This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DHS FOR DIXIE FARIES 
STATE FOR INL/AAE ELIZABETH MCKAY AND PETE PRAHAR 
STATE ALSO FOR EB/TRA/OTP DORIS HAYWOOD AND NEA/MAG 
MADRID FOR STEPHEN PEREZ 
LONDON FOR USIMO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT ETRD ECON PTER PREL PINS PINR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: PORT SECURITY IN OUR TIME? 
 
REF: A) RABAT 0485, B) 04 RABAT 1211 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Morocco is taking its port security 
obligations seriously, and efforts are underway at ports 
nationwide to bring security infrastructure up to the level 
required by the International Maritime Organization's ISPS 
port security code.  Observation at several Atlantic ports 
confirm that Moroccan port authorities are constructing 
guarded barriers around the commercial cargo sections of 
international ports and installing millions of dollars worth 
of cargo and passenger scanning equipment.  Most of these 
endeavors will be finished this summer.  But the GOM still 
has gaps to fill in its port defenses (literally in some 
cases), especially in the area of personnel access control. 
The GOM has asked for assistance from the United States in 
creating a badging system that will allow police to 
effectively screen people entering and exiting port 
facilities (Ref A).  Corruption among port security guards 
may also be a problem.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) A glance at the map shows the importance of ports to 
the Moroccan economy.  Surrounded by the sea to the north 
and west, with the 1,000-mile closed land border with 
Algeria to the east and the sands of the Sahara to the 
south, Morocco is - commercially - almost an island.  As a 
consequence, a full 98 percent of Moroccan trade passes 
through its sea ports. 
 
¶3. (U) Econoff and FSN traveled to central and southern 
Morocco to visit three of the country's principal Atlantic 
coast ports: Jorf Lasfar, Safi and Agadir.  These three 
ports, in addition to Casablanca, handle the lion's share of 
international cargo traffic as well as the country's largest 
fishing fleets.  Managerial responsibility over these ports 
is shared between the Port Commandant, in charge of security 
and safety as well as overall command of shipping 
operations; and the Office of Ports Exploitation (ODEP), 
which runs port commercial operations on behalf of the 
state.  ODEP, which is slated for a major reorganization 
under a bill currently in parliament (septel), finances the 
International Maritime Organization's (IMO) ISPS upgrades 
underway in Morocco. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Jorf Lasfar - Port of Yellow Cliffs 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The industrial port of Jorf Lasfar (Yellow Cliffs in 
Arabic) was built in 1974 to handle traffic to and from a 
nearby coal-fired energy plant and an adjacent phosphates 
plant owned by national phosphates firm OCP.  Commercial 
operations began in 1982, when the port moved 64,000 tons of 
cargo; in 2005, 12 million tons will transit the port's 14 
quays, making Jorf Lasfar the second largest port in Morocco 
by volume after Casablanca. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Jorf Lasfar port is enclosed by a 10-foot 
barbed fence that surrounds the fishing port, administrative 
buildings and international commercial quays.  To meet IMO 
ISPS requirements, the international cargo section was 
walled off from the rest of the port in January 2005 by an 
eight-foot cement wall topped by two feet of concertina 
wire.  Port authorities have also closed off each individual 
quay with controlled access barriers staffed by private 
security hired by the individual pier operators. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Jorf Lasfar Commandant Mohamed Hamzaoui told 
Econoff the ISPS Code is "80 percent implemented," pending 
the completion of a second entry gate under construction 
roughly 100 meters past the first gate where the commercial 
port begins.  Hamzaoui expects the second gate to be 
finished by the end of April 2005.  He said the only other 
pending action is to sign a contract on a tender issued in 
early March for a roving security force that will patrol 24 
hours a day within the port. 
 
