This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015 
TAGS: PTER ASEC CASC EG
SUBJECT: EMBASSY CAIRO'S RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 7 TERRORIST 
BOMBING 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 2799 
     ¶B. CAIRO 2773 
     ¶C. CAIRO 2744 
     ¶D. CAIRO 2743 
 
Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Embassy Cairo's immediate response to the April 7 
Khan el-Khalili bombing (reftels) included expeditious 
consular assistance to the three wounded American citizens 
and their families, the placement of personnel at the crime 
scene to collect information and assess continuing threats, 
and the issuance of notifications and guidance to the 
official and private American communities in Egypt.  Within 
hours of the incident, the Embassy's Regional Medical Office 
arranged the transfer of the wounded AmCits to a better 
hospital and maintained close contact with the attending 
doctors, facilitating communications and bringing in outside 
specialists as necessary.  On April 12, thanks to the 
coordination of Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation and 
the Defense Attache's Office, a fully equipped USAF medical 
evacuation aircraft and crew came to Egypt and transported 
the wounded Americans to Landstuhl regional medical center in 
Germany.  The Embassy's Emergency Action Committee (EAC), 
which has met three times since the incident, and the core 
EAC will convene next on April 17 to review the Mission's 
security posture and guidance to the American community.  End 
summary. 
 
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First Responders 
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¶2. (SBU) Shortly after the April 7 terrorist attack in 
Cairo's Khan el-Khalili tourist bazaar, which occurred at 
approximately 1745 local Cairo time, Embassy personnel were 
dispatched to the scene.  Three consular officers (along with 
an Army Foreign Area Officer who was dining with them) 
proceeded to the scene immediately upon hearing of the 
attack.  They then went to the Hussein hospital where the 
wounded AmCits, and other bombing victims, were taken. 
Assisted by RSO LES personnel, Conoffs confirmed the death of 
AmCit Alex Mirandette and the injury of AmCits Erik 
Mirandette, Kris Ross, and Michael Kiel Tenhaaf. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Due to the poor facilities available at the Hussein 
Hospital, Conoffs began to press immediately for the transfer 
of the patients to a better hospital.  A/LEGATT also 
proceeded to the hospital and was able to conduct a 
preliminary interview with the victims.  Meanwhile, the 
Embassy's regional medical office (RMO) was making contacts 
at the Dar al-Fouad hospital, one of Egypt's best, in a 
western suburb of Cairo.  RMO successfully arranged for two 
fully equipped ambulances and professional medical crews to 
transfer the injured AmCits to Dar al-Fouad. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As Conoffs and RMO worked to address the immediate 
needs of the injured AmCits, RSO raised the alert level at 
all U.S. mission facilities and deployed Assistant RSOs to 
known after-hours concentrations of official Americans.  RSO 
also initiated a dialogue with GOE security contacts to 
determine the details of the attack and assess the 
possibility of a near-term repetition.  The Charge convened 
the Embassy's EAC on April 7 at 2030 local Cairo time and the 
EAC decided to issue a warden message and an alert to the 
Mission community (ref D). 
 
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The Day(s) After 
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¶5. (SBU) EAC members worked into the early hours of April 8, 
gathering information, accounting for mission personnel, and 
briefing counterparts in Washington.  Also early on April 8, 
RSO coordinated with contacts in Egypt's State Security 
Investigative Service (SSIS) to gain access to the attack 
scene.  In the morning, RSO, DRSO, and LEGATT, accompanied by 
SSIS officers, inspected the crime scene.  The Charge called 
a follow-on EAC meeting at midday, April 8, by which time a 
clearer picture of the incident was emerging (ref C).  The 
meeting factored in information garnered from EAC members' 
contacts with various GOE officials, inspection of the crime 
scene, preliminary interviews with the AmCit victims, and 
updated information on their medical condition.  Having 
secured verbal privacy act waivers, consular officers 
notified the AmCits' next of kin. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Starting April 8, RMO and staff began a series of 
daily visits to the Dar al-Fuad hospital and worked closely 
with the attending physicians to ensure the best possible 
care.  When the most seriously injured of the AmCits, Erik 
Mirandette, became critically ill, RMO pushed for more 
aggressive treatment.  RMO made round-the-clock calls to the 
attending physicians and outside specialists and stepped up 
visits to the hospital.  A local surgical intervention 
suggested by RMO may have saved Mirandette's life. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the invitation of the Egyptian Ministry of 
Tourism, 11 family members and three church personnel flew to 
Cairo to be with the injured Americans.  The Consular Section 
worked to facilitate their movements, including helping four 
of them travel without passports.  Consular personnel 
remained all day at the hospital to assist the injured and 
their families/friends.  On April 10, the Charge convened the 
full EAC to review threat information and discuss the 
reaction of the American community (ref B).  The EAC decided 
to maintain the recommendation that Americans avoid areas in 
Cairo frequented by tourists for a further week (until April 
17). 
 
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Investigation 
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¶8. (C) RSO, LEGATT, and ORA have each been in regular contact 
with GOE security contacts for updates on the investigation 
and its findings.  Based on their own observations, these 
offices have also provided Washington agencies with analysis, 
findings, and notes (septels).  As reported ref A, the GOE 
announced preliminary findings, including the identity of the 
suicide bomber/perpetrator and his apparent (Jihadist) 
motives and background, on April 11. 
 
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Public Affairs 
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¶9. (SBU) The Embassy's Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer 
(duty press officer at the time of the incident) handled all 
public affairs dimensions of the Embassy's response.  She 
prepared a special media reaction briefing for the EAC, 
drafted suggested press guidance for use in Washington, and 
served as the principal point of contact for the 
international and Egyptian press covering the incident. 
 
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Medevac 
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¶10. (SBU) The Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation and 
Defense Attache, in coordination with the Charge and the 
Consular section, arranged for a military medical evacuation 
aircraft to transport the wounded AmCits to Ramstein AFB, 
Germany.  The modalities of this transfer were complex and 
involved engagement of the GOE by OMC, DAO, and Consular and 
Political officers;  extensive coordination with Washington; 
and close liaison with the hospital, coordiated by RMO,  DAO, 
and the Consular Section.  RMO provided the aircraft's 
medical crew with a briefing on the condition of the evacuees 
prior to departure. 
 
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Next Steps 
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¶11. (SBU) The core EAC will meet again on April 17 to review 
the Mission's security posture and guidance to the private 
American community.  The Embassy will follow in close detail, 
and report as appropriate, developments in the GOE's 
investigation and any legal proceedings it generates.  We 
will review the Consular Information Sheet and modify it 
(with Department clearance) to reflect the most recent terror 
attack.  In the meantime, core EAC members will constantly 
review the threat environment and recommend adjustments as 
necessary. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY