This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: END OF U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KN KS JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HILL DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA WITH CHIEF 
CABINET SECRETARY HOSODA 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael W. Michalak.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary.  Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki 
Hosoda opened a breakfast meeting with U.S. Ambassador to 
South Korea and U.S. Representative to the Six-Party Talks 
(6PT) Christopher Hill on March 10, 2005, by thanking him for 
his efforts on the North Korea issue.  Hosoda raised the 
Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute between South Korea and Japan 
and asked the Ambassador to convince the South Koreans to 
calm their emotions.  Returning to North Korea, Hosoda 
stressed the need to convince Pyongyang that we will never 
allow it to develop into a nuclear power and that the 
possibility exists of total destruction without any 
compensation.  He offered his assessment that North Korea 
would be willing to allow inspections and dismantlement of 
its plutonium program, in return for compensation, but that 
it is trying to prevent interference in its uranium 
development.  Consequently, it is reluctant to return to the 
6PT.  In response to a question about Japan's probable 
reaction to another DPRK missile test, Hosoda predicted that 
the Japanese public would become even more anti-North Korean. 
 Already, the abduction issue has the public clamoring for 
economic sanctions.  Hosoda said the GOJ knows the United 
States thinks sanctions are ineffective without international 
cooperation but the GOJ believes the Japanese situation is 
different.  Ambassador Hill noted North Korea's engagement in 
illegal activities and suggested that we further look into 
this issue.  Ambassador Hill concluded the meeting by 
reiterating his hope that a solution to the beef issue could 
be found soon.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) During a breakfast meeting with Ambassador to South 
Korea and U.S. Representative to the Six-Party Talks 
Christopher Hill on March 10, 2005, Japanese Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda thanked the Ambassador for his 
 
SIPDIS 
efforts on the North Korea issue and observed that the 
President and Prime Minister Koizumi had discussed the 
problem in a phone call the previous evening.  Ambassador 
Hill said he is cooperating well with DG Kenichiro Sasae, his 
Japanese counterpart, but noted that they are negotiating 
with an "empty (DPRK) chair."  He added that we are also 
working well with the South Koreans who have deep emotions 
invested in the process. 
 
Relations with South Korea 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Hosoda raised the Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute 
between South Korea and Japan.  Takeshima is located in 
Shimane prefecture-Hosoda's home district-and has been 
registered as a Japanese territory for over 100 years, he 
stated.  Immediately after World War II, South Korean 
President Rhee declared the island as part of South Korea 
and, since then, it has been a source of conflict.  Takeshima 
has been treated as a "blank territory"--one that neither 
side discusses--even during fishery negotiations and there 
had been a tacit understanding that neither side should make 
an issue of the island.  However, following Japanese 
Ambassador to South Korea Takano's statement in late February 
that Takeshima is "historically and legally Japan's 
territory," the South Koreans have become more emotional. 
Hosoda asked whether the Ambassador could convince the South 
Koreans to calm their emotions.  Ambassador Hill responded 
that he has publicly and privately urged the South Koreans to 
work out such issues calmly. 
 
¶4.  (C) In contrast, cultural exchanges between South Korea 
and Japan have been very successful, Hosoda observed.  Kabuki 
performances in South Korea have been well-attended and South 
Korean actors are very popular in Japan.  Ambassador Hill 
agreed, saying that Japanese music is very popular in Seoul 
and that he does not observe in Korea the kind of disturbing 
nationalism that has emerged among some younger Chinese. 
Hosoda likened President Roh to the popular "Winter Sonata" 
star Bae Yong Joon and jokingly asked whether the South 
Korean public preferred weak, "soft touch" men.  Ambassador 
Hill replied that Roh sometimes unintentionally makes news in 
his speeches, but that he has three years left in his term 
and Japan and the United States would have to find a way to 
work with him. 
 
North Korea and the Six-Party Talks 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (C) The other countries in the Six-Party Talks (6PT) do 
not support the North's nuclear development, Hosoda stated 
and expressed hope for that the talks would restart soon. 
Ambassador Hill shared his opinion that China may be ready to 
put more pressure on Pyongyang because it knows its prestige 
is being tested.  Ambiguity can sometimes solve diplomatic 
problems, but, Ambassador Hill emphasized, the issue of 
nuclear weapons progress demands crystal clear results. 
Hosoda believed that, after watching China, India and 
Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, North Korea mistakenly 
assumed that it, too, could test a weapon and eventually be 
accepted as a de facto nuclear power.  It is important, 
Hosoda stressed, to convince North Korea that we will never 
allow it to develop into a nuclear power and that the 
possibility exists of total destruction without any 
compensation.  Ambassador Hill said, unfortunately, North 
Korea regards every gesture as a sign of weakness. 
 
¶6.  (C) Japanese political parties and the public are finally 
starting to understand why the United States invaded Iraq, 
Hosoda observed.  With the North Korean nuclear threat 
looming, the "wind is changing in Japan," and many are 
starting to call for economic sanctions.  In October 2004, 
Hosoda mentioned that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons 
and was immediately criticized by the then-Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) Shadow Defense Minister.  Since the North's 
announcement, however, the DPJ does not know what to say or 
do, and does not know what kind of policy to pursue. 
 
¶7.  (C) Hosoda offered his analysis that in contrast to the 
past, when bombers carried atomic weapons, today nuclear 
weapons must be mounted on missiles.  North Korea needs to 
further develop its missile technology and also requires more 
time to perfect its plutonium-based weapons.  Hosoda assessed 
that North Korea would be willing to allow inspections and 
dismantlement of its plutonium program, in return for 
compensation.  Regarding uranium development, however, North 
Korea appears to be in an "intermediary stage."  The North 
does not want any interference in its uranium development 
program and, consequently, is reluctant to return to the 6PT. 
 Ambassador Hill said that in any settlement, North Korea 
would need to account for its equipment and show us what they 
have been doing with it.  He asked what the Japanese reaction 
would be to another missile test. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Japanese government, Hosoda recalled, took less 
than one month to decide to launch intelligence satellites 
following the 1998 Taepodong launch.  He predicted that the 
Japanese public would become even more anti-North Korea if it 
were to test another missile.  Already, the abduction issue 
has the Japanese public clamoring for economic sanctions. 
Prime Minister Koizumi remains cautious and would like to 
continue negotiations, but frustration is growing among the 
public and a missile test would add fuel to the fire.  Hosoda 
said the GOJ knows the United States thinks sanctions are 
ineffective without international cooperation but the GOJ 
believes the Japanese situation is different.  There are many 
North Koreans living in Japan who are making a lot of money 
and sending it back to the DPRK.  These people feel that they 
protect their relatives in North Korea when they send money, 
and if Japan decides to apply sanctions and cut off this 
flow, it could do a lot of damage domestically. 
Consequently, the GOJ is taking a cautious approach, not 
because it thinks sanctions would be ineffective, but 
precisely because it thinks they would be effective. 
Ambassador Hill observed that North Korea is engaged in many 
illegal activities and we need to develop further information 
on these activities to get them to stop. 
 
¶9.  (C) Turning to U.S.-Japan relations, the Ambassador 
remarked that while the President and Koizumi had had a good 
telephone discussion the previous evening, the Ambassador 
wanted to reiterate his hope that a solution to the beef 
issue could be found soon.  He emphasized that there are many 
important issues that require U.S. and Japanese cooperation, 
and stressed that we cannot let an issue like beef stand in 
the way.  Hosoda thanked Ambassador Hill for his time and 
said he thought their relationship was off to a good start. 
He noted that South Korea, too, does not currently import 
beef from the United States and urged the Ambassador to 
convince South Korea to restart imports, as well.  The 
Ambassador assured him he was doing so. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Ambassador Hill has cleared this cable. 
MICHALAK