This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002798 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USARPAC FOR LTG BROWN 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV TH POL MIL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO THAILAND OF USARPAC 
COMMANDER LTG JOHN BROWN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C)  General Brown, your visit to Bangkok to meet with 
Royal Thai Army (RTA) leaders and Chiang Mai to observe this 
year's Cobra Gold exercise will allow you an opportunity to 
develop relationships with senior Thai Army officers.  We 
have requested meetings for you with RTA CINC GEN Prawit 
Wongsuwan (General PRAH-WIT), Royal Thai Supreme Command 
(RTSC) Chief of Staff General Boonsrang Niampradith (General 
BOON-SANG),  RTSC J-3 LTG Khemerat Kanchanawat (General 
KEM-AH-RAHT), and RTSC J-7 MG Noporat Yodvimol (General 
NO-PO-RAHT).  In these meetings, you will get a sense of how 
important years of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) has 
been.  This cooperation was perhaps best illustrated recently 
during our cooperation to mitigate the damage caused in SE 
Asia by the December 26 tsunami.  Since Cobra Gold this year 
will focus on lessons learned from the tsunami, it will be 
appropriate for you to probe your interlocutors to learn how 
our years of joint combined exercises, training and 
cooperation has benefited Thailand's ability to take part in 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq 
as well as prepare Thai forces to work better during the 
tsunami crisis.  You will find the Thai Army to be by far the 
 
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most powerful branch of the Thai armed forces.  You may also 
wish to discuss challenges RTA and RTSC officers face in 
improving "jointness" among the Thai services.  End Summary 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶2.  (C)  Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. 
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive 
response to the December 26 tsunami was palpable.  Thailand 
is a Treaty Ally and has been firmly supportive of the 
International War on Terror and has participated in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct 
investment in Thailand.  The United States is Thailand's 
largest export market and its second-largest foreign 
investor. 
¶3.  (C)  Nonetheless, there are points of friction. Human 
rights remains a key concern.  On October 25, 2004, poorly 
trained Thai military and civilian security forces forced 
nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be 
transported to a military base nearly three hours away.  78 
protesters died en route.  The State Department's annual 
human rights report (HRR), which in 2004 voiced concern over 
the lack of accountability for approximately 1,300 
extrajudicial killings in the initial 2003 phase of a Thai 
"war on drugs" promoted by the Prime Minister, rankles the 
Thai Government. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with 
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic 
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration 
for us.  The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but 
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with 
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make 
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal 
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma. 
 
¶5.  (C)  It surprises many visitors from Washington to learn 
that the Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons 
systems in its arsenal.  While Thai military links with the 
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai 
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast 
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the 
military.  Recently, we have learned that China is 
refurbishing tanks and air defense equipment provided to 
Thailand in the late 1980's.  Thailand is also currently 
negotiating a barter deal trading Chinese armored vehicles 
for Thai fruit.  Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and 
Thailand have expanded in recent years as has the number of 
bilateral military VIP visits. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
¶6.  (C)  We conduct a wide range of major exercises and 
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra 
Gold, the annual exercise which in 2004 involved 
approximately 13,500 U.S. service members and 6,000 Thais. 
Cobra Gold 2005 will be smaller than last year, primarily due 
to U.S. commitments elsewhere and the large number of U.S. 
forces sent to the region for tsunami relief.  Utapao, the 
Thai Navy Air Base used as the primary staging area for U.S. 
disaster relief efforts in the region, has long been a 
critical support hub for U.S. aircraft transiting the region. 
 Over 420 DoD aircraft use it each year.  From January 25 
until February 4, we conducted our largest air exercise with 
the Thai, Cope Tiger.  This year, F-18's from the USS Abraham 
Lincoln participated.  Our largest naval exercise is the 
Combined Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series which 
will take place again in June.  Recently, a number of senior 
U.S. military officials have visited Thailand -- then-Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visited in January, Seventh 
 
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Fleet Commander VADM Greenert came in February and March, 
SOCPAC Commander BG Fridovich was in Thailand April 17-20, 13 
AF Maj.Gen. Rice came April 19-21, and JIATF-West Commander 
Admiral Rear Admiral Kelly visited April 20-24.  ADM Fallon 
will be visiting Thailand a few days prior to your trip. 
 
A NOTE ON THAI MILITARY STRUCTURE 
 
¶7.  (C)  The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai 
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services.  As such, the Royal 
Thai Army Commander traditionally wields more real power than 
the Supreme Commander.  General Chaisit Shinawatra was the 
head of the RTA until the military reshuffle last October. 
His "promotion" to head Supreme Command is viewed by many as 
the result of PM Thaksin's displeasure with Chaisit's 
inability to quickly control the unrest in the southern part 
of the country.  In October, Thaksin named Deputy Supreme 
Commander Sirichai Thanyasiri (General SIR-A-CHAI) to take 
over strategic planning for the south.  Thailand's armed 
forces, which had a history of interfering in the country's 
politics, have not emerged from the barracks since 1992 and 
appear to be fully reconciled to constitutional roles of 
defense and security.  Their exposure to US civil-military 
values through their extensive participation in IMET training 
deserves some credit for this transformation of their 
attitude towards democracy. 
 
