This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002799 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: PTER ASEC CASC EG
SUBJECT: CAIRO TERROR ATTACK: ARRESTS, CLAIMS, AND REACTIONS 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 2744 
     ¶B. CAIRO 2743 
 
Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) In a statement aired on Egyptian TV on the afternoon 
of April 11, the Ministry of Interior identified the (dead) 
perpetrator of the April 7 terrorist attack in the Khan 
el-Khalili tourist bazaar as an 18-year old engineering 
student from the Delta province of Qalyubia.  The 
announcement contradicted stories sourced to the GOE that ran 
in the April 11 morning papers, stating that a 23-year old 
from Giza had been the perpetrator, and that three additional 
suspects had been arrested.  In remarks to the press April 9 
(apparently before any arrests were made), Public Prosecutor 
Maher Abdel Wahed announced that the GOE's investigation 
indicated that the attack was "an individual act" and 
confidently asserted that the attack would not have an impact 
on the tourist industry.  Claims of responsibility have been 
put forward by two groups, one previously unknown, but it is 
too early to reach firm conclusions on their credibility. 
Meanwhile, Egyptian opinion shapers are still digesting news 
of the attacks.  In public commentary, condemnation and 
criticism has been universal, while the inevitable conspiracy 
theories are coming to the fore.  End summary. 
 
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A Perpetrator (and Accomplices?) 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At around 1430 local Cairo Time April 11, Egypt 
State TV carried an official statement by the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) which announced the identity of the (dead) 
bomber who perpetrated the April 7 attack in the Khan 
el-Khalili bazaar, which left four dead and at least 17 
wounded, as 18-year old Hassan Raf'at Ahmad Bashandi, born in 
the Nile Delta province of Qalyubia and enrolled as a student 
of engineering at Zagazig University.  The MOI statement 
announced that a police search of Bashandi's home revealed 
Jihadist propaganda and directions for making improvised 
explosive devices.  The statement claimed positive 
identification had been made through DNA testing.  The 
statement added that the MOI investigation revealed that the 
perpetrator's personality had begun to change last summer, 
following the death of his father, when he began to adopt 
extremist views, and even attempted to prevent his family 
from watching television.  The statement made no reference to 
accomplices, but said that further invesigations were 
continuing. 
 
¶3. (C) The MOI's afternoon announcement was in almost 
complete contradiction to reports carried by the morning 
papers, sourcing GOE contacts, stating that the GOE had 
identified the dead bomber as Mohammed Sobhy Aly, a 24 
year-old, alternatively reported as hailing from Qalyubia or 
from the province of Giza.  According to a report in the 
pro-government daily Al-Akhbar, Aly's identity was revealed 
by a tip from a suspicious family member and confirmed by 
fingerprint tests.   Among the suspected accomplices seized 
was Aly's brother, Gamal Sobhy Aly, and two others, whose 
names were not revealed.  (Comment: The disparity between the 
two reports is odd, and suggests either a poorly informed GOE 
leaker or a willful act of disinformation, though we would be 
at a loss to explain the motive for the latter.  In either 
case, we take the MOI's mid-afternoon statement as the 
definitive GOE account, but note that GOE statements to the 
press, as investigations proceed, can be inconsistent.  End 
comment.) 
 
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"An Individual Act" 
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¶4. (SBU) Earlier, Public Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed, 
Egypt's senior law enforcement official, insisted in remarks 
to the press on April 9 that the bazaar attack was "an 
isolated act," and confidently predicted it would "have no 
impact on tourism."  In his remarks to the press Abdel Wahed 
also warned against "jumping to conclusions," until "all 
details of the investigation come to light," while 
(paradoxically) evincing confidence that this was an isolated 
act, rather than the work of a larger, organized group.  This 
point, sourced to GOE officials was again stressed in several 
leading Egyptian papers on the morning of April 11. 
 
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Claims of Responsibility 
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¶5. (SBU) International Arabic media reported on April 9 two 
claims of responsibility, one posted on an extremist website 
by the previously unknown "Islamic Pride Brigades of the Land 
of the Nile."  In its statement, it described the "martyred" 
perpetrator (without naming him) as one of the "Brigades'" 
operatives and said the attack was made to protest both the 
"tyranny" of the Mubarak regime and U.S. policies in the 
region.  The full text of the statement (in Arabic) was 
subsequently posted on the website of Al-Arabiyya, the Arabic 
satellite news channel. 
¶6. (SBU) According to various media reports, a second claim 
of responsibility was issued by the Group "Jund al-Sham," 
("Soldiers of the Levant"), a group which some have linked to 
the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  Analysts note 
Jund al-Sham has claimed virtually every act of terror 
perpetrated in the Middle East in the past year, including 
the October 2004 attacks on Israeli tourists in the Sinai, 
but there is little evidence to link the group with any of 
these operations.  The GOE consistently described both the 
October 2004 Sinai attacks, and the April 7 incident, as the 
work of isolated cells of individuals and discounted 
speculation of linkage between these attacks and wider terror 
networks. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Another statement by a terror group, but with a 
contrasting message, was published by the daily Al-Ahram on 
April 11.  The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the terrorist 
group responsible for numerous attacks in the 1980s and 
1990s, whose leaders have since been "tamed" into contrition 
by the GOE, condemned the April 7 attack.  The group's 
statement, in particularly convoluted language, argues that 
the April 7 attack "violates Islamic Shari'a," rejects 
violence against foreigners (and claims EIJ never targetted 
foreigners), and warns Egypt's Muslim youth to be wise and 
cautious and not be lured into activities which run counter 
to the interests of the nation. 
 
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Khan Attacks - Egypt Reacts 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While there has been universal criticism and 
condemnation of the April 7 attacks in the Egyptian media, 
the inevitable conspiracy theories are beginning to surface 
in the usual places.  Three principal camps are emerging: 
those blaming the U.S. and Israel, those describing it as a 
spillover of carnage in Iraq and Palestine, and those 
speculating about new extremist groups emerging under the 
nose of the internal security apparatus. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Quarters like the Muslim Brotherhood, organizers of 
the weekly demonstration that follows Friday prayers at the 
Azhar mosque (just a few blocks from the scene of Thursday's 
attack), and the sensationalist tabloid al-Osboa, are already 
characterizing the attack as a "U.S.-Israeli operation" aimed 
at destabilizing Egypt.  Ironically, even a leader of the 
protest group "Enough," quoted in an article in the 
opposition daily Al-Wafd, accused "certain outside forces" 
(read the U.S. or Israel) of promoting chaos as part of a 
plan to impede reform. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Giving implicit credence to this school of thought, 
writer Abdullah Kamel invoked the widely discussed remark 
from Secretary Rice's recent Washington Post interview that 
she expects instability to continue in the Middle East.  This 
incident, the writer asserted, is evidence that the 
implementation of "U.S. plans for the region" is beginning. 
Others, while not pointing the finger at the U.S. or Israel, 
have openly worried that the GOE will seize on the incident 
as a pretext to put the brakes on calls to lift the emergency 
law, a principal demand of the opposition and democratic 
activists. 
 
¶11. (SBU) A number of prominent commentators on security 
affairs, including Di'a Rashwan of the quasi-official 
Al-Ahram Strategic Studies Center, and retired State Security 
official Fouad Allam, are describing the attack as a logical 
extension of instability in other parts of the region like 
Iraq and Palestine.  A third group is speculating worriedly 
that new, previously unknown Islamist terror groups are 
emerging and is expressing concern that Egypt's Ministry of 
Interior has grown lax.  These views have been expressed 
along with criticism of the GOE's rapid assessment of the 
incident as the work of an isolated individual. 
 
¶12. (SBU) A number of commentators in the Egyptian media are 
openly worrying that the April 7 attack could presage a 
return to the unstable 1990s, when the Islamic Group, the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and splinter groups conducted 
numerous attacks, mainly against foreign tourists, but also 
against GOE elites, and even secular intellectuals in Cairo, 
and mounted a serious insurgency in pockets of Upper Egypt 
provinces such as Sohag and Assiyut.  There has been 
speculation, in papers such as the tabloid Sawt al-Umma, that 
a period of laxity on the part of internal security forces 
has allowed new terror groups (perhaps such as the "Islamic 
Pride Bridgades") to emerge. 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
GRAY