This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR JIACG/CT, JIATF-WEST; ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/7/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR EWWT PTER SN CH JA MY ID
SUBJECT: MARCH 1 "RMSI" MARITIME SECURITY WORKSHOP: MAKING 
PROGRESS WITH THE LITTORAL STATES 
 
REF: STATE 38874 
 
Classified By: EP Counselor Laurent Charbonnet, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On March 1, the USG hosted an informal 
workshop on the five "RMSI" elements of maritime security for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.  The meeting 
marked the first time the United States has met exclusively 
with the Malacca Strait littorals on maritime security.  The 
re-worked title "regional maritime security cooperation" 
seemed quite acceptable to all participants.  The USG 
inter-agency team gave presentations on: enhancing 
coordination and information sharing both at the inter-agency 
level and internationally to improve Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA); the JIATF Intelligence Fusion Center 
concept; establishing maritime authorities and responsive 
decision-making architecture; and potential legal models for 
international information sharing and operational 
cooperation.  Malaysia expressed interest in further 
discussions on maritime security, particularly on technology 
to improve MDA; Indonesia expressed interest in further 
discussions on the fusion center concept and on 
decision-making architecture and models for coordinating the 
maritime security missions of a range of domestic agencies. 
Malaysian and Indonesian reactions suggest that the next 
steps in the "RMSI" process should be bilateral efforts with 
Indonesia and Malaysia respectively.  Thereafter, a focus on 
the need for empowering legal arrangements between the three 
littoral states will require a return to a multilateral 
format.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On March 1 in Singapore, the USG hosted an informal 
workshop on the elements of maritime security for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  A representative from the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) also attended.  The 
workshop took place on the eve of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) conference on Maritime 
Security co-hosted by Singapore and the United States from 
March 2-4. 
 
Cooperative Maritime Security: the USCG Experience 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3. (U) Vice Admiral Harvey Johnson led off the morning with a 
presentation on the U.S. Coast Guard's cooperative approach 
to maritime security. The Coast Guard has stepped up 
cooperation with other U.S. federal, state and local agencies 
post 9/11.  Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has been 
instrumental in raising effectiveness. 
 
¶4. (U) Participants highlighted differences between the U.S. 
experience and the situation in the Malacca Strait. 
Singapore's MinDef Policy Director Col. Gary Ang pointed out 
that the users of the Strait of Malacca were mostly 
non-littoral states.  Since user states needed to play a 
part, he suggested, perhaps handling maritime security under 
the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) would be the 
most effective way to proceed.  EAP Maritime Security 
Coordinator Richard deVillafranca responded that, while user 
states certainly had an interest in maritime security policy 
in the region, at the end of the day it would be the littoral 
states that would do the brunt of the actual work.  Another 
factor to consider would be the length of time it would take 
to move policy through the ARF.  The Malaysian delegation 
noted the need to address the socio-cultural roots of 
maritime crime.  Malaysian Admiral Abdul Rahim Hussin advised 
that a comprehensive solution required removing the 
motivation for crime by promoting economic development and 
pointed to Malaysia's experience in defeating its communist 
insurgency in the 1940's and 1950's as an example. 
 
U.S. Maritime Security Policy: the Interagency Process 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (U) PM/ISO Senior Naval Advisor CAPT. Bruce Nichols' 
presentation on the interagency process covered the recently 
concluded experience of U.S. agencies in working together to 
create and implement a new National Security Policy Directive 
(NSPD) to coordinate maritime security policy post-9/11.  He 
highlighted the importance of top-down leadership to keep 
participating agencies on track.  Also important was the need 
for agencies to "take a step back" to educate themselves on 
the organization and functions of their partners, to 
understand the scope and limitations of statutory authorities 
within the interagency participants and to delegate drafting 
to a smaller core group. 
 
