This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 001349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: END OF U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
TAGS: ECIN PREL PARM PINR KDEM CH TW KN JA ASEAN
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN INFORMAL POLICY PLANNING BILATERAL: 
PART I PM SESSION, MARCH 2, 2005 
 
 
Classified By: Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds.  Reasons:1.4(b/ 
d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During informal policy planning talks with 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Vice Minister Tsuneo 
Nishida on March 2, Director of Policy Planning Stephen D. 
Krasner discussed East Asian architecture, China, North Korea 
and the President's democratization agenda.  Nishida said 
Japan was closely focused on the Asia-Pacific theater, but 
shared the fundamental recognition that in today's world, it 
was impossible to separate the region from the challenges of 
the global community.  He outlined the various challenges 
facing the U.S.-Japan alliance, including the Korean 
Peninsula, expanding weapons stockpiles in the region, and 
the Taiwan Strait.  Nishida viewed ARF as an important 
regional institution, and the East Asian community as a 
natural, legitimate trend among Asian countries to create a 
regional institution.  China is a rising power, he said, and 
the GOJ is still evaluating the orientation of the Hu-Wen 
regime.  Despite rapidly growing bilateral economic ties, 
Japan is experiencing daily problems with China and 
uncertainty over its military buildup. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary, cont. Turning to North Korea, Krasner noted 
that China's role appeared central to the problem.  Nishida 
agreed and said the USG and GOJ must think carefully about 
what real leverage China had to help resolve the nuclear 
issue effectively.  Domestic political pressure on Japan from 
the abductions issue was significant, and Nishida was unsure 
how long the GOJ could resist such pressure before having to 
apply unilateral measures such as legal sanctions.  Nishida 
said Japan is hoping for successful resolution in the context 
of the Six-Party Talks, but might be forced to go to the UNSC 
with or without the United States if the Six-Party Talks 
remain a "hollow circus."  Many label the UNSC route a 
"non-starter" because China would oppose it, but if China 
cannot deliver on the talks, the UNSC might become a viable 
option, Tsuruoka argued.  For this reason, things needed to 
start moving in the context of the talks.  Nishida suggested 
that Secretary Rice's upcoming trip to Asia might be an 
opportune time to discuss the issue.  Krasner briefed his 
counterparts on the general goals of the U.S. democratization 
initiative and on the challenges of implementation, and 
invited Nishida to discuss ways to coordinate bilaterally. 
Nishida offered Indonesia and India as two possible targets 
for joint democratization efforts because Indonesia is a big, 
complex, strategically important country and, he argued, 
India's role in Asia will likely grow as China rises.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Deputy Vice Minister Nishida kicked off the informal 
policy planning talks with S/P Director Stephen D. Krasner on 
March 2 by praising the value of such meetings in promoting a 
concrete political agenda and in creating new frontiers for 
expanded U.S. and Japanese cooperation to achieve common 
objectives.  He highlighted the challenge of not only setting 
policies that respond quickly and effectively to immediate 
developments, but that meet a long-term, broader objective as 
well.  S/P Krasner agreed, stating that he was committed to 
continuing the close relationship and appreciated the chance 
to speak candidly on a broad range of issues.  Nishida 
observed that this was the first session of bilateral policy 
planning talks held since S/P Director Krasner was appointed, 
the first since President Bush was re-elected, and the first 
since the Two-Plus-Two talks in Washington on February 19. 
The GOJ considered the Two-Plus-Two meeting to have been a 
great success, and Foreign Minister Machimura was personally 
very happy with the outcome.  Nishida said it was important 
for the U.S. and Japan to work together to maintain this 
momentum. 
 
East Asian Architecture 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Outlining Tokyo's view of the international strategic 
environment, Nishida said Japan was closely focused on the 
Asia-Pacific theater, but shared the fundamental recognition 
that in today's world, it was impossible to separate the 
region from the rest of the global community.  The USG and 
GOJ share common strategic objectives, as clearly 
demonstrated by the four Ministers' recent meeting in 
Washington.  Speaking frankly, he shared the view that future 
uncertainties demanded increased diplomatic efforts by Tokyo 
and Washington to ensure that the region and the world 
developed in a way that was in our best interests. 
 
¶5. (C) The United States and Japan face both new and 
traditional challenges in East Asia, according to Nishida. 
The first challenge was the existence of a peninsula that 
remained divided in two.  He noted that it is legitimate for 
Korean leaders to expect the present situation to be resolved 
peacefully in the long-term with the assistance of good 
neighbors.  In the medium- to long-term, the future of a 
unified Korean Peninsula must be a major agenda item.  The 
United States and Japan have an interest in ensuring that 
reunification occurs in a peaceful, constructive and open way 
that, hopefully, results in the establishment of a joint ally. 
 
¶6. (C) Nishida highlighted his concern about weapons 
stockpiles in the region, noting the proliferation of 
conventional arms across the region.  China is rich enough to 
buy a lot of arms.  ASEAN also is wealthy and some ASEAN 
countries are expanding procurements.  The region also 
boasted one of the biggest weapons suppliers -- Russia.  This 
problem had to be addressed in order to improve the level of 
security in the region. 
 
¶7. (C) Asia, Nishida pointed out, is not Europe.  European 
countries have come a long way since World War II to unite 
under one roof.  Ukraine was just one fairly recent example 
of success in Europe, and some people speculate that Ukraine 
may eventually join the EU or even NATO.  NATO itself is 
moving forward and developing in a positive way to deal with 
future challenges.  Asia, in contrast, does not have an 
equivalent of the EU or NATO.  The U.S-Japan security 
alliance served a similar purpose, but its structure is 
obviously different and it is a bilateral arrangement.  The 
GOJ has spent significant time and energy on ARF, but has 
been disappointed with its progress.  Nonetheless, Tokyo 
believes that ARF is an important regional institution that 
can take steady, albeit small and slow steps toward 
establishing a forum to discuss regional security issues. 
 
¶8. (C) In addition to ARF, there is now the well known, some 
may say "notorious," proposal to create an East Asian 
community, Nishida continued.  The GOJ considers this a 
natural and legitimate trend among Asian countries to create 
an intra-Asian regional institution to discuss a variety of 
issues.  Nishida noted that similar intra-regional groups 
have already formed in Africa, Latin America and Central 
America.  He appreciated USG interest in hearing about 
developments in this area, adding that he could assure 
Washington that this is very much an "Asian" process, i.e., 
there will be steady progress, but it will be slow moving. 
We will have time to work out such matters as the nature of 
the group, the framework for the summit, and the topics 
addressed.  Nishida suggested that the GOJ and USG should try 
to map out what the best institution might be for both our 
interests. 
 
China 
----- 
 
¶9. (C)  The Taiwan Strait was another "challenge" -- although 
not a "problem," Nishida stressed.  He shared the U.S. view 
on the difficulty of the task at hand.  The issue was that 
the situation requires a peaceful resolution by two parties 
(or, Nishida said, "one country, one entity") first.  We must 
work to ensure that international laws were respected and 
observed throughout the process of resolving differences 
between the two sides.  He noted the emergence of China as a 
power in the region and clarified that Japan does not 
consider China a threat.  As Prime Minister Koizumi has 
stated, China presents both opportunities and challenges.  On 
the positive side, almost 3 million Japanese citizens visited 
China in 2002, with half a million Chinese coming to Japan. 
This was a huge number, and was increasing every day.  The 
GOJ welcomed this rising volume of people-to-people contact. 
Moreover, Japan's leading trade partner was now China.  For 
China, its top trade partners were first the EU, then the 
United States, and third was Japan.  This demonstrated that 
China's economy was growing up and a win-win situation was 
being created.  This growing market presented opportunities, 
not just for Chinese citizens, but for Americans, Japanese, 
and Russians as well. 
 
¶10. (C) At the same time, Nishida continued, the GOJ 
experiences problems with China almost everyday.  First, the 
PRC has shown it is not yet prepared to observe laws or 
regulations, not only in the trade and economic field, but in 
political and military affairs as well.  We should take this 
very seriously.  Second, Chinese society was facing huge 
dilemmas.  It was still a Communist country, with a virtual 
one-party system, and the GOJ sees no sign of a change in the 
regime or system itself.  So long as the economy continued to 
boom, the regime was safe, but once (like any other big 
economy) this growth flattened, it was unclear whether the 
society or the regime would be prepared to respond to more 
fundamental social and political challenges. 
 
