This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH BM ASEAN BURMA
SUBJECT: THAILAND'S POSITION ON BURMA AND ASEAN: NEW FACE, 
SAME POLICY 
 
REF: STATE 50205 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke, Reason: 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The appointment of a new foreign minister, 
Kantathi Suphamongkhon, will not substantially change 
Thailand's "constructive engagement" policy towards Burma, 
according to a key Foreign Ministry (MFA) official 
responsible for Burma.  Kantathi has already publicly (and 
privately) made clear that Thailand will not join a movement 
to thwart Burma from assuming the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 
if it has not implemented democratic reforms before then. 
The MFA official said the Burma chairmanship issue will be 
discussed informally in Cebu, but he doubted that other ASEAN 
governments -- despite some recent statements -- were serious 
about pressuring Burma on that issue.  On related matters, 
the "Bangkok Process" appears dead because the SPDC does not 
want to engage potential critics while it still has not 
achieved any reform progress with which to respond.  The Thai 
believe that the European Union (EU) is on the verge of 
softening its policy towards Burma.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 22, Post conveyed reftel para 5 talking 
points in a non-paper to MFA and, on March 31, PolCouns 
followed up with Director Damrong Kriakruan, the senior 
working level official handling Burma.  Many of reftel's 
points were also raised with new Foreign Minister Kantathi 
Suphamongkhon on March 30 by visiting Ambassador to Korea and 
A/S Designate for EAP Christopher Hill (septel), by visiting 
Congressman Adam Smith (D, WA) in a separate meeting, by 
Ambassador Boyce in both meetings, and underscored in a paper 
the Ambassador left with the FM. 
 
¶3. (C) On March 31, Polcouns and Poloff Sweeney reiterated 
the reftel points, elaborating on the negative U.S. view of 
recent developments in Burma and asking for the RTG's latest 
thinking on its own Burma policy and the Burma ASEAN 
chairmanship issue.  Damrong responded that he expected to 
brief FM Kanthathi in the near future on the details of 
Thailand's "Myanmar" policy, but it already seemed clear that 
no change in the "constructive engagement" approach is in the 
offing.  He said that Kanthati has already publicly stated 
his disagreement with the idea put forward by some other 
ASEANs to put pressure on Burma to implement democratic 
reforms or forgo assuming the ASEAN chairmanship for 2006-7. 
He said he expected that the RTG will continue to dialogue 
with the SPDC and, while there are no specific plans yet for 
Kantathi to travel to Burma, the FM will take time to 
approach the SPDC as he has had no personal contact with the 
Burmese generals.  Damrong noted that the plan from former FM 
Surakiart's tenure for an informal "high level meeting" with 
Burmese General Thura Shwe Mann in late May is still on the 
calendar.  He said that MFA has also been approached by both 
SPDC FM Nyan Win and PM Soe Win about visiting Thailand, but 
the RTG has not responded. 
 
¶4. (C) Carefully emphasizing that it was only his personal 
view, Damrong said there might be some room for "fine tuning" 
in Burma relations as Kantathi had also recently been quoted 
as saying that the RTG "won't let the Burma issue compromise 
Thailand's regional standing."  This, he said, could mean 
there is a limit to how much the Thais could really engage 
the Rangoon regime, and might possibly result in "a slight 
step back" from pursuing the bilateral ties. 
 
¶5. (C) Damrong also opined, however, that recent calls by 
Malaysian and Singapore MPs and officials to bring up the 
Burma chairmanship issue in Cebu later this month are mainly 
"a show," allowed by many ASEAN governments, including the 
RTG, to highlight concerns to Burma while keeping the ASEAN 
mechanism and policy of non-interference essentially 
unchanged.  The Thai view, he commented wryly, is "Let 
Kraisak make the noise," a reference to Senator Kraisak 
Choonhavan, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, who is a vocal critic of the Burmese regime.  And 
Damrong said that he did not expect that, in the end, other 
ASEAN governments would join a serious consensus to pressure 
the Burmese, not even the Malaysians.  (Note:  On March 29, 
it was reported locally that Prime Minister Thaksin -- 
supposedly commenting on a statement made by Malaysian FM 
Syed Hamid Albar to the effect that the Burma chairmanship 
issue could only be decided by a full ASEAN consensus -- 
agreed that "all ASEAN members together will have to find a 
solution and decide how to show collective concern to Myanmar 
for its adjustment." End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Damrong said he nevertheless did expect the Burma 
chairmanship issue to be discussed extensively at the ASEAN 
ministerial "retreat" in Cebu although, in line with ASEAN 
traditions, the issue does not even appear on the "indicative 
list" (informal agenda) for that meeting.  However, he also 
noted that Burma is aware that it has about 15 months left 
until the ASEAN ministerial in November 2006, enough time to 
run through its National Convention constitution-drafting 
exercise and a possible referendum, which will probably be 
"good enough for ASEAN." 
 
¶7. (C) Damrong commented that the "Bangkok Process" is 
definitely dead as the SPCD does not want to participate in 
meetings with Europeans and others where they (the Burmese) 
have nothing to talk about in terms of democratic openings 
and only open themselves up to criticism.  Damrong also 
mentioned that he had a follow-on meeting that morning with a 
local representative of the European Commission (EC) who 
apparently wanted to discuss contemplated changes in European 
Union policy towards Burma in the direction of resuming 
high-level visits, restoring some European aid programs, and 
easing up on European use of sanctions.  After that meeting, 
Damrong told PolCouns that the EU seems to moving to these 
revised positions. 
ARVIZU