This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 001391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/SNEC, INR/REA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KZ GG POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SAAKASHVILI AND NAZARBAYEV MEET IN 
ASTANA 
 
 
Classified By: POEC Chief Deborah Mennuti, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili made 
a state visit to Astana March 30-April 1.  Presidents 
Nazarbayev and Saakashvili met at Nazarbayev's new residence 
in Astana, conducted a joint press conference and talked 
alone for two unscheduled hours following the state dinner 
for Saakashvili on March 30.  Although the situation in 
Kyrgyzstan consumed a significant part of the leaders' 
conversation at their official meeting (and Saakashvili 
issued a joint statement on the subject with Ukrainian 
President Yushchenko during the visit), the tangible results 
of the talks were confined to new understandings on 
investments and economic cooperation.  While to all outward 
appearances the visit went off without a hitch, the GOK 
viewed Saakashvili's visit with some trepidation from the 
time it was announced, and their consternation seemed to 
increase as events in Kyrgyzstan unfolded.  The GOK took care 
to keep Saakashvili out of any venues where he might make 
statements that the Kazakhstani opposition cou 
ld seize on as signs of support.  End summary. 
 
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A Calm, Cordial Visit... 
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¶2. (C) The DCM of the Georgian Embassy in Astana (who was 
present at all of the official events) provided a detailed 
readout of the visit to Emboff after Saakashvili's departure. 
 The outward results of the visit were positive, if modest. 
Four protocols were signed - establishing a partnership 
between Astana and Tbilisi, another between the port 
authorities of Aktau and Poti, a memorandum of understanding 
on trade relations and an additional protocol to their mutual 
legal assistance treaty.  In their official meeting, which 
the DCM described as lengthy and productive, the two 
presidents also discussed the possibility of increasing the 
amount of Kazakhstani oil that transits the Baku-Sup'sa 
pipeline, in addition to BTC.  Both sides expressed general 
interest in Kazakhstani export of natural gas to Georgia. 
¶3. (C) The DCM confirmed that Kyrgyzstan was discussed, and 
reported that Nazarbayev repeated the appraisal of the 
situation that he made publicly: that the Kyrgyz revolution 
was carried out by criminals and hooligans, and that the 
country's low standard of living was to blame.  It does not 
appear that Saakashvili made any proposals to Nazarbayev on 
the situation (Akayev had not resigned yet), although the 
Georgian Foreign Minister dropped out of the President's 
delegation to go to Bishkek and remained there throughout 
Saakashvili's Astana visit. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The two Presidents held a joint press conference, 
where they emphasized the growing commercial relationship 
between Kazakhstan and Georgia (trade turnover in 2004 only 
approached $40 million, but has quadrupled in the past three 
years).  Saakashvili was effusive in his praise for 
Kazakhstan's market reforms and even its political evolution 
and made a point of praising Nazarbayev by name several times. 
 
¶5. (C) Nazarbayev hosted a dinner for Saakashvili in the new 
Presidential residence "Ak Orda."  After the dinner, 
Nazarbayev invited Saakashvili for an impromptu tour of 
Astana.  According to the DCM, the two Presidents toured the 
city without aides for two hours, making stops at the 
"Baiterek" monument and the "Duman" saltwater aquarium. 
 
-------------------------------- 
But It Didn't Start Out That Way 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Although in the end the visit went smoothly, the DCM 
told Emboff that it was obvious from the start that the GOK 
viewed Saakashvili's visit with trepidation, which was 
clearly compounded by the situation in Bishkek.  The GOK's 
discomfort was most evident in its undiplomatic handling of 
Saakashvili's itinerary, which MFA officials privately said 
was out of the Ministry's control. 
 
¶6. (C) The Georgian DCM reported that the Ministry refused to 
draft a schedule for the visit, only grudgingly providing one 
when the Georgians insisted it was Kazakhstan's 
responsibility.  The MFA also suddenly, after preparations 
were well underway, insisted on changing the character of the 
visit from an official to a state visit.  The DCM believed 
that the GOK felt that doing so would impose a more 
ceremonial, rehearsed structure on the visit. 
 
¶7. (C) The most contentious arguments took place over 
Saakashvili's speaking engagements.  The Georgian side 
requested time for Saakashvili to address both the Parliament 
and the students and faculty of Gumilev Eurasian University. 
 
 
While the address to Parliament appears to have been a 
non-starter, MFA's first draft of the schedule included the 
address to the students.  State Protocol quickly reneged on 
that proposal, explaining that the University was "too busy" 
that day. 
 
¶8. (C) MFA working-level officials told the DCM that this was 
not MFA's call, and Volkov himself told the DCM that he had 
been "reprimanded" for including the university address in 
the first schedule.  Volkov indicated that there were 
"differences in approach" to the visit in various quarters of 
the GOK.  In the end, Saakashvili gave a private talk to 
selected students and faculty from the Diplomatic Academy. 
 
¶9. (C) The DCM told Emboff that these and other indications 
of GOK hostility to the visit spurred the Georgian side to 
file a last-minute flight plan requesting departure on March 
30 (i.e. the same day as Saakashvili's arrival) in the event 
of a major snub to their President.  He suggested that 
Nazarbayev personally decided whether Saakashvili would make 
the speeches the Georgians had requested. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (C) For all of the wrangling that preceded the 
Nazarbayev-Saakashvili meeting, it turned out to be 
businesslike and uneventful.  Each leader seems to have 
gotten what he wanted: Saakashvili appears to have piqued 
Kazakhstani interest in increasing trade with and investment 
in Georgia, and Nazarbayev got through the visit without 
providing the opposition access to Saakashvili or a statement 
from the Georgian President they might seize as an indication 
of support.  Clearly, very senior figures in the GOK feared 
that unscripted appearances by Saakashvili before Parliament 
or the University risked providing the opposition with a 
political boost.  Those fears were almost certainly amplified 
by the unanticipated events in Bishkek, which unfolded in the 
week leading up to the visit.  Given concern in the upper 
echelons of the GOK about the collapses of other post-Soviet 
governments, preparations for the late April visit of 
President Yushchenko of Ukraine will likely proceed in a 
similarly confrontational manner.  End comment. 
 ORDWAY 
 
 
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