This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/C, AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  4/6/15 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM KPKO TZ BY NL
SUBJECT:  DUTCH ENVOY RACKE SAYS PALIPEHUTU-FNL REBEL 
TALKS WITH GOT PROCEEDING WELL 
 
REF:  BUJUMBURA 323 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified by Charge d?Affaires Michael S. Owen for 
reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Dutch Burundi Envoy Fred Racke told 
Charge that the current talks between the Government of 
Tanzania and FNL-Palipehutu rebels in Dar es Salaam are 
proceeding well so far, and the GOT is becoming 
cautiously optimistic.  President Mkapa has insisted that 
all talks must be within the framework of existing peace 
mechanisms and that FNL leader Agathon Rwasa must 
ultimately participate personally.  If progress is made 
over the next two weeks, then Mkapa plans to consult with 
South African VP Zuma and other regional leaders on how 
to proceed.  Racke said the USG-led tripartite mechanism 
is a significant factor in pushing the FNL toward 
negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Charge met on April 7 with Fred Racke, Dutch 
Special Envoy for Burundi, for a readout on the FNL- 
Palipehutu talks currently underway in Dar es Salaam 
(ref).  The Dutch, French, and UK Ambassadors also 
attended the hour-long meeting. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Racke said the FNL delegation was led by Pasteur 
Habimana, and the GOT delegation was headed by the MFA 
Director for African Affairs, H.W. Biswaro.  The 
Tanzanian Ambassador to Burundi was also participating, 
and Racke is sitting in as an observer.  From the GOT 
perspective, the objective of the meeting is to determine 
whether the FNL is really serious about negotiations with 
the GOB this time.  There had been ?many false starts? 
with the FNL and the GOT was understandably suspicious, 
Racke said, but it now appears the FNL is serious.  The 
GOT?s increasing confidence is evidenced by the fact that 
the FNL delegation met with MFA Permanent Secretary 
Philemon Luhanjo on April 5, and is scheduled to meet 
with Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete on April 9. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Racke said there had been a pause in the talks 
on April 6, when the GOT had asked the FNL to develop a 
specific agenda for the talks.  Without a set agenda, the 
FNL focused on the past rather than the future, he said, 
so the agenda was important to move the talks forward. 
The longer the talks go on, Racke said, the more 
difficult it will be for the FNL to extricate itself from 
the talks. 
 
¶5.  (C)  If the talks proceed well, then Foreign Minister 
Kikwete would report to President Mkapa within two weeks 
with a recommendation on whether or not to continue, and 
Mkapa would then go to South African Vice President Zuma 
and regional leaders to consult on the way forward. 
Whether or not to lift the terrorist group designation 
for the FNL would be a key question at this stage, Racke 
said.  If Mkapa believes the FNL is serious, then he 
would push hard at this stage for direct FNL/GOB talks, 
leading to direct talks between President Ndiazeye and 
Agathon Rwasa, the ultimate objective. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Racke said that although Mkapa remains highly 
suspicious of the FNL, he wants to do everything possible 
to create a conducive atmosphere, without in any way 
undermining the existing peace framework.  Racke said 
Mkapa had written to FNL leader Agathon Rwasa agreeing to 
facilitate the talks on the following conditions: 
 
a.  the FNL had no preconditions for talks with the GOB 
b.  there would be a preparatory meeting first (the 
current Dar es Salaam talks) 
c.  both the GOB and the FNL demonstrated seriousness 
about the talks 
d.  the talks should not impact the calendar for Burundi 
elections and other steps 
e.  the talks should be within the framework of the 
existing regional peace mechanisms 
f.  Rwasa would participate personally in the talks 
 
¶7.  (C)  Racke reported that Rwasa had agreed to all 
conditions in a letter to Mkapa.  Rwasa had originally 
wanted the talks to be under the auspices of the UN, but 
Mkapa had refused, insisting on utilizing existing 
regional mechanisms, and Rwasa had acquiesced. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Asked about why the FNL was apparently now 
serious about talks with the GOB, Racke said part of the 
cause was the evolving situation in the eastern DROC. 
Recent new developments such as the USG-led tripartite 
mechanism, the AU Libreville summit?s commitment to the 
tripartite mechanism and MONUC, increased commitment by 
the DROC Contact Group, and a strengthening of MONUC and 
an apparent new ?willingness to fight,? had changed the 
terrain, according to Racke.  The FNL is legitimately 
concerned that it is losing its refuge in eastern DROC, 
he said, and equally concerned that it must join the 
peace process now or risk being left behind for good. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Racke expressed concern that the CNDD-FDD could 
actively oppose talks with the FNL, and said the 
international community would need to provide strong 
support for President Ndiazeye if he does decide to hold 
direct talks.  Another complicating factor is that any 
guarantees made to the FNL by President Ndiazeye would be 
viewed with suspicion by the FNL, who could legitimately 
wonder how such guarantees could be enforced once 
Ndiazeye steps down.  Racke noted that President Mkapa 
was also taking a considerable risk by getting involved, 
and suggested that if Mkapa does reach the phase of going 
to Zuma and other regional leaders with a recommendation, 
a statement of support from the international community 
would be helpful. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Comment:  Although much work remains to be 
done, the initial signs from these early talks appear 
encouraging.  It is also encouraging that President Mkapa 
is insisting that any talks must be within existing 
regional peace frameworks, and that ultimately the talks 
must involve Agathon Rwasa directly.  End Comment. 
 
OWEN