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Viewing cable 05GENEVA1037, UNHCR STILL GRAPPLING WITH FUNDING AND POLICY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05GENEVA1037 2005-04-22 08:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL US Mission Geneva
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 001037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO ADDRESSEES FOR REFUGEE OFFICERS/COORDINATORS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015 
TAGS: PREF CD SU PHUM UNHCR
SUBJECT: UNHCR STILL GRAPPLING WITH FUNDING AND POLICY 
ISSUES IN SUDAN AND CHAD 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Lynn Cassel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting with U.S. Mission DCM and 
refugee officer, Director of UNHCR's Sudan unit Jean Marie 
Fakhouri highlighted funding and policy issues impacting its 
operations in Chad and Sudan. In Chad, he acknowledged that 
malnutrition had increased at some camps when rations had 
been reduced due to shortages from November to February, and 
stated that the Chad program will remain extremely expensive 
as sparse desert resources are depleted and the climate takes 
its toll on housing.  In Darfur, he said that UNHCR is 
rapidly approaching the point where it will not be able to 
function because of financial constraints, and that the risk 
of humanitarian workers being targeted for violence has 
increased since passage of the Security Council resolution. 
In southern Sudan, he cautioned that donor-pooled funding 
turned over to the Humanitarian Coordinator was unsound 
management, and expressed concern that the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) or Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
could trigger large scale returns before the region was 
capable of absorbing them.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) On funding:  Fakhouri said that at USD 46.7 million in 
earmarked contributions for 2005, UNHCR is in relatively good 
shape in Chad; however, it is facing critical funding 
shortfalls for its operations in Darfur and southern Sudan. 
Thus far, the Darfur appeal has only garnered USD 1.9 million 
from the UK and a promise of USD 450 thousand from Germany; 
UNHCR will have to shut down its Darfur activities if it does 
not receive additional funds.  In the south, he reported that 
Acting High Commissioner (A/HC) Chamberlin has told 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) da Silva that if UNHCR does not 
get a fair share of donor funds made available to him, UNHCR 
will only be able to do transportation and return packages; 
other agencies will need to be held responsible for quick 
impact projects and community development programs which 
UNHCR typically incorporates into a repatriation effort. 
 
3. (SBU) Funding, continued: Fakhouri sees the British (Benn) 
proposal for donors to pool funding which the Humanitarian 
Coordinator then distributes to UN agencies as fatally 
flawed, and is urging donors to proceed cautiously. UNHCR has 
received only 2.3 percent of funds turned over to the HC thus 
far, and received no funding when the HC distributed a 
Swedish contribution of USD 14.8 million for southern Sudan. 
(He contacted Sweden, which subsequently provided a direct 
donation to UNHCR of USD 1.5 million.)  Fakhouri also notes 
that Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
Jan Pronk has instructed all UN agencies to refrain from 
issuing appeals independently, thus tying UNHCR to a system 
which, thus far, has not responded to its needs. Fakhouri 
believes that Japan will support UNHCR activities in southern 
Sudan and is hopeful that the Czech republic, Spain and 
Nordic countries will also respond to the 2005 appeals. 
Mission officers noted that PRM was considering a 
contribution for southern Sudan, and could make another 
contribution to UNHCR protection activities in Darfur, 
depending on availability of funds and UNHCR's pending report 
on how it used the USD 1.35 million contribution in 2004. 
Fakhouri commented that, while other donor contributions are 
important, "without PRM, we won't make it." 
 
4. (SBU) On the Chad budget for 2006: Despite a previous 
Lubbers decision to continue the Chad program as a 
Supplemental Budget (SB) request in 2006, the Acting High 
Commissioner has accepted donor arguments that the Chad 
program should be included in the Annual Budget (AB) in 2006. 
In addition, UNHCR intends to adhere to its self-imposed 
budget ceiling (USD 770 million) in 2006.  Fakhouri 
anticipates a need in Chad of some USD 80 million for 2006, 
even under a best-case scenario.  Mission officers suggested 
that the logical step would be to increase the 2006 ceiling 
by USD 80 million, i.e. from USD 770 million to USD 850 
million.  Fakhouri noted that this would be consistent with 
the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Affairs' 
(PRM) long standing call for UNHCR to prepare needs-based 
budgets, but believes that UNHCR's corporate culture will 
insist on submitting a budget they believe they can balance. 
In order to stay within the ceiling, UNHCR will have to make 
substantial cuts in other country budgets to free up money 
for Chad, and also reduce the Chad budget.  In the past, the 
High Commissioner had reduced SB's by 60 percent when 
incorporating them into the AB.  "If we do that in Chad, 
people will die" Fakhouri concluded. 
 
5. (C) On Darfur:  Fakhouri believes that USG representatives 
in Sudan generally "look favorably" on UNHCR efforts there, 
and reports that they told visiting A/HC that they would like 
to see UNHCR become more active in Darfur.  Mission noted 
that PRM had supported UNHCR protection activities for IDPs 
in Darfur in 2004, but that the 2005 reports and budgets 
suggested that it was increasingly involved in assistance 
activities which fall closer to the mandate of other agencies 
and funding sources. Fakhouri made the point that protection 
and assistance cannot be effectively separated, and argued 
that while other agencies were pouring resources into 
Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps, few (other than 
ICRC) were working in the villages and communities where 
UNHCR is assisting people who had stayed behind or returned. 
 
