This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM PHUM
SUBJECT: IRELAND STILL OPAQUE ON CHINA ARMS EMBARGO 
 
REF: A. DUBLIN 107 
     ¶B. SKINNER-BENTON E-MAIL OF APRIL 22 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary Daly; 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In an April 27 meeting with Department of 
Foreign Affairs Secretary General Dermot Gallagher, the 
Ambassador strongly urged the GOI to join other Member States 
in opposing the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo 
against China.  Gallagher said that Ireland's position on the 
embargo sought to acknowledge changes in China since 
Tiananmen, while maintaining the status quo on EU arms 
exports.  He explained that, if the embargo were lifted, 
Ireland would press for a Code of Conduct that was binding 
and effective.  The Ambassador noted that the Code did not 
reassure the USG, given continued significant EU arms 
transfers to China.  Gallagher observed that China's new 
anti-secession law had changed the mood among Member States, 
and he expressed confidence that the EU would not take 
near-term action on the embargo.  Although Gallagher was 
opaque in describing Ireland's position, he indicated that 
Ireland would not buck the EU trend toward deferring a 
decision on the issue.  End summary. 
 
Ireland's "Subtle Position" 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an April 27 meeting with Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) Secretary General Dermot Gallagher, the 
Ambassador urged the GOI to join other Member States in 
opposing the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo against 
China.  The Ambassador noted that the White House and 
Congress viewed the embargo as a paramount concern and would 
take serious interest in Ireland's position on the issue.  He 
also said that lifting the embargo would be detrimental to 
East Asian security -- a view shared by Taiwan and Japan.  He 
explained that, if the embargo were lifted, an outbreak of 
hostilities in the Taiwan Strait could pit American forces 
against a Chinese military armed with advanced European 
weaponry.  The Ambassador highlighted President Bush's 
intentions to maintain good relations with China, and he 
cited the President's offer to conduct a strategic dialogue 
with European partners on Asian regional security issues. 
 
¶3.  (C) Gallagher replied that Ireland had taken a "subtle" 
position on the arms embargo that sought, on one hand, to 
acknowledge changes in China since 1989 and, on the other, to 
maintain the status quo on arms transfers.  Repeating 
familiar Irish arguments, he noted that China should not be 
in the same category of rogue states as Burma and North 
Korea, which faced similar EU arms bans.  He added that there 
had been improvements in China's overall human rights climate 
since the Tiananmen era, though the Chinese Government had 
far to go on that front.  By the same token, the GOI would 
want to see no change, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, in EU weapons exports to China if the embargo 
were lifted.  To maintain the status quo, said Gallagher, it 
would be necessary to make the Code of Conduct, now a 
political tool relying on good will, into a mechanism that 
was as binding and effective as the embargo.  He remarked 
that Irish and U.S. views on the arms embargo "were not far 
apart," and he expressed confidence that the EU would not 
take near-term action on the proposal to lift the embargo. 
He also noted that Prime Minister Ahern had had productive 
discussions with President Bush on the subject on St. 
Patrick's Day. 
 
The Code of Conduct 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador responded that the Code of Conduct did 
not reassure the USG on the EU's ability to restrain arms 
sales to China.  He pointed out that Member States applying 
the Code had approved defense exports to China worth over 
Euro 400 million in 2003.  He also said that more recent 
items approved for sale, including submarine and radar 
technology, seemed inconsistent with the Code.  Gallagher 
expressed surprise at this information, which, he said, would 
suggest that the embargo itself had been ineffective.  He 
noted that Ireland was not an arms exporter, and he cited 
efforts within the EU to strengthen the Code of Conduct and 
its complementary "tool box." 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador closed by saying that the USG would 
continue to press for an EU consensus opposing the embargo's 
removal.  He also said that Congress, like the 
Administration, was fully engaged on the embargo and would 
expect Ireland to come down on the right side of the issue. 
Gallagher replied that there was already consensus among 
Member States on the bottom line of reflecting current 
realities in their relations with China; there were only 
different approaches to achieving that goal.  He added, 
however, that China's new anti-secession law had changed the 
mood among Member States, and he reiterated that there would 
be no movement on the issue for some time. 
 
Comment: Irish Not Pressing for Action 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) As in previous discussions with other Irish 
officials, Gallagher conveyed the GOI's desire to see the 
embargo lifted, but avoided giving clear indication of 
Ireland's role in internal EU discussions.  Ireland's 
position on the embargo reflects GOI interests in enhancing 
relations, primarily commercial ties, with China, as signaled 
by reciprocal high-level visits since 2003, including Prime 
Minister Ahern's high-profile trade-focused visit to China 
this past January (ref A).  The positive news is that Ireland 
apparently sees no interest in bucking the trend among Member 
States toward deferring a decision on the embargo.  As 
Gallagher mentioned at one point in the conversation, Ireland 
"won't be swinging from the chandeliers" for action on the 
issue. 
 
¶7.  (U) The Ambassador did not have an opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
BENTON