This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL AL SR BS EUN HZ
SUBJECT: US-ITALIAN GOALS FOR BALKANS: "PLAYING THE SAME 
TUNE ON DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS" 
 
REF: STATE 44531 
 
Classified By: POL MINISTER COUNSELOR TOM COUNTRYMAN.  REASON:1.4 (B)(D 
) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In meetings with MFA Political Director 
Terzi and European Affairs Director-General Caracciolo, DAS 
Stephens heard a strong Italian pledge of continued 
participation and cooperation with the US in the Balkans. 
Terzi said that Italy was focusing on a number of important 
issues, from the new political structure in Pristina to 
SFOR-ESDP handover and post-Ashdown OHR in Bosnia to Croatian 
and Serbian compliance with ICTY commitments. Italy was 
relieved by both Kosovo PM Haradinaj's decision to resign and 
go peacefully to The Hague, and by the relative calmness with 
which news of the indictment was received by the general 
population.  Next steps include the selection of a new Prime 
Minister and legislation to safeguard K-Serbs and allow 
access to religious shrines.  Stephens urged that the EU use 
the leverage of the Feasibility Study to keep Belgrade 
focused on the proximate goal of the "3 generals" and on the 
ultimate goal of Mladic and Karadzic,s arrest and transfer 
to The Hague.  Belgrade is "watching Zagreb," underscoring 
the importance of maintaining the EU,s line on Gotovina. 
Italy is working now with its Contact Group partners on 
building blocks for the "Key Messages" on Kosovo's future 
status, to include: no partition; minority protections; 
access to religious sites; and continued international 
presence.  The Italians are also thinking about an 
"Ashdown-like" figure to administer the international 
presence. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary Continued:  During his February 23 visit to 
the region, FM Fini voiced the general European view that the 
will of the people must be respected regarding continued 
Montenegrin membership in the SAM Union.  He could not agree 
when Montenegrin President Vujanovic asserted that a separate 
and independent Montenegro would be a stabilizing 
development. Caracciolo said Italy would stand firm on 
Croatia in Brussels.  Italy was thinking about a narrower 
mandate for the post-Ashdown OHR, and would nominate a 
replacement candidate.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
POSITIVE/PRAGMATIC TONE 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  On March 15, EUR DAS Kathy Stephens and EUR/SCE 
Deputy Director Eric Gaudiosi had separate meetings with MFA 
Political Director Terzi and European Affairs 
Director-General Caracciolo.  POL Minister-Counselor and 
Poloff accompanied.  Balkans Affairs Office Director Raimondo 
De Cardona also participated on the Italian side, and hosted 
a lunch following the MFA meetings.  The overall tone from 
Terzi and Caracciolo (Italian Ambassador in Belgrade 
2000-2003), was upbeat but pragmatic.  Both sides recognized 
the progress made in stabilizing the region over the past 
year, and agreed that Europe and the US must remain engaged 
through the Contact Group and other multilateral institutions 
if the final push to resolve remaining issues region-wide is 
to be successful.  Caracciolo underlined the similarity of US 
and Italian positions and approaches, asserting that we are 
"playing the same tune on different instruments."  That 
morning's bombing of Rugova's motorcade in Kosovo was 
indicative of the still fragile situation on the ground. 
Terzi emphasized Italy's special interest in the Balkans, 
given its geographical proximity and historical ties.  He had 
hosted a lunch for contact group Ambassadors the previous 
week (POLMIN attended for US) during which all agreed that 
the highest priority now is Kosovo, given the upcoming 
standards report and Haradinaj's departure for The Hague. 
That said, no one issue can be looked at in isolation in the 
Balkans, and Italy was focusing on a number of priorities, 
from the new political structure in Pristina to SFOR-ESDP 
handover and post-Ashdown OHR in Bosnia to Croatian and 
Serbian compliance with ICTY commitments. 
 