------------------------------- 
It's Okay, We Have Another Gate 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Jorf Lasfar is relatively easy to secure in that is 
located 20 km from the nearest sizable town, physically 
separated from any inhabited areas by a high yellow cliff, 
and has a relatively small fishing section attached to it, 
minimizing the flow of pedestrians in and around port 
facilities.  In spite of this, gaps remain.  The main gate 
is tightly controlled for identification, but there is no 
badge system or database for comparing IDs.  Econoff noticed 
a 20-foot section of fencing near the main gate was broken 
and lying on the ground.  Econoff pointed this out to Port 
Commandant Hamzaoui, who at first professed ignorance of the 
gap and then barked at an assistant to find out when it 
would be fixed.  The assistant reported that maintenance 
crews knew about the breach and money had been budgeted to 
repair it.  "Anyway," Hamzaoui said, "the broken section of 
fence doesn't really matter - we are building the second 
line of defense [the second guarded gate] past that point." 
Econoff pointed out that with such a large gap in the fence 
the "second" gate would really serve as the "first" line of 
defense, to no response. 
 
---- 
Safi 
---- 
 
¶8. (U) A weather-worn industrial town of 300,000 on 
Morocco's central coast, Safi was once home to the world's 
largest sardine fishing fleet.  The fourth largest Moroccan 
port in terms of volume, Safi suffers from aging 
infrastructure and its proximity to the city itself. 
Shantytowns completely surround one side of the port, and 
the fishing terminal, with its 1,300 artisinal boats, is 
virtually part of the medina, or old city, of Safi. 
 
¶9. (SBU) To close off this section of the port to the public 
would be political suicide in a town which has survived - 
and until the 1980's, thrived - on fishing.  Managers 
instead chose to leave the artisinal fishing port open to 
the public, and in order to satisfy ISPS requirements, 
walled off the international cargo section with a 10-foot 
cement barrier that effectively sections off the still-pubic 
fishing port from the quays that handle international 
commercial traffic. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Since work on ISPS upgrades began in 2003, ODEP 
has spent over $620,000 on physical infrastructure and 
lighting in Safi port.  Operators have upgraded perimeter 
fencing, built a small police post inside the port, and 
mounted new lighting inside and around the perimeter.  New 
customs and police buildings have been constructed just 
outside the main gate, which will be inaugurated later this 
year.  The port authority has purchased five video 
surveillance cameras which - by June 2005 - will be 
positioned around the exterior of the commercial section of 
the port and monitored from a central location in the police 
office within the port's main gate. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In January 2005 the port authority installed 48, 
800-watt lights along the length of the main jetty at Safi. 
Eight guard houses were positioned within and around the 
international cargo docks and are manned 24 hours a day. 
Port Commandant Abderrahim Houir Alami has ordered that 
three huge ammonia storage tanks, used to hold imported 
ammonia destined for Safi's OCP phosphates plant on the far 
side of town, be kept minimally stocked, for security 
reasons brought to his attention by the ISPS Code. 
 
¶12. (SBU) An access road encircling the north side of the 
port was widened in November 2004, and 60-foot lighting 
towers added around the exterior.  Previously the road was a 
dark and muddy lane that attracted a shady collection of 
characters.  Now the widened road and the high-intensity 
lights have converted the area into a place less conducive 
to illicit activity and easier to surveil. 
 
¶13. (SBU) However, security at Safi is not air-tight.  The 
external wall surrounding the port complex is a 12-foot 
cement pillared fence, difficult to climb but easy to pass 
things through.  Econoff witnessed people passing things 
through the gaps in the pillars, and, while touring the port 
with port managers, saw a construction worker scale the 
wall.  Port Commandant Houir Alami conceded that the wall 
was not infallible, but said police patrols and the 
surveillance cameras soon to be installed would prevent 
people from sneaking in.  Finally, pedestrians continue to 
walk freely in and out of the fishing section of Safi port 
today.  Vehicles are checked, but port authorities' claim 
that pedestrians are not checked because they are "known" to 
police officials manning the front gate is not credible. 
 
------ 
Agadir 
------ 
 
¶14. (U) The modern and well-organized port of Agadir sits at 
the bottom of a hill separating it from the rest of the 
city.  A military post commands a perfect view down onto the 
port installations.  The port is divided into four sections: 
a shipyard, a large fishing port, a pleasure harbor for 
yachts and cruise ships, and the commercial port. 
 
