This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

290517Z Mar 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 
TAGS: KWBG OREP PGOV PREL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY EILAND PRESENTS 
BALANCED VIEW OF FUTURE TO CODEL PELOSI 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a meeting on March 23, Director of 
National Security Giora Eiland presented Codel Pelosi with 
his view of the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and the political and security situations in the region. 
Attempting to balance what he surmised was Vice Prime 
Minister Peres's more optimistic view of Israel's prospects 
after disengagement, Eiland discussed his assessment of what 
Israel should expect in the next four months leading up to 
and through disengagements, his analysis of the current 
upheaval in Lebanon, and Iran's nuclear capabilities.  The 
CoDel consisted of House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and 
Representatives Henry Waxman, Darrell Issa, Linda Sanchez, 
Edward Markey, George Miller, Anna Eshoo, and James McGovern. 
 End Summary. 
 
----------------- 
The Two Positions 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Eiland said that he considers the present 
Israeli-Palestinian situation promising, but he has very real 
concerns regarding the future. He sees a large gap between 
the two sides, coming not from differences in substance, but 
in their perceptions of what the process of peace should be. 
He predicted that the real difference would become exposed in 
the next few months.  He contrasted Israel's current position 
with that of the Oslo years.  During that time, he said, 
Israel's focus was on the peace process, building on the idea 
that through it the two sides could achieve security.  With 
the collapse of Oslo, he said, Israel's faith in that 
position died.  Currently, Israel's hope for the future lies 
with the roadmap.  While the final goals are the same as at 
Oslo, the sequence for achieving these goals is different; 
security must come first, leading to peace.  From this 
position, it is impossible to move forward on achieving peace 
until not just terror, but also the terrorist infrastructure 
are dismantled. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Palestinian position differs considerably from 
the Israeli, said Eiland.  Palestinians focus on their 
impressive achievements since the death of Yasir Arafat in 
November 2004.  They point to democratization, noting the 
presidential elections that took place just two months after 
Arafat's death; economic reforms, such as the new reliable 
Minister of Defence; the reorganization of security forces; 
and the improved security situation, what he termed a 
significant and stable trend. Eiland noted, however, that 
many of these accomplishments were designed to satisfy the 
international community, and with the idea that Palestinian 
leaders through dialogue would persuade the Palestinian 
people to support peace over Hamas. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In a note of optimism, Eiland said that for the first 
time there is real trust and a reliable dialogue between the 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders, giving him a basis for hope 
that they can bridge the gap between the Israeli and 
Palestinian perspectives.  In answering a question regarding 
whether or not Israel should present an idea of what final 
status might look like to the Palestinians, Eiland admitted 
that this question is debated within Israel. Prime Minister 
Sharon, he noted, believes that talking about final status 
issues would start unwanted momentum to start final status 
negotiations, even if security needs had not yet been met. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
President Abbas Appeases Hamas 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Eiland contended that upon election, Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas had assumed that he would have time 
to create a new political atmosphere under which he could 
persuade Hamas and other militant groups to abandon violence 
against Israelis.  The lead-up to the historic summit at 
Sharm-el-Sheikh in February 2005 required Abbas to come to an 
urgent understanding with these groups regarding the 
cessation of violence to meet Israeli and American demands. 
In doing so, however, Abbas paid a high price to Hamas, 
making them three commitments that will ultimately weaken his 
position.  He promised that he would never force Hamas to 
dismantle its military capacity and that Hamas would be 
integrated into the Palestinian political establishment.  In 
addition, Hamas forced Abbas to declare Palestinian strategic 
goals regarding final status that he will never be capable of 
delivering. In essence, Eiland said, Abbas sacrificed the 
long term in favor of the short term. 
 
¶6.  (C) Eiland emphasized the role that Hamas will play in 
the July elections, predicting that if Hamas gains strength 
in the elections it will serve as a basis for power sharing 
in the PLC and other institutions.  Hamas will thus succeed 
in its quest to gain the legitimacy of a true political party 
without losing its military capacity.  If Hamas gains 
political legitimacy, Eiland warned, the $30 million that 
Hamas receives from Saudi Arabia, the weapons it receives 
from Egypt, and the political decisions made in Damascus will 
also be legitimized. 
 
