This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/PGI, AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL FI
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY HELSINKI RESPONSE 
 
REF: STATE 60796 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Earle I. Mack, for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (S) Embassy Helsinki has found that our primary challenge 
in dealing with the GoF on counterterrorism issues has been 
to overcome the ingrained Finnish belief that "it can't 
happen here."  This mind-set, on the part of senior officials 
and public opinion alike, has slowed Finnish progress in 
meeting some international counterterrorism standards, and in 
some cases has kept GoF agencies from devoting resources to 
counterterrorism that are commensurate with the worldwide 
threat.  Thus, while Finnish leaders are quick to acknowledge 
the need for a global response to terrorism, behind this lies 
an unspoken assumption that Finland has given terrorists no 
reason to strike here.  (An example might be an April 2004 
speech by PM Matti Vanhanen to loyalists from his 
predominantly-rural Center Party.  Vanhanen sought to 
persuade his fellow Finns that their country is not isolated 
from scourges like terrorism.  He referred to the Madrid 
train bombings -- but instead of arguing that the bombers 
could have struck as easily in Helsinki, he argued that 
vacationing Finns could easily have been aboard the Madrid 
trains.) 
 
¶2. (S) Working in partnership with Finland in the Global War 
on Terrorism has been a high-priority performance goal in 
Embassy Helsinki's Mission Performance Plan for several years 
running.  Our overall objective has been to encourage Finland 
to fight terrorism at home and abroad, while countering the 
misperception that this threat applies only to other nations. 
 Among our supporting tactics: 
 
-- Here in Helsinki, the Embassy has lobbied the Finns to 
strengthen the effectiveness of domestic counterterrorism 
legislation, and maintained regular interchanges with 
officials responsible for implementing the various phases of 
that legislation.  Together with visiting U.S. officials, we 
have sought to help Finnish authorities to comply with 
international standards on aviation and maritime security, 
and to understand the importance of aggressive action to 
control terrorist finance.  Separately, we have also 
instituted an active outreach to Finland's small and moderate 
Muslim community. 
 
-- We have worked to support and facilitate Finland's ongoing 
participation in stabilization and reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, and have encouraged GoF law enforcement outreach 
to the Baltic nations, Russia, and Central and South Asia. 
 
-- We have sought to raise the profile of the terrorism issue 
through speaker programs and International Visitor programs 
aimed at dispelling the idea that terrorism does not threaten 
Finnish soil. 
 
¶3. (S) In carrying out these tactics, we have consulted 
closely with the UK embassy, which has similar objectives. 
The Ambassador meets with the British Ambassador on a monthly 
basis to compare notes, and there are regular contacts at the 
working level as well. 
 
¶4. (S) Looking to the future, we believe that the most 
effective approach will be, as it is today, to concentrate on 
three areas simultaneously: working-level U.S.-Finnish 
cooperation on concrete measures to strengthen Finland's 
response to terrorism; advocacy at the policy level to change 
the mind-set that can shortchange counterterrorism budgets; 
and public diplomacy efforts to overcome popular 
misconceptions about the nature of the threat to Finland. 
 
¶5. (S) The extent to which we are able to do this depends in 
part on the resources available to us.  One specifically 
resource-linked recommendation has been the Embassy's 
request, in the last two Mission Performance Plans, for a new 
Political/Economic officer position to cover counterterrorism 
and regional security issues.  Other recommendations: 
 
-- We have found -- and GoF interlocutors who deal with 
terrorism issues strongly agree -- that travel by Finnish 
officials to the United States to learn from U.S. experience 
and expertise in counterterrorism issues is highly valuable 
for the GoF.  An expansion of International Visitor and 
Voluntary Visitor programs -- perhaps regional (Nordic/Baltic 
or pan-European in focus) -- would expand our ability to 
influence Finnish policymakers and help the working level 
acquire the tools needed to confront the drastically-changed 
post 9/11 world. 
 
-- Conversely, visits to Finland by U.S. officials and 
academic experts are of enormous value.  We are grateful to 
the Department for facilitating visits by the Transportation 
Security Agency (which conducts regular reviews of airport 
security), the Coast Guard (which has coordinated with the 
Finns in improving port security) and individual experts like 
Dr. Paul Jabber (whose December lecture on the sources of 
Muslim fundamentalism was judged by MFA's counterterrorism 
section as particularly useful to GoF officials with little 
or no background on the strategic context for terrorism).  We 
(and the GoF) would welcome more such opportunities.  In 
particular, visits by senior officials from the Department of 
Homeland Security would enable us to program conversations 
that would help sensitize Finnish policymakers, as well as 
press outreach and contacts with opinion-makers to address 
the public awareness problem. 
 
¶6. (S) In our Country Team discussions three subjects have 
emerged as being of particular concern: 
 
-- First, while the Finns have made progress in addressing 
conventional channels of terrorist finance, they exercise 
little or no oversight over hawalas.  As small as Finland's 
Muslim population is, it is large enough to include these 
informal mechanisms for money transfer.  The Finnish 
authorities could learn from U.S. best practices in dealing 
with this potential avenue of terrorist financing. 
 
-- Second, although the Finns appear to meet IMO maritime 
security requirements, they do little or no screening of 
ferry passengers.  Given the large number of ferry vessels 
plying the waters from Finland to Sweden, Estonia, Russia, 
Latvia, and Germany, this gap needs to be closed, and the USG 
may be able to help.  Moreover, although cargo is subject to 
check, in practice very little inspection is done.  (On the 
other hand, Finland has upgraded its screening of air 
passengers and meets all applicable international standards 
in this area.) 
 
-- Third, containers transit Russia on a "land bridge" from 
the Far East to the Baltic.  These enter Finland and are 
trans-shipped, thus are treated by the U.S. as of Finnish 
origin while, in fact, they are from Russia or other points. 
We recommend coordination with Finnish authorities to ensure 
that they screen more adequately the contents of containers 
leaving Finnish ports. 
 
¶7. (S) One strategic consideration: While the Finns value 
highly their bilateral cooperation with the United States, 
they have an instinctive preference for multilateral 
approaches and multilateral fora when possible.  Thus, for 
example, it may be most useful to address the issue of 
hawalas in an EU regional context.  And in more general 
terms, Finland as an active member of NATO's Partnership for 
Peace might be receptive to expanded counterterrorist 
cooperation in the PfP context.  Finally, we suggest that 
e-PINE (which the Finns see as linked to the EU's Northern 
Dimension initiative, pioneer