This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015 
TAGS: PTER PHUM ECON SNAR CO OAS
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DEMOBILIZATION/REINSERTION PROCESS 
 
REF: BOGOTA 02234 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Since 2003, almost 5,000 members of the United Self 
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) have demobilized.  The last 
demobilization was the La Mojana Bloc on February 2, 2005. 
The GOC has begun to remedy the deficiencies in the 
reinsertion process.  Almost 90 percent of demobilized 
paramilitaries have been entered into the electronic 
monitoring system and are participating in reinsertion 
programs.  The GOC is working to address budget limitations 
and improve weak management.  The OAS verification mission is 
also almost out of funding (reftel).  The Ministry of 
Interior and Justice's Reincorporation Office is able to 
utilize the Presidency's "Peace Fund" budget office, which 
allows for more flexible, efficient spending.  President 
Uribe endorsed the Reincorporation Office's Director Juan 
David Angel as the lead on the program and gave him a seat in 
cabinet meetings.  A continuing concern is the lack of 
employment opportunities for the demobilized.  No new 
demobilizations are scheduled, but the GOC plans to 
demobilize the remaining 15,000 paramilitaries in 2005. 
 
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Reinsertion Moving Forward 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) AUC bloc demobilizations follow three basic steps: (1) 
disarm and demobilize in a special demobilization zone, (2) 
report to a Reference and Orientation Center (CRO) to be 
interviewed by the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) and 
receive the first monthly stipend, and (3) begin reinsertion 
programs.  Some demobilizations were better organized and 
provided more services than others.  For example, some blocs 
were given national identification cards during the 
demobilization phase while others had to wait until they 
reported to the CRO.  Since demobilizations began, the GOC 
has been working to fill gaps in the process: 
 
-- CROs: The GOC has established CROs in the cities of 
Cucuta, Medellin, Cali, Monteria, Turbo, Bogota and one 
mobile CRO to service less populated areas.  The GOC hopes to 
create nine more by the end of 2005.  The Peace 
Commissioner's Office has turned over management of the CROs 
to the Ministry of Interior and Justice's (MOI/J) 
Reincorporation Office.  The CROs in Cucuta, Turbo, and 
Monteria are well run and have been fully staffed by the 
Fiscalia, tracking and monitoring staff, municipal liaison 
officers, OAS, and other relevant agencies.  Others, 
including the newest CRO in Cali, are much further behind and 
barely have a skeleton staff.  The MOI/J and Peace 
Commissioner's Office recently held a meeting with all CRO 
directors to discuss how to make CRO operations more uniform 
and plan for a census of demobilized scheduled for late 
April. 
 
-- Tracking and Monitoring: The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), a USAID-grantee, designed a 
computer-based tracking and monitoring system for demobilized 
paramilitaries.  The system issues an alert when a series of 
indicators show an individual is beginning to drop out of the 
reinsertion program.  Tracking and monitoring officials 
conduct home visits to these at-risk persons.  As of April 
15, 87 percent (4,181) of all demobilized paramilitaries had 
been entered in the tracking and monitoring system. 
 
-- Other statistics: 1,189 have completed the National 
Apprenticeship Agency's (SENA) basic course that assesses 
education level and provides an orientation to life skills. 
Fifty-five are in Ralito awaiting finalization of the Justice 
and Peace Law.  Sixty-four have been killed (reftel). 
Eighty-two are in jail either for non-pardonable crimes they 
committed before demobilization or for any crimes they 
committed after demobilization.  The Fiscalia has interviewed 
2,318 (part of the pardon process) and the Department of 
Administrative Security (DAS, rough FBI equivalent) has given 
2,114 judicial passage (a certificate verifying that they are 
not wanted for any crimes).  None, however, have been 
officially pardoned under Law 782, which allows the GOC to 
pardon demobilized for membership in an illegal armed group 
and related, minor crimes. 
 
