This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI 
NSC FOR FTOWNSEND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2010 
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH WISHES TO CONVEY HIS COMMITMENT ON SA/LW 
DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH 
 
REF: SANAA 00564 
 
Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (d) 
 
-------------------------- 
Summary and Action Request: 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1. (S) Following up on his 3/10 meeting with Ambassador and 
DCM, during which he made a pledge to ban once and for all 
the importation of weapons by independent arms dealers, 
President Saleh has requested a phone conversation with 
President Bush in order to personally convey to him his 
commitment on SA/LW and the GWOT. Post promised to pass the 
message to Washington, making no promises, but recommending 
that Saleh use the opportunity to make a very clear and 
specific commitment to President Bush, if the call actually 
takes place. Saleh has provided us with a copy of a letter he 
sent to his Minister of Defense, immediately following our 
3/10 meeting with him, in which he instructs MOD to consider 
null and void all End User Certificates (EUCs) previously 
issued to arms dealers and to desist henceforth from issuing 
same to any arms dealer. Post recommends a ten minute phone 
call be arranged with President Bush in order to put the 
highest pressure possible on Saleh to keep his commitment on 
stopping the flow of illegal weapons in and out of Yemen. 
End summary and action request. 
 
---------------- 
Quick Follow-up: 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Following closely on the heels of his meeting with 
Ambassador and DCM, President Saleh asked his counselor for 
media and public affairs, Abdo al-Burji, to meet with DCM to 
convey Saleh's seriousness, when he pledged to the Ambassador 
that he would take action on the illegal flow of SA/LW into 
and out of Yemen. Bourji, told DCM, 3/13, that President 
Saleh took very seriously the evidence we provided on MOD 
purchased weapons ending up in the hands of terrorists. 
Saleh, said Bourji, wanted to let us know that he has already 
issued instructions to MOD and MOI to cancel all previously 
issued certificates to all arms dealers and to only buy 
weapons through official procurement channels from this day 
on. Bourji then advised DCM that Saleh would like to convey 
his commitment personally to President Bush in order to 
eliminate any doubts about him in Washington. Saleh, said 
Bourji, would also take that opportunity to reconfirm his 
commitment to U.S.-Yemeni partnership in the GWOT. 
 
¶3. (S) DCM applauded the President's sentiments and, without 
making any commitments, said the Embassy would convey Saleh's 
request to the White House and would get back to the 
President on approval and timing of the call. DCM quickly 
added, however, that should the phone call take place, Saleh 
should be very clear and very specific in his commitment to 
President Bush. Saleh had asked the Ambassador on 3/13, to 
see if Washington would ask the Saudis for money to help the 
ROYG buy back SA/LW from Yemeni souks. DCM said that such a 
request should be put in the context of a comprehensive 
strategy that would: 
¶A. Stop the flow of weapons into Yemen through arms dealers 
that routinely kept at least 50% of their purchases for sale 
on the private market. 
¶B. Implement a modern inventory and procurement system 
(something we had offered to help MOD with on previous 
occasions) and to have, therefore, a control system in place 
that would easily show how each imported weapon had been 
disposed of. 
¶C. A buy-back initiative would then make sense, coupled with 
the first two steps and followed by a complete ban on arms 
bazaars in Yemen. 
 
Bourji took careful notes and promised to share them with 
Saleh and to so advise him in the matter. 
 
---------------------------- 
Dulqum, Mo'ayad and Zindani: 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) On the way out of the meeting with Counselor Bourji, 
President Saleh, strolling out of his gazebo with one of his 
bodyguards, called to DCM and asked how the meeting had gone. 
On finding out that it was only a verbal briefing, he 
immediately sent for a copy of his instructions to MOD and 
gave it to DCM. "I want you to let Washington know," said 
Saleh," exactly what I told my ministers. There will no 
longer be any dealings with weapons merchants." Saleh went on 
to ask that we jointly find a way out of "the Hadi Dulqum 
predicament." "Please tell Washington," said Saleh, that if I 
thought this man was dangerous, I'd never let him go. Quite 
frankly, I find Abdelmajid Zindani (the rector of al-Iman 
University and listed by the UN as a financier of terrorism), 
more dangerous and would rather have him under arrest than 
have Dulqum." DCM replied that we would have to work that one 
closely and see if Yemen's Attorney General could use our 
intel on Dulqum to  try him under Yemeni law. As a parting 
shot, Saleh said that he did not think Sheikh al-Mo'ayad 
deserved the conviction he received in the U.S. "because all 
you have on him  is support for Hamas and, all Yemenis 
support Hamas!" Nonetheless, Saleh reassured us, the 
conviction is not likely to cause any adverse public reaction 
in Yemen. 
 
--------------- 
Action Request: 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Post requests approval for 5-10 minutes on the 
President's schedule, preferably in the next week-to-ten 
days, to take a call from President Saleh. We will urge Saleh 
to make the points in par.3. Saleh also wanted to 
congratulate President Bush on his election to a second term 
in office. Saleh may always ad-lib and use the call ask for 
financial assistance in buying out the weapons souks in his 
country. We recommend the president reiterate to Saleh that 
any buy-back project must be contingent on the first two 
steps (cutting the flow and introducing new stock controls) 
being accomplished. End action request. 
Krajeski