--------------------- 
HARADINAJ RESIGNATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Terzi said he was relieved by both Haradinaj's 
decision resign and go peacefully to The Hague, and by the 
relative calmness with which news of the indictment was 
received by the general population in Kosovo.  Terzi credited 
Haradinaj with keeping a lid on the situation by involving 
his political deputies early in the process, and urging calm 
in his public statements following the decision.  Terzi said 
that SRSG Jessen-Petersen's remarks praising Haradinaj may 
have been a bit over the top, but noted that the two had 
developed a personal relationship over the past few months 
and predicted that the long-term consequences of the 
statement would be "marginal."  What is important is that a 
 
 
crisis had been defused and a strong message on the 
impartiality of the ICTY had been sent to Zagreb, Belgrade 
and Sarajevo. Terzi noted that the next step is the selection 
of a new Prime Minister to replace Haradinaj.  It is 
essential the incumbent has credibility, be an efficient 
administrator and cooperative interlocutor for Belgrade.  The 
IC has a bit of a dilemma, continued Terzi, between using its 
influence to ensure such a person is selected, and creating a 
perception that it is interfering in an internal political 
decision. 
 
------- 
IC ROLE 
------- 
 
¶5. (C) DAS Stephens reiterated US appreciation for Italian 
efforts in the region, and for its continued close 
coordination with the US on its multilateral and bilateral 
Balkans initiatives.  She concurred with Caracciolo's 
observation that we must guard against EU "enlargement 
fatigue," and pressed Italy to think creatively, as an EU 
member, about means to accelerate the region's Euro-Atlantic 
integration. She also agreed with Terzi's view that the IC 
has a strong interest in seeing that the right person is 
selected to replace Haradinaj, but there was a "tension" 
between influence and interference.   The US has made clear 
to Peterson it wants to see a broadly representative PISG 
committed to active implementation of Standards. Time is 
running short, and the IC cannot afford any backsliding on 
progress made during Haradinaj's administration.  Caracciolo 
noted that after Haradinaj, the list of responsible political 
interlocutors is quite small.  For instance, his impression 
of Rugova from his visit (accompanying Fini) was very 
negative.  Rugova seems committed to the hard-liners among 
Haradinaj's supporters, and continues to insist on full 
independence for Kosovo with immediate EU recognition. 
Caracciolo also suspects Rugova has a drinking problem - "It 
was his worst performance in years." 
 
----------------- 
REGIONAL APPROACH 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Terzi cited legislation to safeguard K-Serbs and allow 
access to religious shrines as critical next steps.  Stephens 
emphasized the need to carefully craft the script for the 
Contact Group Political Director's April 12 visit to Pristina 
and Belgrade.  It should follow closely the message in the 
letter from Secretary Rice which Stephens had carried to Rome 
for FM Fini: the way ahead in Kosovo cannot be looked at in 
isolation, but rather in the broader context of a regional 
move toward European institutions, and reaffirm continued 
trans-Atlantic involvement, including US participation in 
KFOR.  Stephens noted a recent article in the Financial Times 
by former Italian PM Amato as the type of creative thinking 
necessary to move the process along.  (Embassy Note: We are 
often struck by the fact that Italy's voice is often 
inversely proportional to its interests in the Balkans. 
Fini's identification of the region as one of the key US-EU 
priorities may change that and is worth noting as the IC 
prepares for more high-level travel to the region.  End 
Note.)  Both Caracciolo and Terzi noted that Belgrade is 
aware that it cannot stop and is falling behind the trend 
towards regional integration of its Former-Yugolsav 
neighbors, and must be encouraged to engage actively in this 
process.  De Cardona noted the challenge the IC faces in this 
regard given the current leadership vacuum in Belgrade. 
 
