P 191346Z APR 05
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2531
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
DIA DH WASHINGTON DC
CINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L  DUBAI 001753 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL IR PGOV
SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI VERSUS QALIBAF? 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With 58 days left before the June 17 Iranian 
Presidential election and 21 days until the start of candidate 
registration on May 10, there are 19 Iranian men (and no women) 
cited in Iranian press as possible Presidential candidates. 
Former President and current Expediency Council Chairman Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who in public statements has skirted 
ever closer but as yet refrained from announcing his candidacy, 
is leading in most polls and is considered the favorite.  Polls 
show Former Education Minister Mustafa Moin more popular than 
the other main reformist candidate, former Majlis Speaker Mehdi 
Karrubi, although there is a real chance that the Guardian 
Council will bar Moin from running.  Most interestingly, 
recently resigned Law Enforcement Commander Mohammad Baqer 
Qalibaf seems to be becoming the favorite conservative 
candidate, with some analysts saying that he might be a surprise 
victor come elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
IN THIS CORNER - AKBAR SHAH 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On April 14, Expediency Council chairman and former 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani gave his clearest signal to date 
that he intended to run for President, although stopping short 
of declaring.  At what could have passed at a campaign speech 
before an audience of Office for Consolidating Unity (Iran's 
largest student group) members at Tehran's Jamaran Hosseinieh, 
he said that "my presence in the elections has become more 
definite."  Repeating his previous contention that he hoped that 
someone else who had the requisite "personal capacity and public 
popularity" became President, he said that "I'm still waiting, 
but the more I proceed, based on polls, my hope in achieving 
this wish becomes smaller~given that my poll numbers are high, 
that my presence might perhaps maximize participation, that I 
might get a high vote and might be able to lessen partisanship 
('band bazi'), these are encouraging factors for my presence in 
the election." He said that he would announce his final decision 
within two to three weeks (Note: Candidate registration is May 
10-14). 
 
¶3. (C) Many political stalwarts are convinced that Hashemi (one 
of whose nicknames is "Akbar Shah" due to his vast power and 
possessions) has already made his decision to run, and is merely 
delaying his announcement for maximum effect.  A Rafsanjani-era 
cabinet minister told Poloff on April 11 that he was "99 percent 
certain" that Rafsanjani would run and win, and a serving Majlis 
representative told Poloff on April 18 that he too was sure that 
Rafsanjani would be Iran's next President. 
 
¶4. (C) Although he has not yet announced, Rafsanjani has already 
begun to set up his election apparatus.  A wealthy Iranian-Azeri 
industrialist told Poloff on April 16 that Rafsanjani has put 
his former Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, Morteza 
Mohammad Khan as his campaign manager in Tehran, and his former 
Agriculture Minister Dr. Issa Kalantari for the same position in 
Azerbaijan. 
 
¶5. (C) Interestingly, this industrialist explained to Poloff 
that many ordinary Iranians, especially in villages or outside 
of the major cities, vote based on guidance from opinion 
leaders.  These opinion leaders are often prominent local clergy 
or employers.   This industrialist said that he himself had 
approximately 400,000 workers under him, most of whom would vote 
as he directed.  As such, he has been feted by Mohsen Rezai 
himself, and Mohammad Qalibaf's brother and Tehran Law 
Enforcement Commander Morteza Talai on behalf of Qalibaf. 
However, he  told Poloff that he would be supporting Rafsanjani. 
 A prominent Mashhad industrialist told Poloff on April 18 that 
he had been asked to rent out some of his prime office space in 
Mashhad for use as a Rafsanjani campaign headquarters, although 
being a staunch Rafsanjani opponent, he refused. 
 
