This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

id: 31335
date: 4/22/2005 15:47
refid: 05BOGOTA3863
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination: 05BOGOTA1531|05BOGOTA555|05SECSTATE43965
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 003863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS VE CO GOV
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA COPES WITH CHAVEZ 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 43965 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 555 
     ¶C. BOGOTA 1531 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) This cable responds to Ref A taskings regarding 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's activities and Colombian 
responses. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary: Border incidents, Venezuela's harboring of 
the FARC and ELN FTOs, and a potential arms race have done 
much to mobilize opinion leaders against Chavez.  President 
Uribe has remained steady in the face of these events, yet 
has not hesitated to pursue Colombian FTOs in Venezuela. 
Trade, development projects, and some bi-national commissions 
have resumed, after resolution of a contretemps over the 
arrest of FARC "FM" Rodrigo Granda.  At least one "Bolivarian 
group" exists in Colombia, but neo-Bolivarian revolutionary 
ideology remains muted.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
Harboring the FARC 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) It is well known in Colombia that FARC and ELN FTOs 
maintain camps in Venezuela.  The GOC has presented specific 
and correct -- though not complete -- information to the GOV 
regarding FARC camps and activities in Venezuela on more than 
one occasion, including by MFA Americas Director Mauricio 
Baquero in person during the Granda crisis (paras 10 and 11). 
 FARC guerrillas captured in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander 
Department report, for example, transport in GOV military 
aircraft, for refuge, rest, and recuperation in Venezuela. 
The GOV has declined to acknowledge the existence of the 
Colombian Guerrillas in Venezuela.  In the wake of the 
massacre of six Venezuelans in September 2004, apparently by 
the FARC, Chavez denied harboring any Colombian illegal armed 
actors.  These denials continue. 
 
-------------------------- 
Bolivarian Group Comes Out 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The GOV and Venezuelan Embassy have been silent 
regarding the application of "Bolivarian" revolutionary 
ideology to Colombia.  The only group to make itself public 
-- after four years of clandestine existence -- is a 
"Bolivarian Circle" in Cucuta, capital of Norte de Santander 
Department, perhaps emboldened by the 
Uribe-Chavez-Lula-Zapatero summit in Venezuela the previous 
week (March 29).  Bogota's El Tiempo reported the group to be 
composed of leftist intellectuals, lawyers, and labor 
leaders.  Group members claimed that the Colombian border was 
Chavez country, and that no one identified with President 
Uribe.  They also expressed fear of violent reprisal.  Their 
first public (though not avowedly Bolivarian) activity was a 
2003 screening of a film celebrating the failure of the 2002 
anti-Chavez coup.  None of the 250 invited local politicians 
and public figures showed up.  One circle-member acknowledged 
corruption and militarization of the GOV as weaknesses of the 
Chavez regime, despite his Bolivarian loyalty. 
 
¶5. (C) The GOC has made no formal comment regarding the 
Cucuta or any other Bolivarian group.  The MFA's Baquero 
(protect) noted that the Venezuela-Colombia Border had its 
own culture and that many residents carried identification 
cards from both countries.  He commented that just as 
Colombian illegal armed groups operated in Venezuela, it was 
understandable that Bolivarian circles would cross the border 
into Colombia.  He speculated that other Bolivarian groups 
existed in Colombia farther from Venezuela, but said that he 
had no specific knowledge.  Del Rosario University political 
scientist Vicente Torrijos told poloff that Bolivarian 
organizations were incipient in Colombia and that an academic 
research unit was needed to put forward a non-leftist 
Bolivarian ideology. 
 
------------------------- 
Uribe Takes the High Road 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The GOC has been consistently calm and measured in its 
public comments on Chavez.  FM Barco noted privately that 
Chavez is consolidating his power and acknowledged his close 
ties to Fidel Castro, but intimated that since he is in 
place, the GOC must deal with him.  Under press questioning, 
she acknowledged Fidel Castro's part in overcoming the 
impasse generated by the Granda affair. 
 
¶7. (C) Incursions: On March 20, 2005 Venezuelan soldiers from 
the Hunter Battalion based in La Fria, Tachira State, 
allegedly entered Guaramito, Norte de Santander, searching 
for contraband gasoline.  Colombian National Police (CNP) 
Commander Jose Henao was quoted that the operation was 
unauthorized and now in the hands of the MFA.  MFA 
Sovereignty Director Mauricio Gonzalez noted that gasoline 
costs ten times as much in Colombia and that some smuggling 
is to be expected.  He dismissed the helicopter overflight, 
but said that the MFA and MINDEF were in contact with 
Venezuelan counterparts and were investigating the alleged 
incursion.  Gonzalez noted that rivers dry and change course, 
leading to land and sovereignty disputes, which he 
characterized as frequently inadvertent, and stressed that 
"mechanisms" were in place to handle border complaints. 
 
