This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 
TAGS: PBTS PTER PINS PREL PGOV IZ IR JO KU SY SA TU
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST--CONTINUED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY SUPPORT FOR BORDER SUPPORT TEAM MISSION IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. US CUSTOMS 131939Z APR 05 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 1562 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 1646 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(a), (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C/REL TO UK AND AUS)  This is an action request.  See 
paragraph 2. 
 
¶2.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  Action Request: Post asks that 
the Department of State request the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (Customs and Border Protection) to continue 
its  support of the Border Support Team mission in Iraq. 
Teams at Trebil, Waleed, Rabia and Baghdad International 
Airport (BIAP) are due to depart at the end of their 
ninety-day tours at varying dates in September.  Post asks 
that the Department request replacement teams and that they 
be deployed in time to allow for an overlap of at least one 
week at the border sites.  The same standard should be 
applied to subsequent replacements.  Post welcomes the DHS's 
offer to provide a Country Director in late July. End action 
request. 
 
¶3.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  Border Support Teams (BSTs) 
deployed to Iraq by the DHS Customs and Border Protection 
agency are an essential ingredient in the execution of Iraq's 
strategy to reduce illegal traffic and to facilitate the flow 
of legal cross-border traffic.  BSTs are performing superbly 
at the three border ports of entry (POE) and at the Baghdad 
International Airport (BIAP).  One major result of their work 
is expedited trucking from Syria and Jordan, essential to the 
food distribution system in Iraq.  Although not quantifiable, 
the BSTs have also likely disrupted smuggling and the flow of 
foreign fighters.  While noticeable progress is already 
evident, numerous challenges remain, making their presence in 
Iraq a continuing requirement. 
 
¶4.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  The Iraqi initiative to provide a 
unified POE command under a single officer with 
multi-ministerial authority is a new initiative, which 
followed considerable coalition encouragement.  The new POE 
Directors General are going to need mentoring and a period of 
staff development.  The BSTs represent the best means of 
delivering this expertise and support, making them 
fundamental to the success of the initiative. 
 
¶5.  (C/- REL TO UK AND AUS)  Other challenges at the POEs 
will also require BST involvement for the foreseeable future. 
 BSTs have identified shortcomings in physical security and 
traffic flow that take time to eliminate, both for 
construction and for development of proper implementing 
procedures.  They have also identified challenges in 
organization and training of POE personnel.  While some of 
the solutions are fairly simple procedural matters, the BSTs 
have seen that the POE personnel revert to their previous 
inefficient and ineffective procedures when appropriate 
leadership is not available.  That leadership is often 
provided by the BST; developing the Iraqi leadership to 
perform the same function will take much time.  Some 
technological solutions (e.g., PISCES, Z-Back Scatter) being 
introduced will also require significant time to ensure 
effective operations and maintenance.  Rapid personnel 
turnover in the POEs -- probably a fact of life because of 
their remote locations and austere operating environs - 
- also means that solutions to problems depend on the 
long-term commitment of the BSTs.  Success at the POEs is 
further dependent on the development of complementary support 
capabilities being developed at the appropriate ministries, 
another long-term issue. 
 
¶6.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  DHS has proposed a fairly robust 
Baghdad-based team that moves out to the POEs as required. 
If funding can be found, DHS's proposal may be an acceptable 
alternative in the mid-term future; but not until conditions 
for success have been established at least at the current 
locations.  Other POEs (e.g., ArAr, Um Qasr, Habur Gate) face 
challenges and may need BSTs of their own in the mid-term. 
Options for deploying teams to those POEs need to be retained. 
 
¶7.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  Based on their employment 
experience, BST members have recommended changes to team 
composition and employment.  The addition of the promised DHS 
Country Director to the Mission Country Team will enhance the 
ability of the Mission to evaluate the performance of the 
BSTs and to make decisions about team composition and 
employment principles, as well as the need for subsequent 
replacements. 
 
¶8.  (C/ REL TO UK AND AUS)  By having a positive effect on 
the legal traffic flow at the POEs, DHS Border Support Teams 
complement nicely the efforts of the Multi-National 
Force-Iraq to stop the illegal flow along other parts of the 
border.  DHS continued support of this important mission 
would be greatly appreciated. 
 
¶9.  (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO KIRKUK 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield