attention 
to operations security and compartmentalization, by adding 
heightened elements of strategic and operational surprise, 
and by use of night movement and a nighttime helicopter 
insertion.  The latter elements resulted directly from 
specialized US training and equipment.  The US-trained light 
reaction companies involved showed aggressive will to fight 
and good skills. 
¶7.  (S) On the negative side, the operation failed. 
Interservice coordination and employment of combined arms 
remain weak, and the AFP failed to commit sufficient forces 
to close off all possible escape routes.  Combat commanders 
also remain over sensitive to the impact their operations may 
have on peace negotiations with the MILF -- despite President 
Arroyo's direct orders to the senior command on this point on 
March 30.  Once again, the AFP's decision-making process 
froze in response to the MILF's threat to intervene. 
 
¶8.  (S) Although not successful, the JSOG in its first 
large-scale operation gave a good account of itself. 
Dulmatin, Janjalani, and Abu Solaiman remain on foot and on 
the run in central Mindanao, whose rough terrain offers 
limited mobility.  JSOTF-P, RMAS, and other Embassy elements 
are closely engaged with their counterparts to get the AFP to 
keep up the tempo of its operations and get back in the 
fight. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
Ricciardone