¶6. (U) Singapore's Col. Ang cautioned that it was impractical 
to wait for the littoral states to complete their own 
interagency reorganizations before moving forward with 
regional cooperation.  Rather than wait, he suggested that 
countries needed to use existing relationships.  Malaysia's 
Admiral Abdul Hadi (Director of Malaysia's "MECC" or Maritime 
Enforcement Coordination Center) drew attention to his 
country's own experience with reorganization in establishing 
its MECC and in ongoing efforts to establish the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), which he termed "a sort 
of Coast Guard" to enforce maritime security.  Indonesia's 
Damos Dumoli Agusman (MFA) advised that his country was also 
currently pursuing interagency reorganization; he noted that 
while 9/11 had given U.S. agencies a common definition of the 
threat and a motive to stay focused, Indonesia's government 
agencies had so far run into problems in these areas. 
 
Interagency Communication: the Fusion Center Concept 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (U) Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West) LTC 
Mike Creed discussed the necessary elements for interagency 
coordination by reviewing JIATF-West's efforts to combat 
narcotics trafficking.  Standardization and broad access to 
information were essential to promote interoperability among 
agencies and countries.  This leads to a "Common Operating 
Picture" and the fusion concept, where data can be turned 
into actionable intelligence and used against specific 
targets.  Equally important, there must be an equal 
partnership among agencies, which is fostered by well-defined 
MOU's. 
 
¶8. (U) A Malaysian representative stressed the difficulty of 
getting agencies to share information.  CAPT. Roger Welch, 
PACOM JIACG/CT Director, responded that one solution to this 
problem would be to ensure that all agencies be given credit 
for arrests and seizures so each has an incentive to 
cooperate rather than compete.  Singapore's Col. Ang 
questioned whether the fusion center concept could be 
replicated in the Malacca Strait without first resolving 
larger political issues, due to different levels of 
information sharing among countries and the fact that most of 
the Strait were national territory.  Richard deVillafranca 
agreed on the need for an effective information sharing 
agreement between the three Malacca Strait littorals; he 
noted the 2002 agreement on information sharing between 
Indonesia, Malaysia and three other ASEAN members, but also 
noted Singapore was not yet a signatory.  This agreement 
might become the basis for an initial effort at information 
sharing among the littorals.  On the operational front, he 
noted that the coordinated patrols between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore could be a first step toward better 
information sharing, since enhanced information exchange 
could improve the efficient use of scarce maritime assets. 
 
The Legal Dimension: International Agreements 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The fourth session, presented by L/OES 
Attorney-Adviser CAPT. Ashley Roach, focused on the role that 
bilateral and regional agreements play in establishing a 
successful framework for regional maritime security.  For 
agreements to be effective, states must offer the fullest law 
enforcement cooperation possible in accordance with their 
national laws and on the basis of respect for sovereignty, 
equality and mutual benefit.  Because terrorists and maritime 
criminals do not respect national boundaries and often 
exploit jurisdictional "gaps and seams," international 
cooperation, supported by strong bilateral and regional 
agreements, is a crucial means of enhancing capability to 
suppress illicit activity at sea. 
 
¶10. (U) Reactions to the idea of creating new legal 
structures for maritime security cooperation varied from 
delegation to delegation.  Singapore's Col. Ang was generally 
supportive but cautioned that too great an emphasis on legal 
formalities could potentially impede commerce and 
cooperation; Ang argued for a balanced approach of looking at 
what existing agreements had to offer and making adjustments 
as necessary.  The Malaysian delegation was more cautious, 
emphasizing the importance of maintaining absolute 
sovereignty no matter what form regional cooperation might 
take.  Roach advised that these were perfectly natural 
concerns that the United States had encountered frequently as 
it had built cooperative relationships with countries in the 
Western Hemisphere; he advised that as mutual comfort levels 
increased, countries invariably tended to shed their initial 
reluctance to allow neighbors to play a greater role in 
combating common maritime threats. 
 