¶11. (C) The GOJ is still in the process of evaluating the 
Hu-Wen regime, Nishida said, and has not yet made a 
determination on whether it will be powerful and good, or a 
transitional rule marked by compromise.  One big uncertainty 
was the issue of control over the military.  During meetings 
with Chinese officials, the GOJ always stresses the 
importance of transparency, especially in the area of 
military budget.  Nishida shared  a chart of Japan's and 
China's defense budgets and their ratio to GDP, highlighting 
the upward trend in Beijing's figures over the last ten 
years.  He added that the "well-known secret" was that of 
course these numbers do not include procurement, so the 
official numbers do not capture the full picture.  DVM 
Nishida proposed some form of U.S.-Japan dialogue on the 
Chinese defense budget, i.e., among analysts who could 
compare notes on the real status of China's military budget. 
It was also important, he argued, for us to strengthen our 
efforts to urge the EU not lift its arms embargo on China. 
Nishida had seen on the international news that the U.S. 
Congress had "raised its powerful voice" on this issue, but 
we needed more coordinated action vis-a-vis Europe.  The USG 
and GOJ have a common interest at stake, and we should not 
miss this opportunity to discuss these strategic issues with 
Europe.  Feigenbaum noted that MOFA's chart on defense 
spending appeared to capture the basic trends seen in 
Washington. 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶12. (S) Both Krasner and Nishida agreed on the importance of 
looking at the Korean Peninsula from a long-term perspective. 
 It was clear, Krasner added, that the situation would not 
mirror the German experience because of such things as the 
large disparities in income between the two Koreas.  While it 
may be useful to start to think about the long-term future of 
the Peninsula, e.g. after reunification, it was a sensitive 
topic and would need to be handled delicately, and not in any 
open or formal way.  He also wondered how receptive either 
South Korea or China would be to talking about the very long 
term. 
 
¶13. (S) Nishida responded that in comparison to the U.S. 
experience, Japan's engagement on the Korean Peninsula had, 
for good or bad, a long history.  For Japan, it was unable to 
talk about the future of Korea without talking about the 
past.  As a result, this was a very difficult issue, and a 
domestic political issue as well.  He urged Krasner to pay 
proportionate attention to Japan's point of view when mapping 
out U.S. policy.  To illustrate, Nishida stated that even 
when discussing abduction issues, counterparts in South Korea 
say they are fully sympathetic toward Tokyo's position.  At 
the same time, they add that the ROKG also must think about 
what the Japanese did in the past.  So even South Korea 
raises these "delicate" issues of the past. 
 
¶14. (S) DDG Tsuruoka noted that the USG and GOJ have not yet 
officially discussed long-term reunification, but he argued 
that addressing the issue now could be a way of changing 
South Korean attitudes toward the United States.  He cited a 
recent ROK public opinion poll which showed a large 
percentage of South Korean citizens now believe that the 
United States is to blame for the division of the peninsula. 
Twenty years ago, ROK citizens recognized that Communist 
aggression was actually to blame.  This change was almost 
entirely the result of DPRK propaganda.  Tsuruoka suggested 
that avoiding the issue of reunification had, in effect, 
given the North the opportunity to continue to blame 
Washington for the division of Korea.  While Japan was the 
most hated country in Korea, the United States was second. 
This was a dangerous trend, and the USG and GOJ should work 
to correct this misperception, although, he acknowledged, it 
might not be appropriate to raise the topic in the public 
domain. 
 
¶15. (S) Feigenbaum noted that there was a clear distinction 
made in the ROK between "reconciliation" and "reunification." 
 While the latter was a long-term aspiration of all Koreans, 
the ROKG is focused on its project of "reconciliation" with 
the DPRK.  It was important to convey to the ROK public that 
the DPRK was, in many ways, the obstacle to reconciliation. 
 
¶16. (S) Director Mizutori pointed out that the peaceful 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula was clearly listed as a 
common strategic objective in the most recent Two-Plus-Two 
statement.  Surprisingly, she said, she had not yet heard 
either through private or public channels any complaints or 
concerns about this reference.  While she agreed with the 
basic U.S. analysis of the dangers of discussion, she thought 
that in principle it was important to show that we did in 
fact support the reconciliation process. 
 
¶17. (C) Krasner noted that China's role appeared central to 
the DPRK problem, and wondered how much pressure Beijing had 
been applying on the North.  Nishida agreed that China was a 
central player, saying the PRC may need something from 
Washington or Tokyo -- which could not be viewed as a reward 
or a gift -- to gain Pyongyang's cooperation.  China does not 
want to be seen as taking direction from other countries; 
nonetheless, the United States needs to send a stronger 
message to China, Tsuruoka insisted.  Tsuruoka reminded the 
group that North Korea is no longer party to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and has kicked out IAEA inspectors. 
The longer North Korea postpones talks, the more time they 
have to do what they want, he warned. 
 
