This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN PHUM ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF POLITBURO MEMBER DISMISSIVE OF PARTY,S 
POTENTIAL TO LEAD REFORM 
 
REF: HARARE 128 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: In a candid exchange with the Ambassador on 
April 6, politburo member and former Finance Minister Simba 
Makoni asked about U.S. reaction to the elections.  The 
Ambassador explained USG objections, sharing with Makoni a 
copy of the Embassy press release.  Makoni said the U.S. 
analysis of election irregularities was the most detailed he 
had seen.  Still, he predicted it would have little effect, 
since ZANU-PF had known the U.S. would never endorse a 
ZANU-PF victory.  Noting the degree of self-delusion that 
exists within the party, Makoni predicted that a more 
confident ZANU-PF would emerge from the elections.  However, 
it was not likely to alter its political or economic policies 
significantly.  In that regard, Makoni asserted that Mugabe 
was not impervious to reason but that most of the government 
and senior ranks of the party, and especially the &young 
Turks,8 lacked the political courage needed to argue with 
Mugabe in favor of needed reforms.  Makoni confirmed that 
some in the leadership were interested in rapprochement with 
the West but not on terms other than their own.  Makoni 
closed with a pitch for USG support of his candidacy for the 
ADB presidency.  END SUMMARY 
 
------------ 
The Election 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Makoni asked the Ambassador how the USG regarded 
Zimbabwe's parliamentary elections.  Recounting a litany of 
flaws in the election's conduct and the Zimbabwe Election 
Commission's (ZEC) failure to address discrepancies, the 
Ambassador characterized the election results as not 
credible.  The Ambassador shared the Embassy's publicly 
released assessment on the elections.  Makoni said it was the 
most detailed critique he had seen and raised issues about 
which he and others in the leadership were unaware.  However, 
he said most in the party would discount the U.S. statement, 
since they believed the U.S. had made up its mind in advance 
to reject a ZANU-PF victory. 
 
¶3.  (C) In defense of the elections, Makoni offered a 
detailed description about how the presence of party polling 
agents throughout the process, including at tabulation 
centers, was to have prevented rigging and observed that the 
MDC leadership's claims of "massive fraud" had yet to be 
backed up by any details.  He added that their claims were 
also undermined by the MDC,s (alleged) initial embrace of 
the results when early returns from Harare and Bulawayo 
showed them sweeping the two urban centers.  That said, 
Makoni acknowledged that ZEC should have an institutional 
interest in clearing up doubts about the election by 
releasing the numbers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
A Dysfunctional Ruling Party That Can,t/Won,t Lead Reform 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) While Makoni defended the election results, he did 
concede that popular support for the ruling party was 
shallow.  He cited a study he had done for the party in the 
mid-90s that showed ZANU-PF getting a larger share of the 
vote but in a declining electorate.  That situation had only 
worsened and ZANU-PF was now a "mass-based" party that 
depended on a committed minority to hold on to power.  Every 
day was now &campaign day8 for ZANU-PF as the party had to 
work to maintain support in the face of continuing economic 
difficulties.  The problem was that many in ZANU-PF were 
convinced by their own rhetoric and believed they had the 
people with them and therefore no need to change.  This was 
not true, especially with regard to economic policies, where 
the populace at large was clamoring for change. 
 
¶5.  (C) Makoni said there was an expectation in some quarters 
that the ruling party, more confident of its standing in the 
wake of its electoral showing, might move forward with more 
constructive economic and political policy agendas.  However, 
he thought political expediency would undermine any push for 
reform.  On the economy for instance, his area of expertise, 
the leadership would probably assess that the right economic 
policies would involve unacceptable political costs.  Even 
with a decisive election victory, the party would be loath to 
embrace painful economic medicine.  He added that in any 
event, economic liberalization had not been a ZANU-PF 
priority since at least 2000. 
 
¶6.  (C) Makoni said further constraining ZANU-PF,s ability 
to lead reform was the deference to Mugabe by all in 
positions of potential influence.  It was true that Mugabe,s 
worldview remained suspicious of markets and the West.  That 
said, in Makoni,s experience, Mugabe was not impervious to 
persuasion and could chart a more constructive course if 
enough trusted advisers weighed in.  Unfortunately, no one in 
Mugabe,s inner circle was willing to risk his displeasure 
and tell him the hard truths.  The Ambassador noted not 
without reason, for instance, Mugabe's suppression of 
internal debate on the margins of the December Party Congress 
and Makoni's own dismissal as Finance Minister when he 
advocated reforms.  Makoni conceded the point. 
 
