This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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                  ------------------E26DC7  211733Z /03    
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8340
INFO AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 
ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
DIA WASHDC
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
SECDEF WASHDC
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ACCRA 000769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: GH PGOV PHUM PREL TO
SUBJECT: TOGO OPPOSITION LEADER GILCHRIST OLYMPIO'S VIEWS 
ON UPCOMING ELECTION 
 
REF: ACCRA 535 
 
Classified By: Polchief Scott Ticknor for reason 1.5 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On April 20, PolChief met with Togolese 
opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio in Accra, at PolChief's 
request.  Olympio was optimistic the opposition would win the 
April 24 election, although the saw the potential for 
government manipulation of the vote counting.  If the 
opposition wins, they would immediately reach out to the 
military and move toward a referendum to change the 
constitution.  If they lose, there could be serious violence 
which opposition leadership would have little ability to 
control.  The military might split.  He said Ghanaian troops 
of Ewe ethnicity might cross the border to help their fellow 
Ewes.  Olympio was dismissive of ECOWAS, discouraged with the 
European Union, and critical of France.  End comment. 
 
------------------------------ 
Opposition Could Win Elections 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  Olympio was concerned about RPT/military efforts to 
intimidate voters and rig the polls, noting that conditions 
are not in place for a free and fair election.  He 
underscored the pro-RPT bias of the National Election 
Commission (CENI) and judiciary and noted government steps to 
block participation by international observers, observer 
training, participation by opposition party polling agents, 
and opposition access to the media. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Nonetheless, he was optimistic that the opposition 
would win the most votes in the April 24 election.  The 
opposition is well organized and is taking precautions 
against manipulation (such as distributing lanterns and 
satellite phones).  He believes the Togolese people are eager 
for a change and will vote heavily for the opposition.  He 
was impressed by the reception he received in Togo last 
weekend (it took him over four hours to go from the border to 
Lome because of the crowds.)  In a conversation with Olympio 
earlier that day, opposition candidate Akitani Bob commented 
that he was surprised by the strong show of support he found 
while traveling in northern regions of Togo (and by the fact 
that soldiers watched his campaigning without interference.) 
There are no issues in the election aside from a desire for 
change, he said, adding confidently that Togolese are so fed 
up with the Eyadema legacy that "even a sheep in a blanket" 
could win this election. 
 
¶4.  (C)  While confident that the opposition will win the 
most votes, he fears the government might manipulate the vote 
counting to manufacture an RPT victory or take other measures 
(such as creating a national electricity blackout or ballot 
stuffing) to rig Sunday's results.  A large margin victory 
for the RPT will be seen as a sure sign of election rigging, 
he added. 
 
---------------------- 
If the Opposition Wins 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Olympio's best case scenario is a substantial 
opposition victory with no military backlash followed by a 
period of political reform.  The opposition has already been 
reaching out to members of the armed forces, who Olympio said 
have been receptive, and would this outreach would intensify 
after winning the election.  Some military officers are 
frustrated with the decayed state of the Togolese economy. 
Others are purely motivated by money and could be willing to 
support an opposition government.  Olympio sees the needfor 
reform in the military, although at this poit it would have 
t be very gradual.  If the oppoition wins the election, the 
opposition would also hold a referendum to change the 
constitution, and reform CENI and the judiciary to remove 
Eyadema-era practices and cronies.  If the opposition wins, 
there would be no vendetta against Faure Gnassingbe, who 
Olympio described as "just a kid" who is being manipulated. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Olympio said he has not decided whether he would go 
back to play a political role in an opposition-led Togo or 
would retire from politics (he claimed he was tired of it). 
He was also not sure if he would go back to Togo before the 
election, saying he was consulting with opposition leaders 
and thought his presence might be more of a hindrance and 
distraction than a help at this point.  He also did not want 
 
to be stuck in Togo if the border is closed for a while. 
 
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If Gnassingbe Wins 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  If Faure Gnassingbe wins, there could be "an 
implosion" of violence, starting as early as the night of 
April 24.  Olympio claimed many of his young supporters in 
particular would not accept a Gnassingbe victory and have a 
plan to instigate violence if the opposition loses.  They 
have access to arms and are beyond the control of opposition 
leadership.  He was surprised during his trip to Lome last 
weekend by the "hundreds" of youthful supporters who 
surrounded him for protection.  When PolChief asked what he 
and the leadership were doing to prevent violence from within 
their ranks, Olympio said there was not much he could do when 
the other side was doing the provoking.  He denied that 
opposition backers had instigated violence last weekend, 
putting all the blame on the government.  It was difficult to 
predict where post-election violence might occur, although 
Lome could be particularly violent.  He thought the Togo 
military might split, exacerbating the violence, and that 
fighting in the country could have a strong ethnic dimension. 
 
 
------------------ 
International Role 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C)  Olympio was largely critical of the international 
role to date.  The Ghanaian government was worried about a 
possible refugee influx but "isn't doing anything about it". 
He described his March 16 meeting with President Kufuor as 
merely "pleasantries and photo ops".  Olympio thought some 
ethnic Ewe Ghanaian troops or ex-military might cross the 
border to help defend their fellow Ewes, if attacked. 
According to Olympio, the European Union was not interested 
in playing an active role, deferring to ECOWAS.  ECOWAS was 
"just a group of bankrupt countries".  In a meeting three 
weeks ago, Nigerian President Obasanjo reiterated to Olympio 
that no other ECOWAS countries had an interest in greater 
involvement in the Togo crisis.  Nigeria and South Africa are 
the only African countries who could influence the situation, 
he said.  Several European Missions in Accra are sending 
informal observers to Togo for the election.  Olympio was 
critical of France and said many Togolese intensely dislike 
France for its support of Eyadema and its role in propping up 
dictators throughout Africa.  He saw no general cause for 
concern about violence against foreigners, although he 
conceded that some French and whites mistaken for French 
could be attacked. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Olympio was surprisingly relaxed and generally 
upbeat, given political developments in Togo.  He was open 
with his views (and cell phone numbers of key contacts), 
although he made frequent historical digressions.  He appears 
energetic and in constant touch with opposition leaders in 
Togo.  It was clear that he believes the opposition has a 
chance of winning the election.  It was also apparent that he 
is doing nothing to actively dissuade a violent backlash if 
the opposition loses.  Unlike in our March 15 meeting 
(reftel), in which he praised President Bush, this time he 
made no mention of U.S. influence on the situation. 
 
YATES 
 
 
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