¶8. (C) The GOC responded calmly to the arrest in May 2004 of 
some 90 purported Colombian paramilitaries near Caracas. 
President Uribe called for a complete investigation, and 
welcomed the actions of neighboring countries to prevent 
illegal activities of Colombians abroad.  FM Carolina Barco 
met with Chavez in Caracas, who subsequently calmed down, 
though he continued to blame then Colombian Army Commander 
General Martin Carreno, who is from Cucuta where many of the 
arrested Colombians were hired.  Uribe retired Carreno in 
November 2004.  The GOC handled earlier Venezuelan military 
incursions into La Guajira Department in a similarly measured 
manner. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
But Goes After the Guerrillas in Venezuela 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (S/NF) The DATT reports that the Colombian army quietly 
maintains a 100-man counter-guerrilla company in Zulia State, 
Venezuela across from Colombia's La Guajira Department 
searching for FARC Secretariat member alias Ivan Marquez. 
Colombia Military Intelligence is running covert operations 
inside Venezuela and has arranged with Venezuelan police and 
military for the capture and delivery of more than 30 FARC 
and ELN members operating in Venezuela. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Granda Case (Ref B): The GOC announced on 
December 14 the arrest of FARC international liaison chief 
Rodrigo Granda in the border city of Cucuta.  Granda stated 
that he had been detained in Caracas and spirited out of 
Venezuela.  A FARC communique in late December and relentless 
investigation by Bogota daily newspaper El Tiempo, published 
in January 2005, forced the GOC to acknowledge a Venezuela 
component to the operation.  A crescendo of GOV complaints 
culminated in Chavez's recalling his ambassador from Bogota, 
suspending bi-lateral development projects (most notably the 
Venezuela-Colombia-Pacific pipeline), impeding cross-border 
commerce, and demanding an apology and a one-on-one meeting 
with Uribe. 
 
¶11. (C) Uribe consistently euphemized the situation -- "The 
problem is not with Venezuela; it's with the FARC" -- and 
called upon regional leaders to resolve the impasse.  The 
dust had largely settled by the time the two presidents met 
in Venezuela on February 15.  In that meeting Uribe got a 
statement against terrorism, reactivation of bi-national 
commissions, and full resumption of commerce and joint 
development projects.  Chavez got Uribe to visit and to 
express admiration for Simon Bolivar as an inspiration for 
peaceful coexistence in the region. 
 
¶12. (S/NF) The arrest of FARC leader Juan Jose Martinez, aka 
"El Chiguiro" (a species of rodent), in Venezuela is another 
case in point.  According to the DATT, El Chiguiro's arrest 
resulted from a GOC operation, oiled by a 20 million peso 
(USD 8,500) payoff to GOV authorities.  (It was not, as 
presented in the press, a collateral result of a GOV 
investigation into the kidnapping of U.S. major league 
baseball player Urgueth Urbina's mother.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Commercial Ties and Joint Economic Development 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶13. (S) Venezuela is Colombia's second trade partner after 
the United States.  In 2004 Colombian exports (mostly 
manufactured goods) to Venezuela doubled, and Venezuela went 
from a slight export surplus (mostly raw materials) to a 
major trade deficit with Colombia.  Contraband commerce 
includes weapons, AK-47 ammunition (as reported by DATT), and 
gasoline from Venezuela; drugs and rustled cattle from 
Colombia. 
 
¶14. (C) In their November 2004 meeting in Cartagena, 
Presidents Uribe and Chavez heralded progress in negotiations 
for a pipeline to provide Colombian gas to Maracaibo and 
subsequently Venezuelan gas to Colombia.  They also proposed 
a "poliducto" to bring Venezuelan oil to Colombia's Pacific 
Coast (for possible export to China).  At the time 
politicians close to Uribe told us, surprisingly, that the 
personal relationship between Uribe and Chavez was strong. 
Cartagena meeting press conference banter appeared to reflect 
this rapport.  The Cartagena joint declaration followed 
September and November 2004 Transport Minister meetings and 
called for bridge, water, and road development. 
 
¶15. (C) Deputy FM Camilo Reyes enthused (Ref C) over the 
resumption of bi-national commissions in support of such 
initiatives (as agreed upon by Uribe and Chavez in their 
February 15 meeting).  Sub-committees of the fifteen-year-old 
Presidential Commission for Frontier Integration (COPIAF) had 
been meeting regularly to discuss economic, commercial, 
environmental, educational, and communications affairs.  The 
full plenary will meet in Venezuela in May after a two-year 
hiatus.  Normally FMs lead the delegations.  The MFA's 
Gonzalez said that private sector commercial participants 
will outnumber government officials and academics. 
 
¶16. (C) Bi-national plans for pipelines, roads, and 
electricity-sharing have been underway for some time, and 
they are back on track after settlement of the Granda affair. 
 The MFA's Baquero noted, however, that Chavez's wholesale 
replacement of personnel in various ministries has impeded 
progress on joint development projects such as pipeline 
design.  He declined to label the Bolivarian replacements as 
incompetent, noting rather that the new personnel would have 
to catch up. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Media, Opinion Leaders Close Ranks with Uribe 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Border incidents, Venezuela's harboring of the FARC 
and ELN FTOs, and a potential arms race have done much to 
mobilize opinion leaders against Chavez.  The right is openly 
critical, and the left has not been willing to make public 
statements in his favor.  Independent Democratic Pole (PDI) 
Congressman Gustavo Petro claimed the firm U.S. stance on 
Chavez revealed a bias against regional economic and 
infrastructural integration, and asserted that the Granda 
affair was an Uribe reelection ploy.  These comments garnered 
no public support, even from Bogota Mayor (and PDI founder) 
Luis Eduardo Garzon, who, when asked about Chavez, said that 
military politicians, right or left, were not to his liking. 
In private meetings with poloffs, Garzon has been critical of 
Chavez. 
 