THE RTA 
 
¶8.  (C)  The RTA is a legacy force faced with serious 
modernization issues.  Although 30 years have passed, the RTA 
is still primarily designed to defeat the large conventional 
threat that Vietnam represented in the mid-1980's.  On paper, 
the RTA would seem to possess the capability to defeat a 
large conventional attack -- it seems to possess an 
impressive number of main battle tanks, TOW missiles, and 
helicopters.  Digging deeper, however, one quickly discovers 
real equipment problems.  80 of Thailand's 100 M60A3 main 
battle tanks are inoperable, TOW missiles are past their 
useful life expectancy and, at any given time, only 30 of the 
RTA's 96 UH-1 helicopters are operational. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the 
budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  Since that time, budgets have 
increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels.  Accordingly, 
the RTA must selectively choose how to modernize.  Serious 
corruption in the procurement process is still widespread -- 
and acknowledged by many Thai officers.  Consequently, the 
RTA relies on JUSMAGTHAI and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
system for many of their high-profile procurement programs. 
Recent examples include: 
 
--the 32 million USD purchase of 30 fully refurbished UH-1H 
helicopters; 
--the 84 million USD purchase of 7 UH-60 helicopters (five 
already delivered, two due in December); 
--a recent request for 20,000 M-16A4 rifles valued at 12 
million USD, and; 
--a proposal to buy and refurbish 7 AH-1 Cobras at a cost of 
25 million USD. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The RTA's transformation vision, unpublished and 
informal as it is, is to become lighter and more mobile with 
upgraded C4I systems that will make it more agile 
operationally.  On the C4I front, much work remains.  The RTA 
HQ and subordinate commands use commercial dial-up Internet 
services and email accounts, if they use email at all.  They 
do have VTC capability and use it frequently. 
 
THE TSUNAMI AFTERMATH AND COBRA GOLD 
 
¶11.  (U)  The massive rescue and recovery operation 
undertaken by the U.S. military as a result of the December 
26 tsunami was historic.  Mercifully, U.S. casualties were 
much lighter (about two dozen confirmed or presumed dead) 
than those suffered by several other countries.  Thousands of 
Thai, Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket 
area -- a haven for vacationers during the holiday season. 
Total fatalities will likely never be known; the official 
number is about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they 
expect the final death toll to top 8,000. 
 
¶12.  (C)  U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S. 
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in 
Thailand.  III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was 
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 
536), which was based out of Utapao.  CSF 536 worked closely 
with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to ensure that requests for 
assistance were promptly addressed and to assist coordination 
of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs and corporate donors. 
The Royal Thai Armed Forces granted the U.S. military blanket 
overflight clearances for relief operations in the region, 
including for aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle 
Group which operated off Sumatra.  In addition to permitting 
our use of Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai 
officers into the CSF staff where needed.  During the height 
of operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of 
Utapao. We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies within 
Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body bags. 
USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and 
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while 
bulk shipments tended to go overland.  USN P-3s positioned at 
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the vicinity 
of Thailand and in the region.  Teams made up of medical 
specialists from the CDC, the Armed Forces Research Institute 
of Medical Science and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command 
in Hawaii were also deployed to Thailand to assist with 
victim identification.  U.S. Navy SEALS and a representative 
from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance worked closely 
with Thai military units to search for the remains of 
American and other victims of the disaster. From the 
beginning of the disaster, the Defense Attache Office painted 
the intel picture for commanders, forces, planners, and 
national decision makers.  Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour 
American Citizens Services for weeks after the crisis to 
assist Americans, claim Amcit remains and coordinate USG 
relief efforts. 
 
¶13.  (C)  CSF 536's concept of operations set up Utapao as 
the hub for U.S. relief efforts bound for Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia in addition to Thailand.  In each of those 
countries, Combined Support Groups (CSG) were established to 
interact with the local government, the U.S. Embassies and 
the NGO community.  CSG-Thailand was based in Phuket and 
redeployed on January 22.  Since that time, ongoing 
reconstruction efforts in Thailand are being managed by the 
Embassy, JUSMAGTHAI, and USAID.  A key part of those efforts 
is to focus civil affairs projects carried out under our 
military exercise authority in Thailand to assist Thais 
rebuilding in the devastated areas around Phuket.  At least 
one COMREL project conducted as part of Cobra Gold 05 will 
take place in the tsunami-devastated region. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Cobra Gold 2005 will consist of a one-week disaster 
relief seminar for military, government civilians and NGOs, 
aimed at capturing some lessons learned from the tsunami 
mitigation effort followed by a one-week staff exercise in 
Chiang Mai focused on a disaster relief scenario.  In your 
discussions with Thai officials, it will be appropriate for 
you to underscore the fact that our successes in mitigating 
the damage caused by the tsunami were due in no small part to 
the decades of military cooperation between our two 
countries, cooperation that is perhaps best symbolized by the 
annual Cobra Gold exercise.  By focusing Cobra Gold 05 on 
disaster relief, we hope to capture the lessons learned by 
U.S., Thai, Japanese and Singaporean units who participated 
in Operation Unified Assistance and improve our ability to 
respond to future disasters. 
 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
¶15.  (C)  Besides dealing with the tsunami aftermath, Prime 
Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge is the 
unsettled security situation in the far southern part of the 
country.  Southern Thailand, and in particular the 
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was 
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, 2004 
witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence, with 
over 500 people killed either by militants or by security 
forces.  Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked 
symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to 
be almost daily incidents of violence, notably even after the 
tsunami disaster of December 26.  Attacks most often involve 
 
