This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 001614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL RP
SUBJECT: FIGHTING THE GWOT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
REF: A. STATE 60794 
     ¶B. JAKARTA 4212 
     ¶C. 04 MANILA 5502 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Joseph A. Mussomeli, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.    (S)  Summary.  Terrorism is a disturbingly ordinary, 
ongoing reality here.  The southern Philippines lies along a 
strategic fault line in the global campaign against 
terrorism, with its porous borders, weak rule of law, 
long-standing and unaddressed grievances of Muslim 
minorities, and high levels of poverty and corruption 
offering a fertile field for nurturing terrorist groups. 
Only Afghanistan in the Nineties had a mix of elements more 
conducive to the spread of radical Islamic movements and the 
safeguarding of terrorists.  Through its own efforts, the GRP 
has had some successes, but has fallen woefully short in many 
areas.  Similarly, a variety of USG programs, ranging from 
military to humanitarian to public diplomacy, are making a 
contribution and will be essential toward further progress in 
winning the GWOT here, but even more resources and more 
energetic attention will be needed.  A key missing link so 
far has been a serious revamp of one of the key players -- 
the Philippine National Police (ref c) -- that needs the same 
kind of institutional rethink and reform that we are now 
achieving with the Philippine Defense Reform.  Action 
requests in para 14.  End Summary. 
 
The Threat is Real Here 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Terrorism is arguably more dangerous in the long-term 
in the Philippines than anywhere in East Asia.  Four groups 
on the US Foreign Terrorist Organization list operate here -- 
the New People's Army, the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Pentagon 
Gang, and Jemaah Islamiyah.  While the NPA is responsible for 
regular attacks on and killings of Philippine security forces 
and civilian officials, it is not now focused on confronting 
the United States.  No US citizens have been harmed by the 
NPA since the early 1990s.  This is not the case with the 
Islamic terrorists groups.  ASG elements, trained by the JI, 
were responsible for Asia's second most deadly terrorist 
attack -- the Superferry bombing in February 2004 -- as well 
as for deadly bombings in three cities (including Manila) in 
February 2005.  There are clear indications of ongoing JI/ASG 
planning for attacks on US citizens, as well as possibly on 
the US Embassy, in addition to further attacks on Filipinos 
and other foreigners.  Even more disturbingly, despite an 
eighteen-month cease-fire and ongoing peace talks with the 
GRP, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (which is not 
now on the FTO list, although Embassy has recommended 
designation of at least certain MILF commanders due to their 
clear, and perhaps growing, links with the JI) remains a 
credible military threat, at least in Mindanao.  Elements of 
the Misuari Breakaway Group of the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF), with which the GRP signed a peace agreement in 
1996, engaged in a new deadly round of fighting on Jolo 
Island in February 2005. 
 
Some Successes, But... 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) We are actively engaged with the GRP to combat 
terrorist threats here, primarily from the ASG and JI.  Our 
vigorous military exercise programs have heightened the 
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to 
conduct some limited offensive operations, while our 
intelligence components, in conjunction with our military, 
provide guidance and relevant intelligence to the AFP in 
planning its attacks on terrorist elements, such as 
repeatedly identifying the location of key wanted terrorists 
(Khaddafy Janjalani, Dulmatin).  Unfortunately, subsequent 
AFP bombing operations were glaringly unsuccessful in leading 
to their capture or deaths. 
 
¶4.  (S) The GRP has also made some arrests, including some 
individuals responsible for the Valentine's Day bombings and 
the Superferry bombing, as well as individuals plotting 
against the US Embassy and some implicated in the Palawan 
kidnapping of three American citizens (and subsequent 
beheading of one) in 2000.  Trials are ongoing, but are 
typically slow. 
 
...Key Institutions Are Broken 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) The bottom line we and the GRP face in confronting 
terrorism is that major institutions of the Philippines 
involved in the GWOT -- notably, the AFP, the Philippine 
National Police (PNP), the prosecutors, and the judiciary -- 
are riddled with corruption, are poorly equipped and 
under-budgeted, have ineffective management systems, and are 
often under weak leadership.  Our training of the military 
and police is helping, as are several USAID programs, but 
without profound institutional fixes, there will be no 
enduring improvements in anti-terrorism capabilities. 
 