¶6. (C) Rafsanjani campaign material is also already in 
circulation, and it indicates the slogans and strategies of a 
campaign that seeks to portray him as a strong, capable, above 
factional politics, and someone who can deliver Iran from its 
current crises.   On April 16, one of Poloff's contacts gave him 
a 64-page booklet titled, "Passing Through the Crisis and The 
Start of a New Season - Why We Should Vote For Hashemi." 
Putatively written by "A Group of Independent Iranian Experts" 
in Dey month 1383 (20 Dec 2004 - 19 January 2005), this book has 
64 sections, each headed with a different reason why Rafsanjani 
should become President, to include: 
 
- Public need for Moderation and Tranquillity 
 
- Society needs a President above Factions 
 
- A Strong President for Increasing the System's Efficiency 
 
- Worthy Managers are the Iranian Nation's and Islamic 
Civilization's Capital, and Worthiness must be the Main Standard 
for Directors Selected by the Future President 
 
- Key Responsibilities must be Entrusted to those having 
Experience and Liberality 
 
- Exclusive Power is Corrupting; There are Currently Indications 
of a Dangerous Movement of "Escape from Leadership" (i.e. all 
three branches shouldn't be controlled by the same faction) 
 
- The World has Changed Rapidly.  Internal Affairs Shouldn't 
Keep us in Ignorance of World Developments. 
 
-Hashemi was the Architect of the Policy of Decreasing Tensions 
and Building Confidence Internationally, and he can Engineer any 
Negotiations with Honor and Authority 
 
¶7. (U) Some however contend that Rafsanjani has still not made 
up his mind.  In a April 14 article in the reformist "Sharq" 
newspaper titled, "the Lonely Statesman," prominent political 
scientist (and fervid Rafsanjani supporter) Sadeq Zibakalam 
wrote that despite popular perceptions, Rafsanjani has not yet 
decided to run.  Zibakalam claims that Rafsanjani is still 
seeking to answer two basic questions, the first being whether 
he could win.  Zibakalam points out that Iran has approximately 
48 million eligible voters.  If 50 percent participate, Hashemi 
would need at least 12 of the 24 million votes cast (a 
percentage significantly higher than his current polling).  The 
second question is that even if he does win, it remains to be 
seen what he could do in the face of solid opposition from the 
conservative "Osulgarayan/Abadgarayan" (i.e. the "Principlists" 
and "Islamic Developers") faction, both within and outside of 
the Majlis.  Zibakalam also points out that many if not most of 
Rafsanjani's traditional lieutenants, such as Ataollah 
Mohajerani, Abdollah Nuri, Gholamhossein Karbaschi and (the 
late) Mohsen Nurbakhsh are no longer with him to advise and 
assist him should he run. 
 
¶8. (C) A prominent Tehran-based political analyst told Poloff on 
April 15 that Rafsanjani's brother-in-law and right-hand man 
Hossein Marashi (currently head of Iran's Tourist Organization) 
had quite recently told him that Rafsanjani was still unsure. 
This political scientist, himself a staunch reformist, was 
scheduled to meet with Hashemi at some point within the week of 
April 17-24, at which time he told Poloff he would add his own 
voice to those urging Rafsanjani to run. 
 
AND IN THIS CORNER - THE NEWCOMER 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (U)  Among the ranks of Iran's conservative Osulgarayan, the 
traditional conservative faction controlling the conservative 
coalition "Coordinating Council for the Forces of the Islamic 
Revolution" (CCFIR) , headed by former Majlis speaker Ali Akbar 
Nateq Nuri, Majlis Deputy Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, and the 
pro-bazaar "Islamic Coalition Association," are supporting 
former Director General of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB), Ali Larijani.  Among the five conservative 
candidates who have rejected what they see as the CCFIR's 
premature annotation of Larijani (Majlis representative Ahmad 
Tavakoli, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Tehran 
Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad, resigned Law Enforcement Commander 
Mohamad Baqer Qalibaf, and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen 
Rezai), conventional wisdom is that Qalibaf and Ahmadi Nejad are 
the front-runners. 
 
¶10. (C) On April 18, prominent Tehran-based international 
business consultant "Hassan" made the case to Poloff that 
recently resigned Law Enforcement Commander Mohammad Baqer 
Qalibaf stands a good chance of being Iran's next President.  He 
prefaced his comments by pointing out the potential importance 
of Iran's youth vote (age 16-25).  According to Hassan, this 
group is potentially 40 percent of the vote.  Although many 
won't vote, many will, to include a large portion of first-time 
voters (indeed, Hassan said that turnout might well be as high 
as 60-65 percent).  Hassan said he believed these would be the 
'swing voters' in the upcoming election, and that the logic of 
their candidate selection was important, albeit difficult, to 
understand. 
 
