This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  SOFIA 000524 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV IZ BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA/IRAQ: POLITICS FORCING MOVE TOWARD EXIT 
STRATEGY 
 
REF: A) SOFIA 0436 B) SOFIA O486 C) SOFIA 0067 D) 04 
     SOFIA 2261 E) 04 SOFIA 2054 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Pardew, reasons, 1.5(B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Defense Minister Svinarov's public statement 
that Bulgaria may pull its troops out of Iraq by year-end is 
strong evidence that election-year politics are forcing the 
government to move rapidly toward an exit strategy.  Despite 
Svinarov's comments, no such decision has in fact been made, 
and debate within the government is still at an early stage. 
Nevertheless, the death of another Bulgarian soldier last 
week (ref A) and President Purvanov's subsequent call for 
"quick but not premature" withdrawal from Iraq (ref B) have 
clearly spooked the government, which is trailing in the 
polls three months ahead of parliamentary elections.  With 
two thirds of the population opposed to Bulgaria's presence 
in the MNF, Sergeant Gurdev's death has made Iraq the 
dominant political issue in the country, and one which the 
government is clearly hoping to put behind them.  Our goal 
now is to convince Bulgaria to maintain a battalion-sized 
capability in the MNF until the conditions set forth in UNSCR 
1546 are met and then to transfer as many of these troops as 
possible to the NATO training mission.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.(C) Well-connected insiders, including Foreign Minister 
Passy, profess to have been taken by surprise yesterday when, 
in response to a reporter's question as to whether Bulgaria 
would withdraw its troops from Iraq by the end of the year, 
Svinarov said that a report was being prepared for the 
government on a possible withdrawal.  In addition to Passy, 
two top members of the Prime Minister's parliamentary group 
and the Minister of Energy also told us today that neither 
the Prime Minister's party nor the government has made a 
decision in favor of pulling out of Iraq. 
 
¶3. (C) Explanations for Svinarov's statement range from 
benign (he is a loose cannon, he was misquoted) to 
conspiratorial (he had the tacit blessing of the PM).  There 
may be elements of truth to both interpretations, but the 
facts as we now know them are as follows:  the General Staff 
has prepared a decision memo for the Defense Council, which 
is chaired by the President and includes top civilian and 
military officials but is consultative in nature.  Once 
approved by the National Defense Council, the paper and 
recommendations will be forwarded to the Council of 
Ministers, which will develop an official government 
position.  This is likely to happen before the end of the 
month.  Once approved, the government's decision will then be 
submitted to the National Assembly for a vote before the 
middle of April. 
 
¶4. (C) Passy and others who favor a moderate approach expect 
the government's position to be much "softer" than Svinarov's 
initial comments would indicate, but no one is willing to 
predict a continued Bulgarian presence in the MNF beyond 
¶2005.  Vladimir Donchev, the chairman of the Parliamentary 
committee charged with intelligence oversight and a member of 
the NMSS leadership, believes that the decision to withdraw 
will be formally linked to UNSCR 1546, the formation of an 
Iraqi government and the adoption of a constitution, rather 
than a set date.  The effect, however, will likely be the 
same, since UNSCR 1546 sets a "deadline (in the Bulgarian 
view) for these events to take place by 31 December 2005. 
The government's decision is also likely to call for a 
redefinition of the military mission away from peace 
enforcemnt to training of the Iraqi security forces. 
 
5.(C) The government is clearly reacting defensivelyto the 
effect of Iraq on domestic politics.  TheSocialists (BSP), 
who have called for an immediate withdrawal from Iraq (ref 
C), hold a 2-1 lead i the polls over the Prime Minister's 
National Moement Simeon II (NMSS) with the three months to 
o before elections.  The shooting death of Sergean Gurdev, 
followed by President Purvanov's speech,seems to have 
panicked the government, leading t Svinarov's uncoordinated 
remarks and the curren stampede toward a year-end 
withdrawal. Passy an others are trying to get the process 
back into ormal channels, but the FM's job is made more 
dificult by the lack of leadership from the top. 
 
6 (C) Prime Minister Saxe-Coburg Goha was conveniently out 
of the country when Svinarov spoke out yesterday.  More 
importantly, the PM's entire election campaign appears to be 
adrift, waiting -- so far in vain -- for him to take the 
lead.  Svinarov and others who reportedly support a quick 
 
 
withdrawal from Iraq would like to see the issue neutralized 
before the election.  In the absence of any effort by the PM 
to shift the focus of political discussion from Iraq to the 
government's many successes in foreign and domestic policy 
the PM's party is in danger of losing further ground. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT.  Bulgarians from the Prime Minister on down 
have told us repeatedly over the last six months that, absent 
some concrete economic or political benefits from the Iraq 
deployment, their position would become untenable as 
elections approach (refs D-E).  With the BSP calling for 
immediate withdrawal from Iraq and the polls showing the 
Socialist's lead increasing, at least some members of the 
government appear to have concluded that no "rewards" will be 
forthcoming before June 25, and have decided to try to cut 
their losses. Regardless of the precise contours of the 
government's upcoming decision, it will be essentially an 
exit strategy timed to get them out of MNF operations by the 
end of the year and shift the public debate to issues where 
they are presumably stronger. 
 
¶8. (C) The March 25 meeting between the Secretary and FM 
Passy and the March 29-30 visit to Sofia by Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick potentially can affect the government's upcoming 
decision.  While acknowledging the pressure faced by the 
government and the need for an exit strategy, both the 
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary should urge senior 
 
SIPDIS 
Bulgarian officials to tie military capability in Iraq to the 
approval of the Iraqi constitution, establishment of a 
parliament and the presence of adequate indigenous security 
forces, rather than a date certain.  Only then should 
Bulgaria consider shifting the bulk of its forces to the NATO 
training mission.  END COMMENT