This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR BURNS, SATTERFIELD/DIBBLE, E. 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG GZ IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ECONOMY AND FINANCE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: NSC CHIEF SAYS PASSING THE BUDGET IS GOI CHALLENGE 
NUMBER ONE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: Israeli NSC Director Giora Eiland told 
CODEL Corzine March 13 that passing the budget is the GOI's 
biggest disengagement-related hurdle and that all other 
issues are operational and will be resolved.  The GOI's 
worst-case scenario is Palestinians attacking Israelis in 
Gaza while Israeli security forces and the settlers battle 
each other.  Should Palestinian militants stage serious 
attacks during the withdrawal, the IDF may have no choice but 
to re-occupy Khan Yunis in order to protect the settlers 
during the evacuation.  Eiland criticized Abu Mazen for 
giving too much away to Hamas in order to obtain the 
militants' compliance in maintaining a period of quiet. 
Israel, Eiland maintained, will not engage in any final 
status talks until the PA has dismantled terror organizations 
and Israel's security is thus ensured.  He dismissed 
Palestinian assertions that recent elections, economic 
reforms, nascent security re-organization, and the sharp 
decrease in attacks is a sufficient basis on which to begin 
negotiations.  Eiland said that absence of an effective 
mechanism within the IDF to quickly bring problems on the 
ground to DefMin Mofaz's attention inadvertently delayed 
implementation of political priorities, such as the handover 
of West Bank cities to PA security control.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
GOI Challenge Number 1: Passing the Budget 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) NSC Chief Giora Eiland told CODEL Corzine and the 
Ambassador March 13 that the largest disengagement-related 
hurdle facing Israel is passage of the budget.  Eiland said 
that although the GOI expects the budget to pass, there are 
no guarantees.  Should the budget fail in the Knesset, new 
elections must be held by June -- only one month before 
disengagement is scheduled to begin.  Although disengagement 
is an official GOI position, Eiland cautioned, a new Israeli 
government could delay disengagement implementation until 
December 2005 and still remain within the parameters of 
existing GOI decisions.  Eiland said that MKs understand that 
Israel has reached the "point of no return" on disengagement, 
however, adding that, even if the budget should fail to pass 
and new elections be called, disengagement would proceed. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Worst Case Disengagement Scenario 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Eiland said that, the budget aside, the remaining GOI 
problems connected to disengagement are operational in nature 
and can be resolved, even if the process is difficult.  He 
expressed the GOI hope that the actual withdrawal will be 
carried out in a period of calm.  If, however, the 
Palestinians launch attacks as a means of portraying it as an 
exit under fire, the IDF may have no choice but to re-take 
Khan Yunis to control the situation (Note: Khan Yunis is the 
Palestinian city closest in proximity to the Gush Katif 
settlement bloc and the area from which most attacks have 
originated in recent weeks.  End Note).  "Imagine the 
Palestinians firing rockets on us as we fight each other," he 
said.  Eiland agreed that occupying Khan Yunis would 
certainly entail Palestinian, and possibly Israeli, 
casualties.  Furthermore, it is possible that disengagement 
could halt if the attacks are too severe, possibly entailing 
another government decision to continue. 
 
¶4.  (C) Eiland said that, for Israeli opponents of 
disengagement, it is important to demonstrate that the 
process is too difficult and should not be replicated 
elsewhere.  To accomplish this, these groups may try to 
distract the Israeli security forces by undertaking 
disruptive actions elsewhere in Israel, Eiland said, although 
he expressed confidence that the GOI will be able to 
successfully cope with such a turn of events. 
 
------------ 
PA Missteps 
------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Eiland disputed the assumption that, because 
Palestinians now have a new government, "everything is now 
possible," and cited the PA's relations with militant groups, 
in particular Hamas, as a major GOI concern.  Having Hamas 
sit on an equal footing with the PA in Cairo and elsewhere, 
Eiland said, raises the organization's stature to that of an 
equal, a perilous development as Hamas still remains outside 
PA control. 
 
¶6.  (C) Commenting on the dialogue between Abu Mazen and 
Hamas, Eiland said that Abu Mazen initially assumed he had 
time to both negotiate with the militants and accrue some 
demonstrable gains from Israel to show the Palestinian 
people.  This assumption proved to be mistaken, however, 
because challenges to Abu Mazen's authority, such as the 
break-in to the Saraya prison compound in Gaza City, were 
immediate.  Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's offer of a 
meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh increased the pressure on the PA, 
forcing Abu Mazen to reach a deal quickly with Hamas in order 
to have something to offer Israel in Sharm.  In Eiland's 
view, Abu Mazen gave Hamas too much by promising first, not 
to forcibly disarm their militants, and second, to integrate 
them into the political system according to the strength of 
their showing in the elections. 
 
¶7.  (C) Eiland said that Abu Mazen is bereft of figures in 
the PA upon whom he can lean for support, and some, including 
Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, are actively trying to undermine 
him.  Furthermore, what Eiland called "the Arafat legacy" 
remains a part of Palestinian culture, with Palestinians 
still proudly proclaiming their participation in terrorist 
acts.  Eiland lamented that, even under the new government, 
any punishment is light for attacks against Israeli 
interests, while those convicted of collaborating with Israel 
are sentenced to death.  The Ambassador said the U.S. does 
not believe Abu Mazen is not showing sufficient leadership, 
assessing rather that the GOI does not agree with Abu Mazen's 
strategy. 
 