¶11. (C)  First, Hassan said that many of those in this age group 
who do vote will use their vote to "get revenge" against the 
system, and that a young (43) non-cleric like Qalibaf would be 
the most likely candidate to glean these young protest votes. 
These young voters are not likely to vote for Rafsanjani, a 
71-year old cleric they see as an establishment figure disliked 
even more than Khamenei. 
 
¶12. Secondly, since becoming Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) 
commander in June 2000, Hassan claimed that Qalibaf has 
transformed it into a much more moderate, professional and 
public-friendly corps, which no longer hassles Iran's youth in 
the streets for mingling with members of the opposite sex and 
related social offences.  The head of a major Iranian youth 
group reiterated this point to Poloff in a April 19 
conversation, saying that Qalibaf has been responsible for a sea 
change in the LEF, with young people no longer fearing LEF 
presence on the streets.  Hassan also pointed out that Qalibaf 
has vastly simplified procedures having to do with registering 
for mandatory military service, to the point where it can be 
done on-line, vice repeatedly queuing at different LEF offices 
for weeks.  Qalibaf's stewardship of the LEF during these years 
has given him the reputation of a competent, apolitical manager. 
 
¶13.  (C) Hassan said that Qalibaf's reputation has also been 
burnished while serving as head of Supreme Leader Khamenei's 
anti-smuggling/anti-corruption drive.  This drive has made 
headlines by shutting down an Payam airport in Karaj for 
smuggling activities and for arresting the Iran Tobacco 
Organization's Director General and some senior managers for 
bribery and financial corruption.  Hassan said that he believed 
Khamenei truly wished to cut back on high-level corruption and 
for that reason chose Qalibaf, who, with his IRGC background, 
would be relatively safe from retaliation by IRGC elements.  He 
claimed that Qalibaf's track record in this regard has 
demonstrated that he has sufficient political courage to at 
least attempt to tackle this problem. 
 
¶14. (C)  Hassan also said that Qalibaf has a very warm and 
personable style and appearance, much like Khatami, as opposed 
to many of the other 'scowling and bearded' candidates whose 
appearance can be somewhat off-putting for many young Iranians. 
Hassan pointed to a March 27 appearance of Qalibaf on Iran's 
'Hot Seat' interview program ('Sandali-ye Daq'), where Qalibaf 
recounted the time when he was travelling in civilian clothes 
and was needlessly detained and hassled by LEF members on a 
family trip to Mashhad (until he finally revealed who he was), 
as an example of his ability to reach out and connect to 
Iranians. 
 
¶15. (C) Hassan said another factor working in Qalibaf's favor is 
that he has a solid record as a pilot in the Iran-Iraq war, 
having successfully flown a high number of sorties over Iraq. 
Qalibaf also heads the Iranian Pas football team, which won the 
Iranian league last year and is doing well this year this year 
in the Asia Cup.  Given that Iran is likely to have made the 
World Cup before election day, Iran's football euphoria might 
also benefit Qalibaf. 
 
¶16. (C) Hassan pointed out that Supreme Leader Khamenei himself 
might ultimately support a Qalibaf candidacy, seeing Qalibaf as 
young, a good manager, someone who can rein in corruption, and 
someone who would serve as more of a Prime Minister than a 
President.   Qalibaf's IRGC background would also make him more 
attractive to Khamenei. 
 
¶17. (C) Another factor in favor of Qalibaf is that he might well 
be supported by the "Mashhad Circle" ('Dayereh-ye Mashhad'), 
i.e., a network of prominent and affluent Mashhad-born 
businessmen and industrialists.  This group, despite Khamenei's 
Khorasani background (which is relatively recent), feels 
under-represented in the highest circles of power and might well 
back a Qalibaf candidacy, as did the Yazd group did for Khatami 
during his campaigns (although the Khorasan 'kingmaker' 
Ayatollah Vaez Tabasi himself, head of the Astan-e Qods Razavi 
Foundation, is supporting Rafsanjani). 
 
