This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 001716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/PMBS 
ASD/ISA/AP FOR BG ALLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER MOPS MARR PREL PINS EAID RP
SUBJECT: BUILDING A BRIDGE ON TAWI-TAWI 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY.  Embassy believes the number one USPACOM 
FY05/FY06 humanitarian assistance objective in the 
Philippines should be the Tawi-Tawi bridge project.  The 
project will have a strategic impact on the "rat-line" 
terrorists use to enter and leave the Philippines.  Although 
much smaller in scale -- and cost -- than the "Basilan model" 
of Balikatan 02-1, the principle is the same: attack 
terrorism by changing the basic economic conditions of the 
people.  We request USPACOM re-obligate funding for the 
project, identify a responsible service component, and put it 
at the top of the humanitarian assistance projects for the 
Philippines.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) We welcome the upcoming April 26-28 visit of a 
PACOM-sponsored Naval Facilities (NAVFAC) engineering 
assessment team, which will examine the Tawi-Tawi bridge 
project.  Embassy views this as a critical project for our 
Mission Performance Plan objectives in the Philippines over 
the next year.  Tawi-Tawi is the "door" to Mindanao, and a 
favored "rat-line" for terrorists as they enter or leave the 
Philippines.  Profiting from a weak GRP presence, Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists 
regularly use the island group as a transit point and safe 
haven.  Unprompted, Governor Sadikul Sahali of Tawi-Tawi told 
a visiting JUSMAG officer in January that he has two 
priorities: "fighting terrorism and building the bridge." 
 
¶3.  (U) The project consists of two separate bridge spans 
totaling 300 meters and approximately 8-12 kilometers of 
roads that would connect the Sanga-Sanga and Tawi-Tawi 
islands of the island group, providing the people of this 
marginalized area a vital transportation corridor. 
Leveraging existing Mabey-Johnson bridge components left over 
from a British government aid program during the Ramos-era, 
known as the Salam Bridge Program, the project would use 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and US military 
engineer expertise to complete a long-planned, but never 
completed infrastructure project in one of the most 
conflict-affected regions of the Philippines. 
 
¶4.  (U) The then-commander of the Philippine Navy's Tawi-Tawi 
based Task Force 62 initially proposed construction of the 
bridge project in early 2004.  PACOM approved humanitarian 
assistance funding in August of the same year.  The 
Philippine Navy Construction Brigade (SeaBees) 
enthusiastically supported the project from its inception, 
and dedicated significant resources to site surveys, and 
other preliminary engineering tasks.  Its commander, 
Commodore Margarito Sanchez, pledged to supply troops and 
logistics support for bridge construction, while initial 
discussions with Philippine Army Engineers indicated 
willingness to provide labor and equipment for road upgrades. 
 
A TRIPARTITE PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (U) Embassy understands that PACOM has identified -- but 
not funded -- $400,000 in its FY05 humanitarian assistance 
budget for construction and operations support, while 
USAID-Philippines set aside $900,000 to help meet the cost of 
aggregate and other construction materials.  This assistance 
was predicated on a commitment by the Department of Public 
Works and Highways (DPWH) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) to improve access roads leading to the bridge 
site. 
 
¶6.  (U) With the strong backing of ARMM Governor Parouk 
Hussin, Tawi-Tawi Congressman Anuar Abubakar, and Tawi-Tawi 
Governor Sahali, by December 2004 the ARMM's DPWH had 
completed an environmental impact statement and begun road 
construction.  Using a dedicated crew and equipment, it has 
already re-graded/re-built nearly all of the access roads 
leading to the bridge site. 
 
¶7. (U) Additionally, USAID already has a range of development 
programs across the Tawi-Tawi island group.  Completed 
activities include: reintegrating 350 former Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants into the economy as 
successful seaweed and fish farmers (out of the 25,000 MNLF 
combatants reintegrated throughout Mindanao); building 25 
infrastructure projects (boat-landings, warehouses, solar 
dryers, etc.); providing seven high schools with internet 
capability; providing 69 barangays (neighborhoods) with 
solar-powered electricity; and assisting 203 barangays in 
tuberculosis treatment/prevention, maternal and child health, 
and family planning.  A major, and almost complete, USAID 
activity will improve Tawi-Tawi's main port of Bongao. 
Building the Tawi-Tawi bridges would complement all these 
activities and promote increased economic growth and 
development. 
 
A CRITICAL PROJECT IN A CRITICAL AREA 
------------------------------------- 
¶8.  (SBU) Like the 2002 "Basilan Model," the Tawi-Tawi bridge 
project attacks the terrorists' center of gravity: the 
shelter and support they receive from a disaffected local 
population.  In Basilan, US and AFP troops worked 
side-by-side to build a circumferential road for the island. 
This infrastructure project not only had a positive impact on 
Basilan's economy, but also positively changed people's 
perceptions of the AFP and the Philippine government.  Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has now 
begun to focus on the "Basilan Model" as a way forward in 
fighting terrorism elsewhere in Mindanao. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  We now have a similar -- but significantly lower 
cost -- opportunity on Tawi-Tawi, where we can leverage the 
bridge project to change the political environment.  Joint 
civil-military operations, such as medical civil affairs 
programs (MEDCAPS), dental civil affairs programs (DENCAPS), 
and engineering (e.g., school construction/rehabilitation or 
well digging) civil affairs programs (ENCAPS) linked to the 
bridge project can help re-establish the connection between 
the local populace and the AFP, and also create a positive 
perception of US forces in the minds of the inhabitants.  DoD 
Rewards program advertising can play into this environment, 
as can efforts, through joint training, to improve the combat 
capabilities of TF 62 and other Tawi-Tawi based units. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Embassy strongly believes that building the 
Tawi-Tawi bridge can have a strategic impact on the war 
against terrorism in the southern Philippines.  We urge PACOM 
to re-establish funding, identify a responsible service 
component, and make it a priority project for FY05/FY06. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
Ricciardone