This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000531 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL SNAR PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY'S AG UPSET OVER INCSR, DISCUSSES: 
CABRAL, HIJAZI, POLICE REFORM,  AND MONEY LAUNDERING WITH 
AMBASSADOR 
 
 
Classified By: DCM KEVIN M. JOHNSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C)  AG Oscar Latorre complained vigorously to Ambassador 
4/14 that the section of the 2005 International Narcotics 
Strategy Control Report (INCSR) on Paraguay unfairly singled 
him out for criticism.  Ambassador stressed that the report 
identified problems with the Public Ministry he heads rather 
than him personally, and explained why.  Latorre predicted 
Cabral,s promotion was dead, one way or another.  He offered 
only tepid proposals to advance the Hijazi tax evasion/money 
laundering case, money laundering legislation, and 
cooperation with SENAD and SEPRELAD, alleging that in the 
case of the latter issue these institutions must prove 
themselves to prosecutors.  Significantly, he said the 
President would by decree designate 50 police officers to 
form an elite unit under the AG pending establishment of a 
new judicial police force.  Latorre was genuinely irate over 
the INSCR, but displayed the stonewalling attitude on a host 
of issues that is a major source of criticism.  The AG 
apparently fears cooperating too closely with the USG and 
allies in SEPRELAD and SENAD will limit his freedom of 
action.  End Summary. 
 
INCSR AND THE ANGRY AG 
 
¶2.  (C)  Ambassador hosted lunch for AG Latorre April 14 
after the AG made it known he was livid over criticism in the 
INCSR.  Latorre said he was shocked and angered over language 
he interpreted to be directed at him personally, signaling 
that he was worse than the police and judicial sectors, which 
were cited for corruption while he was also called 
inefficient.  Noting that the criticism was institutional, 
rather than personal, the Ambassador conceded that some 
language should be more precise.  Latorre asked if this was 
retribution for the Cabral case, alleging he had no 
responsibility for the multiple misdeeds by prosecutors and 
others in letting Cabral escape punishment.  The Ambassador 
said it was about institutional problems, not one case. 
Latorre claimed that SENAD personnel (not necessarily SENAD 
Chief Hugo Ibarra) plotted against him, including campaigning 
for Ruben Romero, the President of the Council of 
Magistrates, to replace him. 
 
CABRAL 
 
¶3.  (C)  After a lengthy, self-serving  self defense of his 
own role in the Cabral affair, Latorre said the President now 
sought a new indictment of Cabral as grounds to withdraw his 
promotion from the Senate.  &NDF calls me every day on 
this,8 lamented Latorre, arguing that the legal issues were 
difficult.  New evidence and accusations by the trafficker 
Jaime Amato don,t stand up to legal scrutiny, he said, and 
previous charges were badly mishandled, making it hard to 
move forward.  & I don,t want to be another General 
Rodriguez,8 he continued, referring to the former head of 
SENAD assassinated in the mid-90s.  In conclusion, however, 
Latorre said Cabral,s promotion was now out of the question; 
it was just a matter of deciding how to end the situation. 
(Comment: Throughout the Cabral affair actors in all branches 
of government have steadfastly pushed responsibility for 
derailing his promotion to others; the President, 
prosecutors, the Supreme Court, and the Senate have all 
refused good opportunities to put this to rest.  The back and 
forth continues in an almost comic way, but Cabral,s 
promotion now appears less likely.  End Comment.) 
 
MONEY LAUNDERING LAW 
 
¶4.  (C)  Latorre praised the draft money laundering 
legislation in the Senate, arguing that it was a good moment 
to push it, and there shouldn,t be too much opposition.  He 
suggested a joint meeting with Colorado Senator Bader Rachid, 
who heads a committee examining broader penal code reform, to 
gain momentum.  The Ambassador asked about NDF and Latorre 
pushing it, rather than relying on Rachid (an uncertain ally 
at best).  Latorre agreed the President could do that. 
(Comment:  Rachid and other Senators close to shady business 
leaders may wish to shape the legislation in small but 
important ways to protect themselves and their friends. 
Latorre,s suggested approach shows reluctance to push the 
law; he prefers either making a deal with powerful Senators 
or having others do the pushing.  Ambassador will raise this 
again with President Duarte, who has expressed strong support 
for the bill but will now need to press Senators to pass it. 
End Comment.) 
 
FISCALIA COOPERATION WITH SEPRELAD AND SENAD 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador pressed Latorre for better 
cooperation by prosecutors with SEPRELAD.  The AG described 
at length why prosecutors historically haven,t trusted 
SEPRELAD or SENAD, arguing that small steps are needed to 
build confidence.  Asked about the Hijazi money laundering 
case, Latorre suggested a meeting where SEPRELAD could 
explain to prosecutors how it can help.   (Note: this has 
been done already.  end note.)  Asked about unfulfilled 
promises by prosecutors to share documents with SEPRELAD, he 
repeated his argument that trust needs to be established.  He 
suggested working a few small cases, such as illicit 
enrichment by police officers, as a first step.  Latorre then 
criticized SENAD, saying it was impossible to believe the 
marijuana in San Pedro Department couldn,t be detected and 
destroyed; SENAD lacked the will to act, he maintained.  The 
Ambassador noted dramatic improvements in SENAD and SEPRELAD 
and urged prosecutors to take better advantage of their help. 
 (Comment:  Latorre,s laments about two imperfect but 
improving institutions rang especially hollow given the poor 
public image of prosecutors from different offices within the 
Public Ministry.  End Comment.) 
 
NEW POLICE UNIT 
 
¶6.  (U)  The AG said NDF had agreed to detail 50 police 
officers to his office to form an elite investigative unit. 
This is an interim step to deal with dramatic problems in the 
police pending possible creation of a new judicial police 
force, he added. 
 
COMMENT:  CONFIDENTLY PURSUING HIS OWN AGENDA 
 
¶7.  (C)  Strengthened by his relatively good performance in 
the Cubas case (compared to the police), Latorre may be 
reelected in August and is flexing his muscles.  While the 
INCSR language bothered him, his exaggerated reaction is a 
way to question whether it is worth it to cooperate with the 
USG and agencies we,ve sponsored (SEPRELAD and SENAD.)  His 
reluctance to share information with Embassy allies has a 
simpler explanation, however; too close cooperation limits 
his ability to control the agenda, decide who gets prosecuted 
and what information gets public, which friends are rewarded 
and enemies punished, etc. 
 
KEANE