¶7.  (C) Makoni said that impetus for change, if any, within 
the party was most likely to come from some in the ascendant 
"Old Guard."  The "Young Turks" and "technocrats" lacked the 
courage of their convictions and had proven incapable of 
asserting themselves effectively.  He recounted his own 
experience in falling from grace as Finance Minister several 
years ago.  Many in the politburo agreed with his 
market-oriented prescriptions but left him isolated during 
politburo meetings.  He concluded that these individuals bore 
greater responsibility for Zimbabwe's economic disaster than 
even Mugabe himself because they knew better but were too 
timid to act. 
 
------------------- 
Bilateral Relations 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked if the country's desperate need 
for re-engagement with international financial institutions 
and the West would be a powerful enough incentive to take 
concrete measures that are a precondition to any conceivable 
rapprochement with the United States and other like-minded 
governments.  Makoni conceded that, notwithstanding the GOZ's 
"look East" rhetoric, there was nowhere for Zimbabwe to turn 
but to the West for economic recovery.  However, by any 
measure the economy had collapsed years ago and with the rise 
of informal markets, was not as bad off (as compared to 
2002-03) as it might appear.  The GOZ was more likely to 
remain in its familiar anti-imperialist posture and just 
"muddle through" before it would pursue concrete political or 
economic reforms in any "charm offensive."  That said, he 
urged the Ambassador to wait for the dust to settle on the 
election and then discuss bilateral relations with selected 
GOZ and ruling party officials.  Makoni suggested reaching 
out to Party Chairman John Nkomo, Secretary for 
Administration Didymus Mutasa, and Defense Minister Sydney 
Sekeramayi.  Vice-President Joyce Mujuru would be constrained 
for now by the newness of her position but was "open-minded" 
and might be a constructive interlocutor down the road. 
 
¶9.  (C) Makoni emphasized that the government was not the 
"beginning and end" of Zimbabwe, and also urged strong USG 
engagement with other potentially influential figures.  Civil 
society and the churches remained important.  Mugabe was 
religious despite his Marxist leanings, and listened to 
clerics such as Zimbabwe's senior Jesuit, Father Fidelis, and 
Anglican Bishop Kunonga.  Mugabe also respected and liked to 
engage with self-made businesspersons such as John Chiweshe 
(Chairman of the Tobacco Merchants Association) and safari 
mogul Mike Chidziwa.  As for himself, Makoni said he remained 
on good terms with Mugabe and could see him whenever he 
asked.  They continued to have frank exchanges and Makoni 
asserted the Mugabe continued to enjoy intellectual debate. 
He dispelled popular notions that Mugabe had dismissed him 
for his economic proposals; rather, Makoni had resigned when 
he realized that his proposals would never be adopted. 
 
------------------------ 
Pitch for ADB Presidency 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Makoni closed with a request for American support of 
his candidacy for the presidency of the African Development 
Bank (ADB) and laid out his (admittedly strong) personal 
qualifications for the job.  The Ambassador undertook to 
relay the request to Washington but noted that Makoni's 
nationality might pose complications given the state of 
bilateral relations.  Makoni emphasized that ADB candidates 
competed as individuals on the strength of their own merits 
and not as government representatives.  In his case, SADC 
members had collaborated to get behind one candidate from 
their region; he earned their endorsement in a competitive 
process, which spoke to the strength of his credentials and 
the breadth of his appeal.  He recognized that at least one 
candidate was using his "wrong address" against him, shopping 
the idea that Makoni was subject to travel sanctions even 
though he is not on U.S. or EU sanctions lists.  He urged 
that the USG weigh these factors and give his candidacy full 
consideration. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) In a Mass Public Opinion Institute poll a year ago, 
Makoni was the only putative successor to Mugabe aside from 
MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai who garnered significant 
support from all provinces.  That Makoni, one of Zimbabwe's 
most impressive senior technocrats, has essentially given up 
on Zimbabwe's politics to seek the ADB job, speaks volumes 
about the lack of oxygen inside the ruling party leadership. 
We agree with his assessment that post-election ZANU-PF will 
be no more dynamic or capable of constructive policy shifts 
than pre-election ZANU-PF was.  Indeed, his views tend to 
confirm our own analysis that ZANU-PF will be incapable of 
reforming itself, much less Zimbabwe, as long as it is an 
institution made in the image of Robert Mugabe and bent 
solely to his personal political ends.  As noted in reftel, 
we think that endorsement of his ADB candidacy could send the 
wrong signal to the GOZ, notwithstanding Mr. Makoni's 
individual merits.  Moreover, despite his wishes, we think 
Makoni can do more good if he stays in Zimbabwe rather than 
in effect joining the millions of other bright Zimbabweans 
who have fled their country. 
Dell