¶18. (U) Javierana University historian Martha Marquez views 
Chavez as a classic populist for his direct relation with the 
lower classes and nationalization of resources.  She felt the 
jury was out on Chavez's rejection of "savage neoliberalism." 
 
 
------------------- 
Visas and Migration 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) The GOC does not require visas of entering Venezuelan 
citizens unless they plan to work, nor do initial business 
visits require a visa.  Immigration for Latin-Americans 
requires one year's residence under a formal resident visa. 
Far more Colombians reside in Venezuela than Venezuelans in 
Colombia.  Movement across the border has traditionally been 
fluid, notably among Wayuu indigenous, whose territory 
transcends the border between Colombia's La Guajira 
Department and Venezuela. 
 
--------------- 
Border Security 
--------------- 
 
¶20. (S/NF) Military relations have been gradually worsening, 
though bi-national police cooperation is somewhat better. 
The last Bi-national Frontier Commission meeting (COMBIFRON) 
took place in March 2001.  Chavez canceled the September 2001 
meeting after a dozen years of relatively successful military 
and police cooperation.  Venezuela is the only bordering 
nation with which Colombia has no COMBIFRON.  Subsequent 
cross-border military communication has varied by region and 
commander.  General Matamoros, Commander of the COLMIL 18th 
Brigade, engaged in a harsh verbal exchange with his 
Venezuelan counterpart following an exchange of small arms 
fire between their troops (no casualties reported) in Arauca 
Department some six months ago.  COLMIL First Division 
General Mario Montoya, whose area of responsibility includes 
the border Departments of La Guajira and Cesar, has had staff 
talks with his Venezuelan counterparts. 
 
¶21. (C) In a December meeting in Venezuela, GOC MOD Jorge 
Uribe and GOV MOD General Jorge Luis Garcia agreed to 
semiannual meetings to combat narco-terrorism and drug 
trafficking and to "correct errors."  No date has been set 
for the next MOD meeting, but it is to take place in 
Colombia.  Despite Uribe's apparent satisfaction with the 
outcome of the March 29 summit, Chavez remained unwilling to 
resume the COMBIFRONs. 
 
----------------------- 
Venezuelan Arms Buildup 
----------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Uribe, Chavez, and later Spanish President Rodriguez 
Zapatero have put the best face on Venezeulan arms purchases 
(Russian helicopters, assault rifles, and possibly Migs; 
Brazilian attack aircraft and possibly radar; Spanish 
military transport aircraft and corvettes; and maybe even 
some North Korean missiles).  The presidents say the weapons 
will promote internal security, narcotics interdiction, and 
border control -- and deny that the arms race posited by the 
press will ensue. 
 
¶23. (S/NF) The DATT reports that the COLMIL already feels 
out-gunned along the Venezuelan border, however, and is 
gradually moving up armored vehicles.  The Russian rifles use 
the same ammunition for which the FARC now pays top dollar, 
and their use by Venezuelan forces makes for a potential 
increase in supply and decrease in cost on the Venezuelan 
black market. 
 
¶24. (C) The GOC has expressed interest in buying 155 mm 
howitzers, and Israeli Spike anti-armor missiles.  (Venezuela 
has AMX 30 tanks; Spain under Rodriguez Zapatero canceled an 
AMX tank sale to GOC based on an offer by the previous Aznar 
government.)  The COLMIL wants to get its M113 armored 
personnel carriers back on the road and mount machine guns 
and or missiles on them. 
 
¶25. (C) Colombian Senate President Humberto Gomez Gallo 
publicly criticized Spain's billion dollar arms sale to the 
GOV during President Rodriguez Zapatero's visit.  Editorial 
comment characterized Rodriguez Zapatero's participation in 
the four-president summit in Venezuela as a cover for the 
billion dollar arms sale.  The MFA's Baquero (protect) 
allowed that Chavez's arms purchases bore watching, but 
rejected the possibility of a Venezuelan invasion. 
 
---------------------- 
Ideology and Diplomacy 
---------------------- 
 
¶26. (C) The March 29 summit pitted Uribe's center-right 
ideology against Chavez and two other leftists.  Uribe wanted 
the declaration to say that terrorism causes poverty.  The 
others wanted a statement that poverty causes terrorism, 
which Uribe rejected as justifying the actions of the illegal 
armed groups operating in Colombia.  The compromise document 
noted that poverty caused a variety of social ills including 
violence, and that terrorism, in Colombia, caused poverty (by 
inhibiting investment, etc.). 
WOOD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================