This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL KWBG IS EU EG LE SY ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: (C) OTTE SAYS HE'S PRESSING PA FOR SECURITY 
REFORM, BUT UNDERSTANDS "LIMITATIONS" ON PA'S CAPABILITY 
 
FOR SECURITY ACTION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) In a March 7 meeting with the Ambassador, EU Middle 
East envoy Marc Otte said he would press the PA, during his 
visit this week, on the need for security service reform, 
while focusing in his GOI meetings on Israeli-Palestinian 
economic cooperation.  He reported that World Bank President 
Wolfensohn had told him that the Bank would not ask for donor 
support for Palestinian economic infrastructure absent 
Israeli security "openings."  Noting that Abu Mazen told EU 
officials in Brussels following the recent Tel Aviv bombing 
that the PA is not capable of responding in areas it does not 
control, Otte said expectations for PA performance should be 
tempered by realism about PA capabilities.  The Ambassador 
pressed back, pointing out that the PA could find many ways 
to assist an investigation, such as the one into the Tel Aviv 
bombing, even without full security control in relevant 
areas. 
 
¶2. (C) Otte confirmed reports that the EU is debating how to 
deal with Hamas in the run-up to Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections, although he said that chances for removing 
Hamas from the EU terrorist list are slim given the EU 
requirement for consensus.  Otte saw chances for the EU 
listing Hizballah as similarly slim, despite Hizballah's 
recent pro-Syrian posture, because "even the Brits" want to 
defer a decision until after the Lebanese elections.  Noting 
that the Syria-Lebanon turmoil was a major topic of 
discussion during his just-completed visit to Cairo, Otte 
assessed that Egyptian officials are pressing President Assad 
hard, and that they appear well-informed about Assad's 
intentions.  GOE intelligence chief Soleiman expressed 
concern about the Syria-Lebanon situation, commenting that 
"the Syrians don't get it."  Recalling his meeting with Assad 
a week before the Hariri assassination, Otte commented that 
Assad seemed to view high-level visits to Damascus not as 
signs of international displeasure with the SARG, but as 
reaffirmation of his own importance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) Amb. Marc Otte, the EU Special Representative for the 
Middle East Peace Process, told the Ambassador March 7 that 
he would focus, during his visit this week, on security 
reform in his meetings with PA officials, and on 
Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation in his meetings with 
the GOI.  He noted that the EU has accelerated its assistance 
to the PA security services, but that he would make clear to 
his PA interlocutors that EU material assistance must fit 
into a larger PA plan to "transform" the services.  He gave 
few details of the economic issues he would raise with the 
GOI, but noted that World Bank President Wolfensohn recently 
told him that the Bank would not/not ask donors to contribute 
to economic infrastructure projects for the Palestinians 
absent security "openings" by the Israelis to facilitate the 
movement of people and goods. 
 
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PA Security Reform 
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¶4. (C) Otte reported that he had stressed the need for the PA 
security services to act against terrorism when he met, 
during a just-completed trip to Egypt, with Egyptian 
intelligence chief Omar Soleiman.  He said he urged Soleiman 
to step up GOE assistance to the PA security services.  The 
Ambassador commented in response that our current message to 
Soleiman stresses the need for Egypt to work with PA security 
force leaders to help mold their organizational planning. 
Material assistance is secondary. 
 
¶5. (C) Reflecting on the PA security response to the February 
25 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Otte noted that Abu Mazen had 
told EU officials in Brussels after the bombing that PA 
security forces could not be expected to pursue suspects in 
areas under Israeli security control.  Otte commented that 
the international community should give weight to PA security 
capabilities in formulating expectations for PA security 
performance.  The Ambassador concurred that the PA security 
services have weaknesses, but pointed to ways that the PA 
could use resources it does have to assist investigations 
such as the one into the Tel Aviv bombing.  The GOI, he 
noted, shares responsibility with the PA for the difficulty 
the two sides have had collaborating in the Tel Aviv bombing 
investigation.  The U.S. has been trying to coax the two 
sides to overcome inhibitions, such as about protocol, to 
cooperate more effectively in the bombing investigation and 
broader joint security projects, especially the transfer of 
authority in West Bank cities. 
 
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EU Debate on Hamas... 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Otte about reports that France 
and Italy are advancing a proposal to remove Hamas from the 
EU list of terrorist organizations.  Otte acknowledged that 
EU states are debating how to deal with Hamas during the 
upcoming Palestinian Legislative Council elections.  Chances 
that the EU would delist Hamas are small, he said, because 
the step would require EU unanimity.  At the same time, he 
added, "nothing prevents" EU states from taking national 
measures on Hamas.  He noted, for example, that the lack of 
EU action on adding Hizballah to the list of terrorist 
organizations has not prevented the Netherlands from 
categorizing Hizballah as a terrorist organization on its 
national list.  (Comment: The comparison was unclear.  Otte 
did not explain how individual EU states could take steps to 
interact with Hamas in ways precluded by Hamas' designation 
on the EU terrorist list.) 
 
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... and on Hizballah 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked for Otte's assessment of chances 
that the EU would decide to place Hizballah on the terrorist 
list, especially in light of Hizballah's recent pro-Syrian 
stance.  Otte said the Hizballah designation is still a 
matter of debate within the EU.  "Even the Brits," he said, 
are "cautious" about the designation, preferring to wait 
until after the Lebanese elections so that they can assess 
Hizballah's role in domestic Lebanese political life. 
 
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Syria-Lebanon 
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¶8. (C) Otte reported that ongoing events between Syria and 
Lebanon were a major theme in his discussions in Cairo.  The 
GOE, he commented, is clearly lobbying President Assad hard 
and is aware of Assad's thinking.  Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit, 
for example, gave Otte the gist of Assad's speech on Syrian 
troop redeployments in Lebanon a half-hour before Assad 
spoke.  Soleiman, he noted, expressed concern about the 
direction of the Syria-Lebanon issue, telling Otte that "the 
Syrians don't get it." 
 
¶9. (C) Otte recounted that he had met with Assad about a week 
before the Hariri assassination.  Assad then tried to 
convince Otte of his good intentions toward Lebanon and 
Israel, and complained about what he perceived as President 
Chirac's obsession about ending the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon.  Otte said he told Assad that the EU was not seeking 
to isolate Syria, but that Syria had few friends and needed 
to improve its posture toward Israel, Lebanon and Iraq.  Otte 
said he warned Assad not to spoil the positive momentum in 
the Israeli-Palestinian track following the Sharm al-Sheikh 
summit.  The Ambassador asked Otte to assess whether Assad 
appreciates the seriousness of messages he receives from 
high-level visitors to Damascus, or whether Assad perceives 
the visits as signs of his importance in the region.  Otte 
said that Assad appeared to have interpreted then-Deputy 
Secretary Armitage's January visit as a sign of encouragement 
 
SIPDIS 
because it occurred despite what Assad perceived as likely 
objections to the visit by USG hard-liners seeking to isolate 
Syria. 
 
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