What's Working and Still Needed 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) PDR: The most effective long-term GWOT-related 
program in which we are already engaged is the Philippine 
Defense Reform (PDR) initiative, which is undertaking the 
overarching reform programs that will transform the AFP into 
a more modern, professional, transparent, and accountable 
institution.  The Department of National Defense has already 
invested $17.45 million in this program and is committed to 
further investments of $36.6 million in 2005, with expected 
funding to remain at this level in the decade ahead.  USDOD 
has budgeted $11.1 million for PDR in FY05, with a 
significant portion of the requested $20 million in FY06 
funds also dedicated to PDR.  We count on the continued 
funding by the USG to keep pace with the GRP's own ambitious 
aspirations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Military: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), used to 
train or equip the three light reaction companies that form 
the core of the GRP,s Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG), 
six Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) and 12 Naval Special 
Warfare teams (NAVSOF), remains a valuable tool to tip the 
balance in favor of the AFP in Mindanao.  The "Basilan Model" 
developed by JTF-510 has achieved significant success by 
combining humanitarian assistance and civil-military 
operations with efforts to upgrade AFP combat capabilities; 
PACOM is examining replication of this model throughout the 
southern Philippines. 
 
¶8.  (U) Civilian: USAID's programs in Mindanao have begun to 
transform this conflict zone.  The "Livelihood Enhancement 
and Peace" (LEAP) program has already provided livelihood to 
over 25,000 former MNLF combatants and provides a 
"demonstration effect" for MILF combatants if and when the 
GRP and MILF sign a peace accord.  Public diplomacy programs 
have helped carry this message, notably through broadcast and 
distribution of a documentary on LEAP called  "Arms to 
Farms." 
 
What's Not Working as Well as It Should 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) DS' Rewards for Justice program has made an impact 
(we have paid out $1 million to three individuals).  However, 
the process is time-consuming, given its case-by-case nature 
and the Washington decision-making process.  It would be 
helpful if, similar to USDOD's Rewards program, we had a 
pre-approved list of individuals whose capture we could 
reward almost immediately.  It would also be helpful to have 
an in-country operational budget to publicize the program, as 
the USDOD rewards program has. 
 
¶10. (SBU) ICITAP training programs for the PNP have come 
virtually to a halt following the departure of the resident 
program manager in December.  ICITAP has now taken steps -- 
willingness to sign up to ICASS and submission of an NSDD-38 
position request -- but we have not been able to obtain 
confirmation from INL of the current (still from FY2004 
funds) allocation of funds to ICITAP.  INL funding should be 
flexible and timely, and we need more responsiveness from INL 
staff. 
 
What's Not Working at All 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The PISCES program is irremediably broken.  Plagued 
by software glitches from its inception, and incompatible 
with any other USG border management system or technology. 
We should either develop an export version of the existing 
Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement/Customs and Border Protection 
(DHS/ICE/CBP) system, or let the EU border management 
initiative take the lead. 
 
¶12.  (S)  The role of the Saudis -- whether with funding from 
private or public sources or, more egregiously, in direct 
interference from the Saudi Ambassador to get suspected 
terrorists with Saudi passports released from custody and 
permitted to depart -- remains ambiguous.  We see no 
improvement in Saudi efforts to curtail funding to Islamic 
groups in the Philippines.  We need to impress on the Saudi 
government the importance of information-sharing with other 
governments in the region. 
 
¶13.  (C)  The role of the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) in facilitating the GRP/MILF peace process has been a 
distinct disappointment, despite its work on ancestral 
domain.  The Malaysians appear adamant against a role for 
USIP in or on the margins of the negotiations themselves, 
even as an observer. 
 
What's Additionally Needed -- Now 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) Action request:  Embassy seeks support for -- and 
will continue consultation in more depth on -- the following 
new programs: 
--  funding for a comprehensive "Management Assessment of the 
Philippine Police" (ref c); 
--  development of a fusion model involving RMAS, other 
relevant Embassy offices, and concerned USG elements to 
provide embedded USG analysts at a single GRP counterpart 
agency, to be selected from among the current proliferation 
of GRP Task Forces and Centers; 
--  USG assistance to redress inefficiencies in the 
Philippine judicial system that make prosecution of terrorist 
suspects at best a long-term struggle; 
--  technical assistance to develop high-security jail 
facilities for holding terrorists suspects, some of whom 
have, notoriously, escaped Philippine prisons; 
--  an expanded ATA assistance program focused on the 
Philippines' Anti-terrorism Task Force (ATTF) under 
Malacanang Palace (the President's Office). 
Mussomeli