¶7. (C)  Terzi agreed that the Amato piece was well written 
and "influential."  He said that during his visit to the 
region, Fini tried to convey to all interlocutors, Serb and 
Kosovar alike, that there was "light at the end of the 
tunnel" and that the standards review was a step in the 
evolution towards a government in Pristina with broad 
authorities but connection to a "European dimension" to 
include some type of security presence as a stabilizing 
component.  Fini stressed, with DPM Labus particularly, the 
need for active and cooperative Belgrade participation, for 
example, encouraging K-Serbs to participate in elections. 
Italy was working now with its Contact Group partners on 
building blocks for the "Key Messages" on Kosovo's future 
status, to include: no partition; minority protections; 
access to religious sites; and a continued international 
presence.  Caracciolo added that the Italians were also 
thinking of a "Bosnia model" for Kosovo - not partition, but 
an "Ashdown-like" figure to administer the international 
presence.  We should also use pieces from the OHRID agreement 
and Serbian ideas on status, mixing the best of these and 
other initiatives and apply to Kosovo as appropriate.  the 
threat of violence cannot be used to drive the process in 
Kosovo.  Caracciolo would be traveling to Athens and Vienna 
the following week to brief governments there and enlist 
support and ideas.  He lamented Greece's still inflexible 
 
 
position on the "Macedonia" name issue and expected the 
Italian Parliament to vote to take a similar position to the 
US' in the near future. 
 
---------------- 
ICTY COOPERATION 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Stephens said that the US was encouraged by the 
recent improved level of cooperation with the ICTY, noting 
that the transfer rate of PIFWCs to the Hague has increased 
dramatically in recent weeks.  The results represented the 
effect of the US and EU speaking with one voice on the 
necessity of accused war criminals being brought to justice. 
Stephens hoped that the EU would use the leverage of the 
Feasibility Study to keep Belgrade focused on the proximate 
goal of the "3 generals" and on the ultimate goal of Mladic 
and Karadzic,s arrest and transfer to The Hague.  Belgrade 
is "watching Zagreb," underscoring the importance of 
maintaining the EU,s line on Gotovina."   Caracciolo noted 
that Fini had reminded Kostunica that he too was a "man of 
the right," but underscored that there was a difference 
between patriotism and the extremism of the Yugoslav wars, 
and that PIFWCs were "not heroes but criminals." 
 
¶9. (C)  Terzi agreed that pressure must be kept on 
governments region-wide for full ICTY compliance.  However, 
he argued that the Feasibility Study was simply a 
preparatory phase" in the accession process.  He guaranteed 
that the EU would, in parallel, continue to urge Belgrade to 
pursue more actively war criminals living in areas or among 
populations it controls or influences.  Caracciolo said Italy 
would stand firm on Croatia in Brussels, urging member states 
to complete the "negotiating framework" for Croatia but 
placing the process on hold until Gotovina arrives in The 
Hague. 
 
--------- 
SAM UNION 
--------- 
 
¶10. (C) Terzi reported that Fini also discussed SAM union 
issues with Montenegrin President Vujanovic in Belgrade. 
Fini concurred with the general European view that the will 
of the people must be respected regarding continued 
Montenegrin membership in the Union.  However, Fini could not 
agree when Vujanovic asserted that a separate and independent 
Montenegro would be a stabilizing development.  For instance, 
Montenegro could not advance within the EU's Stabilization 
and Association process without Serbia as an economic driver. 
Caracciolo worried about the presence of a "rogue state" in 
its neighborhood created by a referendum that excluded votes 
of Montenegrins living in Serbia. 
 
------------------- 
BOSNIA POST-ASHDOWN 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C)  Stephens said that with approaching 10th anniversary 
of Dayton and imminent departure of HiRep Ashdown, the US had 
been thinking about the structure and personnel that make up 
the international presence in Bosnia, and asked whether 
Italians had been doing the same.  Terzi said that Italy had 
not reached final decisions, but was thinking about a 
narrower mandate for the post-Ashdown OHR, as a signal to 
Bosnians that they have made some progress over the past 10 
years, and as a way to increase the "European Dimension" role 
within the IC presence.  Italy would be putting forward a 
candidate to replace Ashdown, and was thinking along the 
lines of an "ambassadorial" candidate, rather than someone 
from the "political circuit."  Caracciolo had visited Bosnia 
with Fini, where their meetings had included talks with US 
military officials.  He had come away "concerned" at the slow 
rate of progress and foresaw a continued strong international 
presence for some time. 
 
12 (U) DAS Stephens has cleared this message. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME00989 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL