This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MANILA 001506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC 
DEA WASHDC 
FBI WASHDC 
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/PMBS, S/CT FOR KAREN CHANDLER, INR/EAP/SEA, 
INL/C/CP, AND INL/AAE FOR PRAHAR,KAPOYOS,AND MCKAY 
JAKARTA FOR ICITAP/HARDGROVE 
BANGKOK FOR ILEA 
DOJ FOR ICITAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KCRM KCOR KJUS ASEC RP
SUBJECT: LAW ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
REF: A. MANILA 1286 
     ¶B. MANILA 00129 
     ¶C. MANILA 00312 
     ¶D. MANILA 01253 
     ¶E. 04 MANILA 05502 
     ¶F. 04 MANILA 5437 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The nexus of law enforcement corruption 
in the Philippines lies in four key areas: 1) bribery in 
recruitment and extortion in training; 2) ineffectual and 
politically manipulated Internal Affairs; 3) financial 
mismanagement; and, 4) procurement and resource 
mismanagement.  PNP leadership has admitted that the PNP has 
a problem with endemic corruption and taken initial steps 
toward reform.  However, sustaining positive change is 
dependent upon transient command personalities, resisted by 
an entrenched old guard, and vulnerable to the exigencies of 
politics.  Post,s proposed Management Assessment of the 
Philippine Police (MAPP) would provide the basis for a 
strategic overview and a comprehensive reform plan. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CORRUPTION AND MALFEASANCE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) According to Transparency International's "2004 
Global Corruption Barometer," the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) is the most corrupt national institution in the 
Philippines.  Corruption in the PNP and related agencies 
stems primarily from the unholy trinity of gambling, drugs, 
and prostitution that beset law enforcement organizations 
worldwide.  However, PNP corruption is exacerbated by 
Philippine law, which gives local officials control over the 
appointment and dismissal of local PNP commanders, 
encouraging corrupt city mayors to make common cause with 
dishonest police commanders.  Mission observers compare the 
PNP to police forces in Al Capone,s Chicago or 1940,s "L.A. 
Confidential" Los Angeles. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Apart from corruption, many cops undertake 
investigative short cuts that often employ physical abuse, 
the planting of evidence, and sometimes -- allegedly under 
guidance from local elected officials -- the extra-judicial 
killing of criminal suspects.  The PNP suffers from a potent 
combination of malfeasance (misconduct or wrongdoing) and 
misfeasance (improper and unlawful execution of an act that 
in itself is lawful and proper) within an institutional 
culture of poor management.  The results permit not only 
corruption but also a level of incompetence that is often 
indistinguishable from corruption.  Mission law enforcement 
officials often find individual PNP members courageous, but 
-- especially at junior levels -- tempted by the 
opportunities (and, given the poverty-level wages, the 
virtual necessity) to "learn how to earn" from corrupt 
officers in the field. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The PNP leadership has admitted the PNP has a 
problem with endemic corruption, and has publicly expressed a 
willingness to improve the PNP as an institution.  After his 
appointment as PNP Chief in September 2004, then-Director 
General Edgar Aglipay made several moves to counter growing 
criticism of PNP incompetence under the tenure of Hermogenes 
Ebdane (formerly National Security Adviser and now Secretary 
of Public Works and Highways).  Aglipay used his six-month 
term in office to acknowledge publicly the PNP,s culture of 
misfeasance, incompetence, and corruption, and to create 
disciplinary barracks at the former U.S. Naval base at Subic 
Bay and in Camp Molintas in Benguet province.  Since October 
2004, 198 police officials identified by their commanders as 
lazy, undisciplined, and abusive have had to undergo one of 
five re-training courses or a "Values and Leadership 
Enhancement Course." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In addition, Aglipay inaugurated campaigns against 
the solicitation of petty bribes for minor traffic offenses, 
and succeeded in getting officers back in proper uniform, 
properly groomed, and visible on their beats.  Even the 
appearance of PNP headquarters at Camp Crame noticeably 
improved, with interior courtyards cleared of refuse, drained 
of still water, and landscaped.  Under "Project Item," the 
PNP optimized deployment of personnel to perform the three 
basic police functions of patrolling, traffic management, and 
investigation.  National Capitol Region command staff again 
prowl the streets at night, conducting snap inspections of 
police posts and checkpoints.  There is an increasingly 
visible police presence on many major thoroughfares during 
rush hour and at night, an important component of the "broken 
windows" school of community policing.  Encouragingly, 
incoming Director Auturo Lomibao appears ready to continue 
with many of Aglipay,s initiatives (ref A). 
 
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING - YOU GOTTA PAY TO PLAY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In a PNP Anti-Corruption Plan submitted by outgoing 
chief Director General Aglipay to President Arroyo, the PNP 
made public what has been common knowledge for years -- 
bribery of police trainers and extortion of recruits are 
common practices.  As one Internal Affairs Service Police 
Superintendent (Colonel equivalent) at a PNP training 
institution quipped to poloff, "when you start with garbage, 
you get garbage."  The Filipino press has reported complaints 
of extortion of recruits in the Visayas and the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) by officials of the National 
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the official body charged with 
supervision and recruitment of police officers.  Police 
trainees and local government officials have complained that 
NAPOLCOM officials also sometimes receive amounts ranging 
from 50,000 to 100,000 pesos ($900-$1,800) for swearing in 
police recruits who fail the entrance tests but are willing 
to pay bribes. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Under Philippine law, the Department of Interior 
and Local Government (DILG) controls the institutions -- the 
Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) and the Philippine 
National Police Academy (PNPA) -- that provide entry-level 
and senior-executive training for the PNP.  Both civilians 
and PNP instructors staff the institutions.  Officially, the 
PPSC provides equipment and training allowances to its 
students, with the GRP budgeting 1,370 pesos (approximately 
$25) per student per day for a 90-day training course for 
enlisted police recruits.  However, according to Embassy 
contacts, students only spend 60 of those 90 days in 
training, with a third of the training days at the discretion 
of the local training centers, providing an excellent 
opportunity for skimming.  While the PNPA in principle 
provides equipment and uniforms to officer recruits, much of 
the equipment needed for training is reportedly either 
non-existent or of poor quality (handguns in particular). 
Recruits from both institutions often must take out loans or 
buy what they need on installment plans from individuals and 
businesses connected to PPSC or PNPA staff.  Many newly 
minted officers graduate from the PPSC and PNPA heavily in 
debt and unprepared to face the dangers of their new 
assignments.  PNPA cadets are also sometimes expected to 
perform personal errands for their instructors during class 
time in exchange for passing grades, according to contacts. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) According to PNP sources, PPSC misconduct continues 
with the siphoning off of funds for the six-month Public 
Safety Officer Senior Executive Course (PSOSEC), a 
requirement for all PNP officials at the Superintendent rank 
who want to be eligible for promotion to Chief Superintendent 
(Brigadier General equivalent).  Internal PSOSEC documents 
cited an unspecified Training Sustenance Allowance "subject 
to availability of funds," which often do not exist in 
practice despite budget allocations.  PSOSEC also contains a 
foreign travel requirement supposedly funded by the PPSC, 
where students travel to countries such as the United States 
and Australia to observe counterpart institutions.  However, 
according to PNP contacts, PPSC instructors often tell 
students that there are "no funds available" for the trip and 
the students must pay not only their own way, but also that 
of their instructors.  Because the students fear they may not 
qualify for coveted US and Australian visas as ordinary 
tourists and want the promotions upon graduation, they 
allegedly readily agree to the payola and go along with the 
fiction that the trip is official GRP-funded travel. 
 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE - THE PNP,S PAPER TIGER 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) PNP contacts have confirmed that the PNP has yet to 
make much headway into cases of malfeasance, even when its 
intelligence and surveillance operations collect proof of 
cops planting evidence or extorting bribes from criminal 
suspects.  According to experienced observers both within and 
outside the PNP, the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) has a 
relationship that is too close and collegial to the force it 
is supposed to investigate.  PNP sources allege the highest 
levels of the PNP Command Staff and elected officials often 
pressure IAS to drop or whitewash investigations, and then 
use dirty cops for their own political ends. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) IAS is fractured -- each of the 13 regions and 5 
districts in Metro Manila has its own IAS, leading to 
fraternization with the commands each investigates and 
inspects.  The IAS budget comes from the office of the PNP 
Chief.  Past PNP Chiefs (including Aglipay) have shown 
themselves reluctant to expend scarce resources to air dirty 
laundry on their watch and harm their chances of a lucrative 
Cabinet slot after their brief tenure (former PNP Chiefs in 
Cabinet-level slots include not only Public Works Secretary 
Ebdane but also Transportation Secretary Leandro Mendoza). 
Given these parameters, much of the IAS budget appears to be 
diverted to other needs.  Often, internal affairs 
investigations are used to score public points against 
members of rival PNP factions.  Even these operations usually 
fail to deliver swift, sure, and public justice that would 
deter corrupt cops.  Administrative dismissals of corrupt 
police officials are possible, but are of mostly low-ranking 
non-commissioned officers (in 2004 the PNP dismissed 269 NCOs 
and 9 officers).  To fire higher-ranking officers for 
corruption or incompetence requires consistent pressure from 
the highest levels of the PNP command staff over a period of 
months if not years, which many consider an unattainable goal 
in a force that has had 12 chiefs in 14 years. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In one high profile case, onetime National Bureau 
of Investigation (NBI) "Confidential Agent" Martin Soriano 
was dismissed by the NBI in 1999 for a series of illegal 
activities.  Soriano, allegedly operating under the 
protection of and in cooperation with corrupt PNP officers, 
then struck out on his own as a private detective, 
specializing in confidence swindles of women that involved 
kidnapping, false arrest, and extortion. The PNP's Police 
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) unit finally 
arrested Soriano on January 31, 2005 after he received 
200,000 pesos ($3,600) and a late model Mitsubishi van in 
exchange for the release of his latest victim, whom he had 
"arrested" on drug charges and held in a hotel for days. 
According to PNP comments to the press, Soriano's extortion 
efforts involved the cooperation of eighteen PNP members -- 
including a station commander -- from the Western Police 
District (the command partially responsible for securing US 
Mission facilities).  All eighteen, however, defied orders 
from the Chief of the National Capitol Region Command (the 
equivalent of a two-star general in command of all of Metro 
Manila's police forces) and then-Chief Aglipay to appear for 
questioning for over a week, although the PNP subsequently 
placed them all on "floating" status -- no work with full pay 
-- pending further disciplinary action.  According to PNP 
contacts, many of the eighteen are now seeking the 
protection/intercession of prominent politicians and hoping 
to wait out the glacial pace of the criminal courts and the 
PNP's disciplinary procedures. 
 
FINANCIAL GAMES 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In a January 2005 meeting on GRP anti-corruption 
initiatives attended by the Ambassador and representatives of 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation, then-Chief Aglipay 
reported that 91.7 % of the PNP's 34.8 billion pesos budget 
($633,036,363) is earmarked for "Personal Services" (salaries 
and other direct payments).  A lack of efficient internal 
controls traditionally allowed unscrupulous officers to pad 
salary rolls with "ghost" (or "15-30") employees who do not 
work, but only appear on the 15th and 30th of each month to 
collect their salaries.  The former Chief of the Records 
Management Division told poloff that it took the majority of 
his two-year tenure to computerize the records of all 117,000 
PNP members, including purging the rolls of "ghost cops." 
NAPOLCOM is presently investigating three members of the 
Masbate Police Provincial Office (PPO) in Region 5 working in 
the finance and human resources section for their reported 
failure to stop the issuance of paychecks in the name of a 
fellow PNP NCO currently serving a six to ten-year sentence 
for attempted murder.  Other corrupt activities include 
officials swindling subordinates' salaries and/or allowances 
by forging their signatures on the payroll list, submitting 
documents to the unit's finance officials, and keeping the 
money.  Red tape and corruption also plague the PNP's 
processing of retirement claims.  Delays in the payment of 
retirement benefits have created opportunities for "fixers" 
to expedite claims, sparking a protest of dozens of retired 
police officers in front of the PNP's Camp Crame headquarters 
on March 7. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Before his retirement, Aglipay announced a series 
of financial reforms including a tenure limit for PNP 
comptrollers, as well as finance, budget, fiscal, and 
disbursing officers, to terms of no longer than five years, 
published monthly reports on the utilization of funds, use of 
automated teller machines (ATMs) from the Land Bank of the 
Philippines to pay employees instead of paper checks, removal 
of management sections from the Comptrollership, and an 
internal audit service.  Aglipay recommended as well the full 
computerization of the personnel and financial information 
database system by July 31.  However, Embassy contacts have 
noted that the PNP faces severe fiscal and personnel 
challenges in implementing these financial and personnel 
reforms even if the new PNP leadership is serious about 
continuing this effort. 
 
PROCUREMENT AND FINANCIAL MESS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The PNP's Camp Crame Headquarters sits across 
Espiritu De Los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from the Department of 
National Defense and Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP).  As the AFP and PNP were only separated 14 
years ago, most officers above the rank of Captain or Police 
Chief Inspector share the common alma mater of the Philippine 
Military Academy and face similar difficulties to DND and AFP 
in procurement, logistics, and financial administration 
related to corruption and incompetence.  PNP officers from 
the Directorate for Plans sit in on briefings on Philippine 
Defense Reform (PDR) by the AFPs J-5 (plans) counterparts. 
Some have admitted to poloff that they now more fully realize 
the need for a PDR-like process to improve the PNP's 
procurement systems to allow for more accountability and 
transparency.  At present, the PNP's attempts at reforms in 
this area lack the PDR's comprehensive and strategic focus, 
officers have noted. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  PNP officials have cited the example of a 
controversial procurement decision in 2003 to replace 
existing stocks of 9mm handguns with caliber .45 1911-A1 
pistols.  In a 20-million peso ($377,358) contract, the PNP 
amended its 1995 specifications for caliber .45 handguns. 
This change caused gun dealers to complain that the changes 
were made to allow only the purchase of model 1911-A1 pistols 
made by Arms Corporation of the Philippines (Armscor).  Gun 
dealers grumbled that the PNP sought to "change the rules to 
favor the company owned by (First Gentleman) Mike Arroyo's 
first cousin" (Demetrio "Bolo" Tuason).  One disgruntled gun 
dealer commented that "if this isn't tailoring specs to favor 
Armscor, then I don't know what is."  Gun dealers also 
complained that, in tests conducted by the PNP in October and 
November 2003, the Armscor pistols' safety broke during the 
drop test and jammed at 3,000 rounds, when the PNP's minimum 
for an endurance test is 5,000 rounds.  During training 
conducted in 2005 in the Philippines by Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force-West personnel, trainers commented that the 
Armscor .45s were unreliable, inaccurate, and potentially 
dangerous to the operator.  Nevertheless, Armscor remains an 
approved supplier to the PNP. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Almost 3 million pesos (about USD 52 million) -- 
or 8.29% of the PNP's total budget-- is dedicated to 
maintenance and operations, but Embassy contacts have 
reported that corrupt officers have many tricks to divert at 
least some of these funds.  Popular practices include 
skimming the operational funds as they come down the chain of 
command, "conversion" (when officers spend money specifically 
allocated for one item on another), and "throwback" (when 
corrupt officers allocate funds for an imaginary project and 
pocket the money).  PNP contacts have commented that the PNP 
has zero funds dedicated for capital outlays, leading to some 
"necessary" conversion in the form of misfeasance or "honest 
graft," in order to provide construction support for needed 
offices or services dedicated to officer welfare such as 
sports, recreation, or health facilities.  Additionally, PNP 
officers sometimes find themselves under a command order to 
go on motorcycle patrol but without available gasoline funds, 
leading them reportedly to solicit -- or coerce -- needed 
funds from local businesses or individuals. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The PNP management is a mess.  Few PNP officials 
would even try to deny this reality, which severely affects 
the credibility of the GRP and public perceptions of 
governance.  Cops are among the most noticeable of public 
servants, and daily exposure to corrupt, inefficient, or 
badly managed police officials is a cancer upon the body 
politic.  Systemic flaws need institutional reforms that 
training programs, such as the USG has conducted through 
USDOJ's ICITAP as well as other assistance from international 
donors including the Australians and the British, do not 
provide.  Embassy's inter-agency Law Enforcement Working 
Group strongly urges INL funding for our proposed Management 
Assessment of the Philippine Police (MAPP) (ref E), which 
envisions a joint US-Philippine analysis of the PNP's 
institutional flaws in order to provide recommendations for 
restructuring, modernization, and professionalism, similar to 
what the Armed Forces of the Philippines hope to achieve from 
the PDR bilateral initiative.  The PNP and senior GRP 
leadership has never been more willing to buy into such an 
in-depth study.  Embassy believes that the GRP would, as with 
the PDR, agree to absorb the bulk of the costs for 
undertaking suggested reforms, given the growing realization 
that failure to pursue such a course will further enfeeble 
the PNP, hamper the improvement of rule of law, lead to 
greater crime and corruption, lessen the peace and order 
needed for faster economic growth, and undermine public 
safety and internal security in the face of existing 
terrorist activities and insurgencies.  In the absence of 
such systemic PNP reform, popular impatience for better 
police performance and management -- exacerbated by the 
belief that nearly everyone in the PNP is corrupt -- may also 
encourage more public support for elected officials, such as 
the mayors of Davao and Cebu, who have openly supported the 
use of extra-judicial killings, coordinated in concert with 
local police forces under their control, as a means of 
controlling crime (refs B, C, D).  Such an outcome would be 
disastrous to the human rights climate in this treaty ally 
and democratic partner, and would also undermine or harm 
progress on major USG goals here to combat terrorism, 
narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and other 
transnational problems. 
Mussomeli