Table Top Exercise: Caribbean Region Model 
------------------------------------------ 
¶11. (U) Brigadier General (Ret) Thomas Flemming from PACOM 
described the Caribbean Regional Agreement (CRA) to 
demonstrate how countries could collectively build greater 
situational awareness to combat transnational threats.  While 
the focus of the CRA was narcotics, several aspects of it 
might be applicable to the Strait of Malacca.  For example, 
the CRA had a Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System 
that provided a common operating picture with real-time 
electronic communications.  Respecting national sovereignty, 
each state could determine how much information it shared. 
 
¶12. (U) A Malaysian participant emphasized concern for 
environmental protections and improved aids to navigation 
instead of a disproportionate emphasis on terrorist threats. 
Singapore's Col. Ang observed that the three littoral states 
already cooperated on air traffic control, with over-lapping 
radar coverage and a system where controllers could 
communicate in real time.  There was also some discussion of 
existing bilateral and trilateral mechanisms to enhance 
maritime security in the Strait.  CAPT. Welch closed by 
stressing the need to inventory existing assets, agreements, 
and capabilities to identify gaps in coverage and areas where 
capacity building could be done with greatest effect. 
 
Afternoon Wrap-up Session 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) Singapore's Col. Ang again emphasized the importance 
of involving user states in maritime security policy and of 
having an external body such as the ARF or IMO play a role. 
Ang also offered that a holistic approach to maritime 
security should also include consequence management -- the 
cooperative measures that countries would take after an event 
had occurred.  He advised that working on consequence 
management would involve fewer political obstacles than 
cooperating on prevention and might be a way to 
institutionalize the regional maritime security dialogue. 
 
¶14. (U) In response to the IMO representative's intervention 
on the serious regional and global economic consequences of a 
terrorist incident in the Malacca Strait, the Malaysian MFA's 
Wan Napsiah Salleh cautioned that "extreme examples" of 
possible terrorist activity or rampant piracy in the Strait 
of Malacca amounted to saying that her government was not 
doing enough.  She advised that Malaysia was aware of the 
need to "be vigilant," but it would have to carefully study 
the ideas presented during the workshop before deciding 
whether they were suitable for Malaysia.  The Indonesian 
delegation's reaction was more muted.  DEPLU's Damos Dumoli 
Agusman was appreciative of U.S. efforts and expressed 
interest in further discussions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) It was a considerable achievement to bring together 
diplomatic, military and law enforcement representatives from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to discuss 
maritime security.  It is an indication that the maritime 
security debate has shifted over the last six months.  While 
preserving national sovereignty remains sensitive, the 
discussions focused more on organizational and operational 
issues.  The next steps on our maritime security strategy for 
the Strait of Malacca should include following up on the 
interest Malaysia and Indonesia expressed in the use of 
technology to enhance MDA and Indonesia's desire to learn 
more about the inter-agency process that led to the 
Presidential Directive on Maritime Security Policy. 
Malaysian and Indonesian reactions suggest that the next 
steps in the "RMSI" process should be bilateral efforts with 
Indonesia and Malaysia respectively.  Thereafter, a focus on 
the need for empowering legal arrangements between the three 
littoral states will require a return to a multilateral 
format. 
 
¶16. (C) Comment, continued:  After the March 1 discussions, 
Maritime Coordinator deVillafranca briefed Japan Coast Guard 
(Iwanami and Sakurai) and Chinese MFA (Counselor Zhao 
Jianhua) in broad terms about the objective and outcomes of 
the workshop.  The Chinese reaction, in particular, suggests 
a lessening of suspicion and concern about USG engagement 
with the Malacca Strait littorals on maritime security, a 
notable development given that 80 percent of China's oil 
imports transit the Strait.  On Japan, despite goodwill and 
common strategic and operation objectives, we continue to 
grapple for a way to coordinate our respective maritime 
efforts in the Malacca Strait. 
¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by EAP Maritime 
Coordinator Richard deVillafranca. 
LAVIN