¶18. (C)  Finally, Hassan said that contrary to what many believe 
in the West, there is no ambient sense of crisis among the young 
in Iran.  He claimed there is an emerging feeling of 
self-confidence, bolstered by the economy relative strength.  He 
cited the relative ease that one can get a car loan these days 
with only 20 percent down as an example of factors that are 
lightening the public mood.  He also said that US pressure on 
Iran and scenarios of a US-led strike against Iran are not taken 
seriously by many young Iranians.   He claims that desires for 
greater democracy are not a priority, but rather that the young 
are looking to be left alone to "have a good time."  The youth 
leader with whom Poloff spoke reinforced this point, saying that 
Iranian youth today, unlike when Khatami was first elected, are 
more 'pleasure-seeking' ('lezzat-gara'), and are unfazed by even 
unemployment as long as their parents, often working two to 
three jobs, are able to provide them with pocket money.  Hassan 
added that he sensed that what people were looking for from the 
system currently was primarily 'greater efficiency,' which could 
play to Qalibaf's strength. 
 
¶19.  (C) Hassan also pointed out that Qalibaf, who only recently 
has declared his desire to compete, is already polling better 
numbers than the other conservative candidates.  In a just 
concluded 'Baztab' website poll, he finished third overall with 
13.8 percent, behind Rafsanjani (21.6 percent) and Moin (16.6 
percent - but there is a real chance that the Guardian Council 
will bar Moin from running).  Qalibaf's numbers increased three 
percentage points over the first Baztab poll in mid-March, and 
Hassan told Poloff that conservative polling organizations are 
consistently showing Qalibaf as the main vote-getter among 
conservatives.  Hassan suggested that if Qalibaf's numbers 
continue to improve while CCFIR favorite Larijani's stay in the 
high single-digit, even Larijani himself might choose to drop 
out of contention to save himself embarrassment. 
 
¶20. (C) Despite the above, Qalibaf does have many negatives 
Hassan conceded, primarily the fact of his military background. 
Hassan and many other Iranians have told Poloff that as a rule 
Iranians don't like the military when it comes to selecting 
civilian leaders.  Indeeed, Qalibaf's opponents have already 
started their campaign against him by stating that as a military 
man, he cannot be President, since Article 115 of the 
Constitution states that "the President must be elected from 
among religious and political personalities."  A Guardian 
Council spokesman has said that this matter is for the Majlis to 
decide, which is unlikely before June, and it seems unlikely 
that Qalibaf would be barred from running on this account. 
 
¶21. (C) Nonetheless, Hassan concluded his reasoning by pointing 
out that the Iranian voter quite often votes on the basis of 
emotion, and that if a Qalibaf candidacy were to 'catch fire' as 
did Khatami's (albeit for different reasons) in 1997, then he 
could well wind up winning.  Indeed, Hassan said that one reason 
that Rafsanjani was delaying committing was to wait to see how 
serious Qalibaf was about his quest, and he said that ultimately 
Rafsanjani would choose not to run, being unsure of a 
first-round victory (election laws says that there is a run-off 
between the top two candidates if no single candidate gets a 
majority of the vote). 
 
¶22. (C) COMMENT:  Qalibaf himself recently told press that "my 
only serious opponent in the elections is Hashemi Rafsanjani," 
and indeed indications are that Qalibaf might be potentially be 
Rafsanjani's strongest competition.  Hassan's theory puts 
Qalibaf in the interesting position of possibly becoming a 
'protest candidate' with Establishment backing.  None of the 
other conservative candidates show any sign of increasing their 
popularity beyond single-digits, and as the 1997 Khatami victory 
(or, more accurately the Nateq-Nuri loss) showed, the 
conservative clerically-dominated 'Establishment' can only do so 
much for its candidate if another candidate catches the public's 
eye. 
 
 
DAVIS