------------------------------------ 
PA-GOI Cooperation Not Yet a Reality 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Israel finds itself in the odd position of trying to 
persuade the PA to engage in discussions on disengagement, 
Eiland said, at a time when the PA is uncertain of what it 
wants to say.  If there is full cooperation, especially on 
economic issues, Eiland continued, both sides benefit. 
Without adequate cooperative efforts, it is unlikely that the 
Palestinians will see sufficient improvement in their daily 
lives to allow Abu Mazen to reap the political benefits that 
disengagement offers.  The Palestinians, in Eiland's view, 
remain preoccupied with their new government, and it remains 
unclear who exactly is responsible for what.  Furthermore, 
Eiland said that "no one (in the PA) is working on plans." 
 
--------------------------- 
Not Repeating Oslo Mistakes 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Although the GOI recognizes that it must help Abu 
Mazen, and could move faster in, for example, dismantling 
roadblocks and fixing passages, Eiland said Israel cannot 
move forward on status talks while "all of Hamas' capacity is 
still intact."  The first day that Hamas is dissatisfied with 
developments, Eiland said, Hamas will use that capacity to 
again hold Israel hostage.  Abu Mazen, Eiland continued, is 
not strong enough to take on Hamas, and therefore he must 
persuade the faction to comply.  The Ambassador pointed out 
that, even were Abu Mazen stronger, Hamas is a problem that 
would not disappear.  Eiland responded that the GOI 
understands that dismantling militant groups will be "a 
gradual process," and that there is a clear difference 
between the GOI's public statements and private expectations 
in this regard.  The PA could, however, take steps such as 
making it illegal to carry weapons in public in lieu of 
immediately attempting to fully disarm militant groups.  Abu 
Mazen needs such "demonstrations of (his) direction" for 
himself as much as for Israel, Eiland stressed. 
 
¶10.  (C) The GOI, according to Eiland, is determined not to 
repeat what he called the "mistakes of Oslo," and will insist 
that any dialogue or process with the Palestinians lead to 
better security for Israel.  The perception of 80 percent of 
Israelis, Eiland said, is that Oslo failed because Israel did 
not insist on the full dismantling of terrorist 
infrastructure before giving political concessions to the 
Palestinians.  The roadmap is far more specific than the Oslo 
process, he added, and, under the Israeli interpretation, 
Israel will not even begin to discuss final status issues 
until its security concerns are addressed. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Palestinians, however, insist that what has been 
accomplished to date -- elections, some economic reforms, the 
beginnings of security re-organization, and the overall 
improvement in the security situation -- is a sufficient 
basis upon which to proceed with political talks, Eiland 
said.  The Palestinians warn that failure to initiate final 
status talks soon (and certainly before the PLC elections in 
July) will result in a perhaps fatal loss of momentum. 
 
---------------- 
On the Plus Side 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Eiland acknowledged some positive trends in the PA: 
Abu Mazen has replaced a number of security personnel with 
better qualified people; PA security forces have intercepted 
some five or six planned attacks and are prepared to take on 
security in several West Bank cities.  When asked if others 
in the GOI also recognize the PA's accomplishments, Eiland 
responded that the IDF Chief of Staff assessed in a recent 
conversation that the PA had accomplished 10 percent of what 
is required.  As that is up from zero the last time Eiland 
asked the question, Eiland laughingly affirmed that things 
may be moving in the right direction. 
 
----------------------------- 
Speaking a Different Language 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Elaborating on the handover of West Bank cities to 
PA security control, Eiland said that Israel and the PA are 
both playing tactical games at the expense of larger 
strategic issues.  For example, although DefMin Mofaz issues 
orders that a handover will take place, it is left to local 
IDF commanders to negotiate the details and carry out the 
handover.  IDF and PA negotiators then clash over definitions 
of, for example, whether a road is or is not "open," with the 
IDF saying that opening the checkpoints is sufficient to 
enable movement, while the PA holds out for a complete 
absence of IDF forces in the area.  Eiland said that "it 
takes two weeks" for problems like this to come to DefMin 
Mofaz's attention, as the IDF lack a mechanism that ensures 
his timely notification until the issue works its way up 
through channels. 
 
------- 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) In Lebanon, Eiland identified three elements -- 
sustained U.S. and European pressure, pressure from Lebanese 
groups, and Arab anger -- that, in the aftermath of the 
Hariri assassination, all aligned and provoked remarkable 
opportunity for change.  Eiland predicted that the Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon would be a complete one and would 
have one of two results: either a strong, independent 
Lebanon, or else a return to the chaotic wars of the 70's. 
Even in a best case pullout scenario, however, Syria will 
still retain economic clout in Lebanon, plus the loyalty of 
no small number of Lebanese, Eiland said.  If UNSCR 1559 is 
fulfilled, Hizballah must disarm along with all other 
militias in Lebanon, Eiland said.  While the GOI believes 
that it would have been more reasonable to press on Hizballah 
only after the new government gets on its feet, the Israelis 
understand that that moment has passed. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶15.  (C) Eiland said that the trend emanating from Iraq is 
now positive and will have an increasingly positive impact in 
the region once other Arab populations recognize that Iraqis 
will have a better life than they do.  Another positive sign 
to watch for will be Iraqis speaking out against foreigners 
who are fighting on behalf of the insurgency and who are 
responsible for killing Iraqis.  The impact on the 
Palestinians of Iraq's move towards democracy is somewhat 
less, Eiland said, as Palestinians have a democratic example 
much closer in Israel. 
 
¶16.  (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear 
this message. 
 
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