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isolated shootings of local officials, although increasingly 
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common.  While 
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or 
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that 
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their 
own purposes. 
 
¶16.  (C)  Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem 
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs 
as he once declared, and is an issue that potentially reaches 
beyond Thailand's borders.  Last December, Thaksin claimed 
publicly during a radio address that Thai militants are 
training in Malaysia and that Indonesian extremists are 
instigating some of the violence.  This rather clumsy public 
assertion offended the two fellow ASEAN governments.  Thaksin 
is not likely to ask for direct U.S. assistance as the RTG 
maintains -- as do we -- that the southern situation is 
primarily a domestic issue.  Until recently, this violence 
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence 
of attacks directed towards foreign interests.  On April 3, 
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned 
Carrefour supermarket in Songkla's Hat Yai City and at the 
Hat Yai airport, killing two persons and injuring two 
American citizens.   Thai officials may ask you for U.S. 
equipment and technology such as UAVs to support efforts to 
monitor militant movements in the south.  We recommend you be 
receptive but noncommittal, and suggest that technical 
experts follow up.  You may also wish to point to our plans 
to improve human rights training for Thai soldiers and 
officers who will rotate to the south.  We are working with 
U.S. experts to develop a multi-faceted training program to 
educate enlisted soldiers, mid-level officers and senior Thai 
leadership.  It would be prudent to keep in mind that Thaksin 
-- and most Thais -- are sensitive about any perception that 
the U.S. wants to establish a security presence in the south. 
 Outrageous but widely circulated rumors that the U.S. has 
fomented violence in the South also need to be considered 
when discussing offers of possible U.S. assistance.  In your 
meetings, you may wish to: 
 
--Seek your interlocutor's assessment of the situation in the 
south and to ask what the Thai strategy is to bring the 
situation under control; 
--Point out our desire that any Thai security response be 
conducted while respecting international human rights norms 
and explain the negative consequences associated with 
incidents like Tak Bai. 
 
THAILAND AND IRAQ 
 
¶17.  (C)  Thailand dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part 
of OIF.  In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a 
car bomb while on duty in Karbala.  Thailand's second 
six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq 
ended on September 20, 2004.  While participation in OIF has 
not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in 
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's 
deployments to Iraq against him.  Several RTG officials have 
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by 
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south.  Recently, 
CJCS General Myers sent a letter to General Chaisit asking 
Thailand to consider sending staff officers to man the OIF 
Multinational Headquarters.  It would be appropriate for you 
to ask your interlocutors how they intend to answer General 
Myers' request.  Similarly, during your meetings with senior 
Thai officials, you may wish to: 
 
--Express appreciation for Thailand's previous deployments to 
Afghanistan and Iraq; 
--Explain that the Administration hopes Thailand will 
consider a follow-on deployment in support of OIF; 
--Assure RTG leaders that U.S. military experts will help 
them shape the deployment. 
 
INTEL COOPERATION 
 
¶18.  (C)  PACOM J2 tried to implement an Intelligence 
Modernization Program with the Royal Thai Armed Forces during 
the past year.  However, the Thai military intelligence 
community stiff-armed the offer, primarily on the 
questionable grounds that the individual services do not want 
or need to be part of the joint approach offered by USPACOM. 
This helps illustrate a problem the Thai military -- and the 
Thai Government -- has in dealing with the southern 
insurgency, i.e., excessive stovepiping of information and 
insufficient sharing within the Armed Forces or with other 
agencies.  While our bilateral intel relationship is good, it 
can be improved, especially at the military-to-military 
level.  USARPAC has been at the forefront of conducting 
valuable intelligence related subject matter expert exchanges 
for many years.  In discussing intelligence matters with your 
interlocutors, you may wish to: 
 
--Underscore lessons the U.S. Government has learned about 
intelligence cooperation and the necessity to link 
intelligence together from the military services, Joint 
Commands, and other Agencies. 
--Emphasize that your G2, in coordination with the PACOM J2, 
will continue to work the RTA and joint pieces of 
intelligence modernization with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. 
 
¶19.  (U)  We look forward to seeing you.  Best wishes, and 
have a safe journey. 
BOYCE