This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000564 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL ETTC PARM PHUM IZ SA SR YM DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH SAYS FROM NOW ON NO MORE WEAPONS DEALS USING 
ARMS BROKERS 
 
REF: STATE 39726 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request for NEA/ARPI.  See para. 12. 
 
¶2. (S) Summary.  Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to 
President Saleh on March 10.  In a classic Saleh move to put 
his interlocutors on the defensive, the Yemeni President 
opened with a theatrical tirade on the latest Human Rights 
Report and U.S. hegemony and double standards in the region. 
Starting with an offensive that the U.S. cannot stop 
legitimate arms sales to Yemen, Saleh changed his tone in 
mid-meeting.  He conceded that the ROYG had had a fifty-fifty 
deal with arms merchants before, but that he was ending this 
practice.  Having first said that the shipment of 10,000 M92s 
was already on its way, upon hearing that we had stopped it, 
Saleh switched gears, insisting he had issued an order to 
stop it himself.  Saleh ended with a promise, that from now 
on it would be "official policy" that only the MOD may buy 
weapon on behalf of Yemen.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador, DCM and PolEcon Chief (notetaker) met with 
President Saleh on March 10 to deliver reftel demarche on the 
cancellation of Yemen's purchase of 10,000 M92 automatic 
rifles from SaM.  In an attempt to preempt this unpleasant 
message, Saleh, who had been given a heads-up regarding its 
content, jumped in first. "You don't like our Serbian deal 
and we don't like your human rights report."  Saleh 
complained that the U.S. hammers Yemen on its human rights 
record, while demanding extra judicial treatment for Yemeni 
detainees like Hadi Dulqum, and Jaber al-Banna. 
 
¶4. (S) Saleh announced that on March 9, due to criticisms of 
Yemen's human rights practices from the Department of State, 
Congress, and international and local NGOs, he decided to 
refer the cases of Hadi Dulqum, Jaber al-Banna, and Abu Assem 
al-Makki to the Attorney General's office for prosecution. 
"If there is a case, we will try them, if not, they must be 
released."  Ambassador told Saleh he looked forward to 
discussing human rights issues with him at a future date, but 
reminded the President that he had come to deliver a very 
specific and serious message about Yemeni SA/LW purchases. 
"Yes we buy weapons," Saleh retorted, "we are an independent 
state and we need them." 
 
-------------------------- 
Preserving Our Partnership 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Ambassador told Saleh that the U.S. fully recognized 
Yemen's legitimate defense needs, but that the weapons 
procured on behalf of the ROYG by third party Yemeni arms 
dealers far exceed such requirements and are ending up in the 
hands of terrorists.  The USG has grave concerns at the 
highest levels, continued Ambassador, and urgent action is 
needed in order to preserve the U.S.-Yemeni partnership. 
 
¶6. (S) Ambassador informed Saleh that the USG has been able 
to trace two M92s automatic rifles used in the December 
attack on our Jeddah Consulate to Yemeni MOD procurement 
orders.  Raising the SaM deal for 10,000 M92s, Ambassador 
told Saleh that Yemen's defense and security forces could not 
possibly need so many of this specialized weapon -- one 
highly favored by terrorists for its light weight, small 
size, and high fire power. 
 
----------------- 
You Can't Do That 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador reminded Saleh that early last year he had 
promised to cancel all end-user certificates (EUC) and 
transfer licensing authority to the MFA.  Yet, continued 
Ambassador, there is no evidence of a change in ROYG policy 
regarding third-party procurement.  In an effort to 
demonstrate how seriously the U.S. takes this matter, 
Ambassador told Saleh, the U.S. has asked the Government of 
Serbia and Montenegro to cancel the sale of 10,000 M92s to 
Yemen.  "You can't do that," retorted Saleh, "the guns are 
already on their way!" 
 
----------------------------- 
...Yes, Mr. President, We Can 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) "Mr. President, we can and indeed we have," said 
Ambassador, adding that along with the U.S., weapons 
producing Eastern European countries are losing confidence in 
the legitimacy of Yemeni EUCs.  Grasping perhaps for the 
first time the seriousness of the message, Saleh asked which 
broker had negotiated the M92 deal with SaM, and agreed that 
the M92 had a "dangerous shot" favored by terrorists.  Saleh 
suddenly announced, "When I heard of this deal yesterday, I 
gave the order myself to cancel it!" 
 
----------------- 
...Loud and Clear 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Switching gears, Saleh conceded that "in the past" he 
had allowed arms dealers to keep 50 percent of weapons 
purchases for the ROYG, with the other 50 percent going to 
the armed forces.  "But no more," Saleh declared.  Likely 
concerned which deals might be next stopped, he hastened to 
inform Ambassador that he personally had just signed a Czech 
deal for 10,000 pistols and 5,000 'ordinary' AKs for use by 
his regular forces.  "All other deals negotiated by arms 
dealers are null and void --This is an official decision," 
Saleh said.  Turning to his aide he instructed, "Write that 
down!" 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Tell Prince Nayef to Help Buy Out Our Souks 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) "We do not give arms to terrorists," Saleh said to 
Ambassador, admitting that arms of all kinds are available in 
Yemen's weapons souks and "anyone can buy them." Saleh said 
that arms dealers will sell to anyone, "just like Hadi 
Dulqum," adding that "if you and the Saudis are so worried" 
help me clean out the souks.  Saleh told us that Saudi 
Interior Minister Prince Nayef was due in Sanaa on March 11 
to sign a new border security fence protocol with Yemen on 
March 12.  He suggested that the U.S. and KSA work together 
to determine the right sum of money, "perhaps 200-300 million 
dollars," and agree to "buy out all the arms bazaars in 
Yemen." 
 
¶11. (S) Ambassador and DCM both pressed Saleh to tread 
carefully on Hadi Dulqum -- not an ordinary arms merchant but 
dealer to AQ -- and give us more time to find a legal 
solution to his case.  While the U.S.-Saudi buyback idea can 
be explored, Ambassador reiterated to Saleh that the flow of 
illegal weapons must be shut off for any internal arms 
control measures to be effective. 
 
¶12. (S) Comment and Action Request.  At his acrobatic best, 
Saleh started of aggressively but ended up admitting to 
"mistakes" and promising to make a break with past practices. 
 Prince Nayef's visit may be an occasion to put more pressure 
on Saleh by promising U.S.-Saudi efforts to help him keep his 
word.  If the SAG is willing, we might jointly press Saleh to 
follow through on canceling pending arms deals in Eastern 
Europe, sever his ties with his favorite arms dealers, and 
accept our help in putting in place a modern inventory 
control system to help him (and us) account for all weapons 
purchased by MOD henceforth.  A buyback plan, in this 
context, might be worth the cost.  Begin Action Request: 
Post requests comment on feasibility of asking KSA at such 
short notice to use Nayef's visit March 11 visit to join us 
in a trilateral exploration of this idea. End Comment and 
Action Request. 
Krajeski