This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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C O N F I D E N T I A L  ACCRA 000787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014 
TAGS: GH PGOV PREL TO
SUBJECT: GILCHRIST OLYMPIO'S VIEWS OF ABUJA MEETING AND 
TOGO ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: PolChief Scott Ticknor for reasons 1.5 d and e. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  PolChief met on April 26 with Togolese 
opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio in Accra.  Olympio said 
that in Abuja he had agreed to Obasanjo's request that he and 
Faure Gnassingbe cooperate in a government of national unity. 
However, the agreement was "in theory", while in practice 
this would be very difficult.  If asked to join Faure in a 
government of national unity, the opposition would consult, 
but would be unlikely to accept.  Olympio was convinced the 
election result -- which came to us during the meeting -- was 
rigged and that the opposition won 65 percent of the vote. 
He had no specific plan for preventing violence but hoped the 
international community would bring pressure and offers of 
assistance to bear on a solution which would reject the 
election result and support a repeat, fairer election in six 
months.  End summary. 
 
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Meeting in Abuja 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In an April 26 meeting with PolChief, Togo 
opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio said he had a four hour 
session with President Obasanjo in Abuja, including a 
one-on-one and a lengthy meeting which included Faure 
Gnassingbe.  Obasanjo, who did most of the talking, told both 
parties that whichever party wins the election, it should be 
seen as a transitional government to pave the way for 
democracy in Togo.  He noted that the military is an 
important institution and the winner needs to learn to 
manage.  He hoped that, with training and assistance, the 
military could evolve from a "tribal" to a "republican" 
institution.  Obasanjo also acknowledged that the 
constitution needs to be reformed.  He asked Faure and 
Olympio to agree to cooperate in a government of national 
unity, whoever wins.   Olympio said he agreed "in theory". 
Obasanjo followed the meeting with a press conference. 
According to Olympio, there was then a somewhat contrived 
congeniality. Obasanjo asked the two men to shake hands and 
then asked Olympio to embrace Faure (which Olympio said he 
would not do because he had never met Gnassingbe before this 
event.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  Olympio then clarified that, while agreeing "in 
theory", in practice this idea was "very difficult".  When 
asked what he would do if Faure offered participation in a 
government of national unity, he said he would have to 
consult colleagues in the opposition but he thought the 
opposition would be unlikely to accept.  Olympio added that 
he had already faced criticism within his coalition for what 
he did in Abuja.  When asked what he would do if were in a 
position to govern Togo, he mentioned he could think about 
being inclusive in ministerial portfolios, "but we didn't 
win." 
 
-------------------- 
The Election Results 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Half way through our meeting, someone came to us 
with the election results showing Gnassingbe had won. 
Olympio took note but had no visible reaction.  He said the 
result was as he expected.  The opposition had faced "a 
Hobbson's Choice" - participate in an election they knew 
would lose through manipulation or not participate and face 
international criticism.  Togo could now be entering a 
difficult period, he said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  PolChief asked if there was a way to prevent an 
outbreak of violence and what the opposition would do to 
intervene.  "We will not encourage it", he responded, noting 
that opposition activists would go through the country with 
megaphones urging calm.  However, it is not clear that the 
youth will listen, he said.  When asked what he would do to 
calm events, he said he would consult with other party 
leaders from within Ghana (many of them visit him in Accra). 
 
¶6.  (C)  He was confident the U.K. and Canada would reject 
the election results.  He believes the election was rigged. 
Because indelible ink was easily removed, and there was 
significant ballot stuffing, the ballots in the boxes do not 
reflect the will of the voters, he said.  Nonetheless, he 
opined that the opposition won 65 percent of the vote.  When 
PolChief showed him a transcript of the Department 
Spokesperson's response to questions in the April 25 daily 
briefing, Olympio was pleased.  He hoped the U.S., Germany, 
Canada and Nigeria would reject the election results and 
press for a new election in six months.  His ideal would then 
be for these governments to support a package of technical 
and financial assistance that would help Togo make electoral 
 
reforms and prepare for a truly free and fair election.  This 
would require international pressure on Gnassingbe.  Obasanjo 
offered to put a permanent African Union representative in 
Togo and there is also an offer of a permanent ECOWAS rep, 
"to monitor decisions" in Togo.  Olympio welcomed these 
offers. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (C)  Olympio has known Obasanjo for fifteen years and 
clearly sees Nigeria as a key position to find a way out of 
the current situation.  Olympio offered no plan for 
preventing violence except hopes that the international 
community would step in (although he reiterated his dismissal 
of the effectiveness of ECOWAS.)  In previous recent 
meetings, Olympio had expressed optimism that the opposition 
could win the election.  His lack of emotion when the results 
came in probably reflects a resignation in the face of 
election-day violence and irregularities.  On election night, 
Olympio had called PolChief in a panic mode, saying it was 
"the worst case scenario".  He was not panicking today (he 
was trying to relax in his gardening shorts) but appeared 
undecided about what happens next.  His comments about the 
need for international pressure and support for a new 
election were in response to PolChief's questions as we were 
walking out of the meeting and appeared more off-the-cuff 
than well thought through. 
YATES 
 
 
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