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Problems Remain 
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¶3. (C) Limited resources and poor interagency management 
continue to cause delays in issuance of reinsertion benefits. 
 In early April, a large group of former guerrillas and 
paramilitaries from the individual deserter program 
temporarily took over the MOI/J's Reincorporation Offices to 
demand their benefits.  They were persuaded to leave the 
offices without violence but the demobilized continue to 
complain about the program, especially lack of employment. 
The GOC has taken some steps to resolve these problems, but 
progress has been slow: 
 
-- Tight budget: The MOI/J's Reincorporation Office's 2005 
budget is CP 71 billion (roughly USD 29.5 million), the Peace 
Commissioner's demobilization budget is CP 47 billion 
(roughly USD 19.6 million), and the Defense Ministry's budget 
for individual deserters is CP 28 billion (roughly USD 11.6 
million).  In order to make spending more efficient and 
flexible, each agency is going to put the Presidency's Peace 
Fund in charge of its budget.  This should help ease delays 
in allocation of resources.  However, the Reincorporation 
Office has warned that it has enough funding to cover basic 
reinsertion costs but not enough for productive employment 
projects unless outside assistance is provided. 
 
-- Coordination: In early April, President Uribe called a 
meeting with Reincorporation Director Angel, Peace 
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, and other cabinet members 
to discuss problems with the demobilization/reinsertion 
process.  Uribe emphasized that reincorporation was a key GOC 
mission and endorsed Angel as having the lead.  Angel will 
now attend all cabinet meetings.  In the past, Angel had 
complained that he did not have sufficient political weight 
to direct the dozen or so state agencies involved in 
demobilization to provide services in a timely manner. 
 
-- Employment generation: Some demobilized have temporary 
municipal jobs but the majority remain unemployed.  The 
private sector has provided few opportunities, although some 
organizations, such as the National Cattle Rancher's 
Association, have expressed interest in doing so.  President 
Uribe announced that he would begin requiring all government 
public works contracts to include some jobs for the 
demobilized.  He directed Angel to find an experienced, 
well-connected businessman to serve as a liaison between the 
private sector and the Reincorporation Program.  The 
Ambassador gave a speech to the American Business Council of 
Colombia on April 15 and urged them to get involved. 
 
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OAS Out of Funding 
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¶4. (C) The OAS verification mission faces similar budget 
problems.  Funding from USAID and the Dutch and Swedish 
Governments will run out in June.  Mission Director Sergio 
Caramagna has said he may be forced to shut down his offices 
without more assistance.  On April 15, Caramagna briefed the 
G-24 countries on the peace process and the OAS mission's 
role.  He emphasized that, although the peace process was not 
perfect, it had already removed almost 5,000 paramilitaries 
from the battlefield and had the potential to remove several 
thousand more.  He pointed out that OAS verification would 
make the process more legitimate and help prevent former 
paramilitaries from returning to another illegal armed group. 
 Caramagna sent a similar message to the OAS Permanent 
Council in March.  Thus far, only the Swedish and Dutch have 
expressed interest in further supporting the mission.  Both 
countries brought in outside consultants to evaluate 
assistance to date and recommend if it should continue. 
 
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No More Demobilizations Planned 
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¶5. (C) Since the debate began on the Law for Justice and 
Peace, there have been no more demobilizations and talks have 
been in a holding pattern.  Restrepo has held at least two 
negotiation sessions with the AUC since February, but they 
have been heated and not resulted in concrete agreements. 
The AUC has complained that the Justice and Peace Law does 
not provide enough legal guarantees.  Some commanders have 
threatened to break off negotations if they are not satisfied 
with the conditions of the peace process.  Many of the 
remaining AUC groups are led by commanders heavily involved 
in drug trafficking who have been reluctant to demobilize. 
Nevertheless, the GOC continues to say it will demobilize all 
of the remaining 15,000 AUC members before the end of Uribe's 
term.  The principle AUC groups left to demobilize include: 
 
-- Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB): includes the Liberators of the 
South and the Vanquishers of Arauca; powerful in the eastern 
plains, the southern Pacific Coast, and the Magdalena River 
valley. 
 
-- Pacific Bloc: Led by Diego Murrillo; powerful on the coast 
of Cauca and Valle del Cauca Department. 
 
-- Centauros Bloc: splintered into at least two groups since 
Bloc commander Miguel Arroyave was killed but is still active 
in the eastern plains. 
 
-- Northern Bloc: led by Jorge 40; active in Cesar, 
Madgalena, and La Guajira Departments. 
 
-- Middle Magdalena Self Defense Forces: led by Ramon Isaza, 
who has been reluctant to demobilize given his mistrust of 
other AUC commanders. 
 
 
WOOD