¶18. (C) Nishida said the USG and GOJ must think carefully 
about what real leverage each had to resolve the issue 
properly.  From Japan's perspective, the domestic political 
pressure from the abductions issue was significant, and 
Nishida was unsure how long the GOJ could resist such 
pressure before having to apply unilateral measures, 
particularly in the next year.  Tsuruoka sensed growing 
Japanese doubt over the efficacy of diplomacy, and worried 
that the public would soon begin to question the value of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance.  He stressed the need to reconvene the 
Six-Party Talks in order to prove to the Japanese public that 
diplomacy still works.  China has a different strategic view. 
 Instead of pressuring North Korea, China demands that the 
United States make concessions.  Tsuruoka exhorted the United 
States to convince China to move by using a stronger message. 
 Nishida suggested that Secretary Rice's upcoming trip to 
Asia might be an opportune time to discuss the issue and 
encouraged the United States and Japan to commit more time 
and energy to solving the DPRK problem. 
 
¶19. (C) Krasner asked whether a failure to resolve the issue 
diplomatically would lead the Japanese to pursue an 
independent nuclear path.  Nishida assured him that the 
Japanese government would not go that far.  He admitted, 
however, that public pressure might force the government to 
take unilateral measures, like sanctions.  Tsuruoka explained 
that the government knows that sanctions applied by one 
country would be ineffective but said that at times 
governments sometimes have to behave irrationally in order to 
pacify their people politically.  Nishida said that while PM 
Koizumi is trying to downplay the possibility of sanctions, 
other politicians are taking a very hard line.  The Japanese 
government is caught in between the two groups of politicians 
and, he predicted, this "delicately constructed package" 
would become untenable if progress is not made soon. 
 
¶20. (C) The North Korea crisis has exposed the Japanese 
public for the first time to a real, direct threat, Nishida 
said.  To that end, Japan has tried to strengthen its ability 
to be a global player and a better ally to the United States. 
 For example, the public accepted the SDF dispatch to Iraq, 
in part, because of the threat on the Korean Peninsula. 
Yamada agreed that the Japanese government has used the North 
Korean situation to facilitate the dispatch of the SDF to 
Iraq.  In order to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance in a 
global context, we need to solve the North Korea problem, 
Yamada concluded.  (COMMENT:  Asked subsequently by Embassy 
Tokyo to comment on these statements by DVM Nishida and his 
deputies, Northeast Asia Division Principal Deputy Taisuke 
Mibae said he sees no direct linkage between the Six-Party 
diplomatic process and regard for the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
among officials of the Japanese government, or the 
public-at-large, and has not heard anyone else in the 
Gaimusho expressing that point of view.  As to whether Japan 
may impose unilateral economic sanctions on the DPRK, Mibae 
pointed out that public pressure for sanctions was firmly 
linked to the abduction issue, not lack of progress in the 
Six-Party Talks as Nishida and his colleagues agreed.  He 
said even a total collapse of the talks would not necessarily 
increase the public call for sanctions.  Furthermore, he 
said, his division believes the public call for sanctions 
issue is now waning, in large part because the public views 
the newly enacted oil pollution law as a de facto sanction, 
despite the fact the law was not created for that purpose. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶21. (C) DDG Tsuruoka noted that Foreign Minister Machimura 
had told Secretary Rice that we should always keep open the 
option of bringing the DPRK nuclear issue to the UNSC if the 
Six-Party Talks fail.  The initial purpose of the Six-Party 
process was to secure results on the nuclear issue, but this, 
unfortunately, has not been accomplished.  The actual result 
has been to demonstrate to the world how odd and strange the 
DPRK really is.  Libya is now behaving well and Syria is on 
the verge of improving its behavior, while the DPRK still 
tops the IAEA's agenda.  Regarding the possibility of taking 
the issue to the UNSC, Tsuruoka suggested that Japan would 
not necessarily insist on immediate sanctions but might seek 
a milder statement.  Many label the UNSC route a 
"non-starter" because China and Russia would oppose it, but 
if China cannot deliver on the Six-Party Talks, the UNSC 
might become a viable option, he argued. 
 
¶22. (C) Nishida agreed that since Japan is now a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC,  the next step would be to 
take the issue there.  He said that Japan is a strong 
advocate of UNSC reform and is in the midst of Constitutional 
revision.  For 60 years, both the UNSC and Japan's 
Constitution have been left untouched, but times are changing 
Nishida said, and Japan should not avoid friction with China. 
 Japan will be forced to go to the UNSC with or without the 
United States if the Six-Party Talks remain a "hollow 
circus."  Despite China's veto power, Japan can now raise the 
issue at anytime and if China repeatedly resists discussing 
the issue internationally, China will lose face, which would 
have serious consequences in Asia, where "face" is important. 
 He suggested that a next step might be to go to Beijing 
together or individually to deliver a common message: "we 
need action, we need results."  When asked about the timing 
of such a move, Nishida suggested a month from now. 
 
¶23. (C) Mizutori shared that all six members of the process 
had attended an ARF meeting a few weeks ago.  South Korea, 
Japan and the United States demanded that North Korea return 
to the table, while China, Russia and North Korea asserted 
that all parties should show flexibility.  This rhetoric was 
surprising, she said, since North Korea had just announced it 
had nuclear weapons.  Nevertheless, Mizutori thought it 
succeeded in proving to other Asian countries that North 
Korea was irrational and that China and Russia were 
irresponsible. 
 
Democratization 
--------------- 
 
¶24. (C) Krasner briefed his counterparts on the general goals 
of the President's democratization initiative and on the 
challenges of implementation.  The President and Secretary 
Rice had an ambitious agenda and Krasner would be busy 
identifying ways to use existing tools more effectively and 
developing new tools.  The United States is considering ways 
to better deal with nations that are outside the pattern of 
globalization and not integrated into the global system. 
Much of Africa, for instance, has lower per capita income and 
shorter life expectancy than in 1980.  He emphasized the 
importance of international coordination and invited Nishida 
to share his views on the endeavor and ways to coordinate 
bilaterally. 
 
¶25. (C) Democratization has always been an important pillar 
of U.S. diplomacy, Nishida said, and Japan, too, believes in 
common values and objectives.  He thought democratization was 
enjoying real success and said there is a shared sentiment in 
capitals like Tokyo and Paris that a prudent approach, i.e., 
one that is slow, steady, and takes account of local factors, 
is best.  In response to a question about what form of 
U.S.-Japan coordination would be good for the Asian region, 
Nishida said he would support almost any joint initiative as 
long as it was feasible and results-oriented.  He admitted 
that MOFA's resources were constrained and moaned that every 
day is a budgetary battle. 
 
¶26. (C) Krasner asked about specific countries that might 
make good targets for joint U.S.-Japan democratization of 
good governance promotion in the Pacific region.  Nishida 
replied that Indonesia and India might be good candidates. 
Indonesia is a big, complex, strategically important country 
and India's role in Asia will likely grow as China rises. 
Although it works well with other Asian countries, India 
needs to be more integrated in regional efforts.  Nishida was 
unsure whether India was ready to work with Japan and United 
States and pointed to India's refusal to accept assistance in 
the aftermath of the tsunami.  He said it showed that India 
is a country of proud people which has substantial resources. 
 He warned that India could become over-confident and refuse 
to work with other countries.  Indonesia is moving forward, 
too, and will host the Bandung Conference in April, which 
Japan will enthusiastically attend.  Shear noted that the 
1955 Bandung conference came to represent the solidarity of 
the anti-colonialists, the emergence of China, and the birth 
of the non-aligned movement.  He wondered why a revised 
Bandung was the optimal vehicle for Japan.  Nishida agreed 
with the analysis of 1955 but said the upcoming conference 
will symbolize the emergence of the Least Developed Countries 
and of Southeast Asia, a project Japan wanted to be part of. 
(COMMENT: At a dinner discussion on UNSC reform, reported 
septel, it emerged that Japan's enthusiasm for Bandung is 
explicitly part of its effort to lobby for a two-thirds vote 
of the General Assembly for its UNSC candidacy.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
¶27. (C) Tsuruoka predicted that the Bandung conference 
attendees would use it to mark their shared values and that 
successful Asian countries could contribute to African 
development.  Indonesia was successful because consistent 
support for the regime in power gave it enough time to 
develop a viable economy.  Now Asia is trying to translate 
its experience to Africa.  Tsuruoka warned that we should not 
try to impose our ideas of democracy on Africa because that 
would give Africa an excuse not to democratize.  He said 
there are many things that we can do together and offered 
Japan's three principles in building strong democracies: 
partnership, ownership and consent by the recipient.  Krasner 
agreed that the key to democratization is to create a set of 
incentives that guides political leaders to make the right 
decisions. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
Director of Policy Planning Stephen D. Krasner 
S/P Member Evan Feigenbaum 
POLMIN David Shear 
POL Steve Hill 
POL Tandy Matsuda (notetaker) 
ECON Christina Collins (notetaker) 
 
Japan 
----- 
Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy Tsuneo Nishida 
Deputy Director General Koji Tsuruoka 
Policy Coordination Division Director Kazuhide Ishikawa 
Policy Planning Division Director Hiroshi Kawamura 
National Security Policy Division Director Mami Mizutori 
UN Policy Division Director Kazutoshi Aikawa 
 
¶29. (U) S/P Krasner has cleared this cable. 
MICHALAK