6. (C) On Politics:  Chad is an extremely fragile state and 
would collapse under the weight of a renewed refugee influx, 
Fakhouri said.  The Government of Sudan, however, believes it 
is on solid ground because the international community has 
fired both barrels (sanctions and the ICC) without effect and 
"ten days later they walked away from Oslo with USD 4.5 
billion."  The GOS has also gained popular support in 
Khartoum and Darfur by stating that it will not extradite 
Sudanese for trial by the court. 
 
7. (C) On security of humanitarian workers: Fakhouri, who is 
posted in Khartoum and understands some Arabic, has commented 
previously on the inflammatory rhetoric which has come from 
mosques and media over the issue of western interference in 
Sudanese affairs.  He noted that, after the Security Council 
resolution passed, anti-UN sentiment in Darfur and Khartoum 
increased, and that those people "whose names are in the 
(ICC) envelope" now see little to lose in pursuing their own 
agendas.  Fakhouri stated that evidence in the shooting of a 
DART team member last month indicates that it was a targeted 
ambush "intended to kill."  However, he noted that while 
hostility to the UN and its implementing partners as well as 
the UK and France has grown, the U.S. had been largely exempt 
from the latest round of inflammatory language, presumably 
because of our position on referring cases to the ICC. 
 
8. (SBU) On conditions in Chad: He is "saddened but not 
surprised" by the malnutrition issue in northern Chadian 
refugee camps, which Deputy High Commissioner Morjane had 
raised with him after Mission officers delivered a demarche 
on the issue.  He acknowledged that multiple shortcomings had 
occurred and efforts were underway to resolve them. UNHCR 
Chad Desk Officer provided Mission officers with a draft 
field report which resulted from the demarche (FAXed to PRM). 
 The cause of increased malnutrition at some camps is most 
likely program flaws, including ration shortages from 
November to February. The report states, however, that full 
rations have been re-established and other measures, 
including improved monitoring and NGO management, have been 
successfully implemented.  Fakhouri predicted that expenses 
to maintain refugees in Chad in 2006 will remain high and 
possibly increase as water sources and firewood are depleted 
and the desert climate destroys tents and plastic sheeting. 
Replacement of tents, a constant quest for water, and 
distribution of cooking fuel will soon become necessary and 
will remain a factor as long as there are refugees in Chad. 
 
9. (C) On southern Sudan: UNHCR mobilized an Emergency 
Response Team to work in southern Sudan, primarily Equatoria, 
to establish plans and facilities prior to the rainy season. 
During the rainy season (May-September), UNHCR will attempt 
to create conditions for the beginning of repatriation if it 
receives funding.  The German parastatal NGO GTZ will serve 
as a logistics partner for project implementation.  However, 
unexploded ordnance is a major concern which has yet to be 
addressed. He does not believe that large numbers of refugees 
or IDPs will choose to return at this time; however, he fears 
that a call by Garang for refugees to return would empty out 
Kenya's camps, and that "subtle pressures" by the GOS, such 
as bulldozing IDP camps near Khartoum, could also propel 
large numbers of people to a desolate South. 
 
10. (SBU) On IDPs: Fakhouri offered somewhat contradictory 
but revealing views on UNHCR,s position on IDPs.  He said 
that UNHCR's mandate interpretation regarding assistance and 
protection of IDPs has evolved beyond the position that UNHCR 
should restrict itself to populations which had crossed an 
international border.  However, he stated that a 
collaborative approach to protection of IDPs will not work; 
there must be a lead agency with a clear mandate. He 
acknowledged that UNHCR needs to be more predictable in its 
IDP response, and that its "pick and choose" approach has, in 
the past, confused and at times angered both donors and other 
international organizations. He somewhat incongruously added 
that protection of IDPs by humanitarian agencies does not 
work, except in failed states, and "Sudan is not a failed 
state."  He noted that the UNHCR activities in Darfur were 
focused on keeping standards of return high for both refugees 
and IDPs, a point which the A/HC and Director of 
International Protection have also made.  "We will not accept 
a lowest common denominator approach to returns" he 
concluded. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment:  Because Fakhouri is regarded as a 
knowledgeable and astute observer of events and policies, 
this cable largely reports his statements as made.  While 
other analysts may take strong issue with a number of points, 
his opinions could nonetheless be useful in formulating 
policy and funding decisions affecting not only UNHCR and 
refugees, but in the broader humanitarian and political 
context. 
 
12. (U) Comment continued:  Mission recommends that the 
Department consider Fakhouri's analysis on the manner in 
which UNHCR prepares and presents its 2006 budget, and inform 
both UNHCR and other donors of its position prior to the 
UNHCR donor consultations scheduled for May 18 and 19. End 
comment. 
 
13. (U) Khartoum minimize considered. 
Moley