------------------- 
The Future of Hamas 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) When asked whether Abbas is in a position to make 
demands of Hamas to disarm, Eiland responded that Abbas does 
not think he will ever be in such a position.  Abbas believes 
that the only way to reach a cessation of violence is the 
full integration of Hamas into the Palestinian political 
system, hoping that with enough political achievements, Hamas 
will become more moderate with much to lose if it returns to 
its old cycle of violence.  Hamas's vision is that in gaining 
political legitimacy, it will not need to give up its 
philosophy (i.e. the destruction of Israel) and will be able 
to maintain its military capabilities. 
 
¶8. (C) Eiland stated, however, that Israel's expectations of 
President Abbas are stricter than this agenda, and require 
him to take actions against Hamas now.  Eiland contended that 
dismantling the terrorist infrastructure consists not only of 
actions, but also of creating the right atmosphere.  In the 
past, Palestinians who committed acts of violence against 
Israeli citizens were not adequately punished. Eiland posed 
the question of how these people will be dealt with in the 
future.  He predicted that if Abbas adapts new values, 
bringing such criminals to justice, it will lead to a true 
dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. 
 
¶9. (C) Eiland posited that there is indeed a chance that 
Hamas, Hizbollah, and other militant groups can transform 
themselves into purely political movements, especially if 
Hamas understands that Palestinian popular support is given 
only to real political movements.  Palestinians are sick of 
violence, he said, Palestinian citizens must force them to 
change their ways.  Unlike Al Qaeda, Eiland remarked, Hamas 
is sensitive to the feelings of the "street." In responding 
to a question on Israel's estimation of President Abbas, 
Eiland challenged that Abbas had been too hasty in making 
commitments to Hamas, and that Egypt had helped him make 
these mistakes. Egypt has only one consideration, Eiland 
said: the $1.3 billion that the United States gives Egypt in 
military aid.  Worrying that they might lose that money, the 
Egyptians tried to present themselves as essential and as a 
stabilizing force in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Prospects for Democracy in Lebanon 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Eiland viewed the current demonstrations against 
Syria in Lebanon as an opportunity for Lebanese democracy, 
but warned that there is more than one possible outcome of 
these events.  The most desirable would be that Lebanon 
becomes an independent, democratic state.  On the other hand, 
the differences between groups in Lebanon that lead to the 
country's long civil war could once again emerge. Syria's 
influence would continue through its involvement in Lebanon's 
economy.  In Eiland's third scenario, Iranians would fill the 
power vacuum left by Syria, fulfilling their interest in 
exporting the principles of the Iranian revolution in 
Lebanon, a country with a 35 percent Shia population.  In 
this case, Hizbollah might become even more powerful than 
before, with the military capability to attack Israel. 
 
¶11. (C) Eiland suggested that one way to ensure the most 
desirable outcome is for the international community to send 
a clear message to Lebanon's leaders, not to just those 
elected after the May elections, but to all potential 
leaders, demanding the dismantling of all militias in 
Lebanon. 
 
------------------------ 
U.S. Involvement in Iraq 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) In response to the CoDel's question, Eiland said that 
Israel does not like to officially participate in discussions 
of Iraq, but he was willing to comment that the United States 
has "clearly made some mistakes there."  Despite this, he 
said was optimistic that Iraqis were beginning to question 
the increased number of foreign terrorist elements in Iraq, 
while at the same time continuing to strengthen their 
democratic system. 
 
--------------------- 
Iran's Nuclear Future 
--------------------- 
¶13. (C) Eiland said that the stronger position the U.S. is 
now taking on Iran is "bringing the world together in a 
united voice" on the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions.  In 
its coordination with the United States, the European Union 
is now able to be more blunt in its demands on Iran, while 
also offering Iran a "carrot" and not just a "stick."  He 
warned that if China is not a part of this international 
front, it will be difficult to take seriously the issue of 
Iran's nuclear capability at the United Nations Security 
Council.  While Iran will not have nuclear weapons for 
another two to three years, Eiland explained, it might be 
completely technologically independent within the next six 
months, meaning that it will no longer rely on foreign 
assistance in pursuing nuclear technology. 
¶14. (C) Asked about Israel's position on Iran if there is no 
UN action in the next six months, Eiland said that Iran's 
leaders are still sensitive about international legitimacy, 
and are worried about the growing number of Iranians who are 
against the regime and identify more closely with Western 
values.  He contended that it would be too dangerous for Iran 
domestically if it were to become isolated.  Iran is pursuing 
both a civilian nuclear project and a military project 
simultaneously, he added, and it should accept international 
demands to inspect both, thereby slowing down the process. 
 
¶15. (C) Codel Pelosi did not have an opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
 
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