¶15. (SBU) A 12-foot perimeter wall surrounds the entire port 
complex, with just one entry gate guarded by police and 
customs officers.  The busy fishing port is essentially a 
public place, with no effective system of access or 
identification control.  Cars and mopeds are stopped for 
identification, but there was no list or database for cross- 
check of IDs, and pedestrians are allowed to pass 
unhindered.  ODEP Director Driss El Hidani said the police 
don't ask for ID because they know everyone by sight, but 
considering the volume of foot traffic flowing through the 
gates, this is unlikely. 
 
¶16. (SBU) To bring Agadir up to ISPS standards, in January 
2005 authorities walled off the international commercial 
section from the rest of the port with an eight-foot cement 
wall covered with metal barbs.  The new wall surrounding 
Agadir's commercial port stands in sharp contrast with 
observations made by Econcouns during a July 2004 visit (Ref 
B).  There is additional fencing with individual ID 
checkpoints surrounding the petroleum terminal and the cargo 
storage facility.  A team of police, customs and ODEP 
officers conduct roving patrols inside the port 24 hours a 
day. 
 
¶17. (SBU) A multi-million dollar Chinese-made cargo scanner 
will arrive in Agadir in April and be installed by end of 
May (Ref A).  It will be used by customs officials to 
examine both incoming and outgoing container traffic on an 
ad hoc percentage basis according to the existing threat 
level.  Agadir has already received three other scanning 
units: a baggage scanner, a walk-through metal detector for 
passengers, and an itemizer that will be used to sweep 
suspicious items for explosives and drugs.  This equipment 
will be installed when the second entry post is completed, 
and will be operated by the local police.  When the port is 
in category I (normal) status, the scanners will be used on 
an ad hoc basis.  When the port or an arriving ship are 
elevated to category II (alert) status, all passengers and 
baggage will be checked.  ODEP uses movable cement barriers 
and empty cargo containers to build additional temporary 
enclosures on an ad hoc basis around ships that arrive in an 
elevated security posture (sensitive cargo, passengers or 
destinations). 
 
¶18. (SBU) ODEP director El Hidani told Econoff the new ISPS 
requirements have done him a great service.  Before ISPS 
implementation began the port had troubles with stowaways, 
theft and misplaced cargo due to the flow of people milling 
freely inside the international section.  The mandate that 
came with the ISPS Code (and the state money to implement 
it) has solved many of these problems. 
 
-------------------------- 
Emigrants, not Dirty Bombs 
-------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Port authorities in Jorf Lasfar and Safi - ports 
which handle little or no containerized traffic - confided 
to Econoff that their greatest security concern is 
preventing illegal emigrants from boarding ships as 
stowaways, not the export of dangerous materials for use in 
international terrorism.  There is a fairly significant 
stowaway problem from Moroccan ports, mostly Moroccans and 
sub-Saharan Africans seeking passage to European ports of 
call.  Seven would-be emigrants were detected in Safi last 
year, and Jorf Lasfar Commandant Hamzaoui told Econoff one 
or two stowaways are caught trying to board through his port 
each month. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The stowaway problem proves that Morocco's ports 
are not air-tight.  Port authorities spoke at length of the 
infallibility of the exterior fences surrounding their 
ports, and did not seem to appreciate (or accept) the 
obvious contradiction between their claims of an airtight 
system and the regular discovery of stowaways in port. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Since the fences are for the most part in good 
shape - with the exception of a small section near the 
police post in Jorf Lasfar - any stowaway activity would 
either be the result of corruption among security forces 
guarding the exterior, or human error.  Port authorities 
refused to concede that security services would 
intentionally allow people to pass on a systemic basis, but 
did acknowledge that occasional opportunistic corruption may 
occur. 
 
--------------- 
How We Can Help 
--------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Moroccan port authorities clearly understand the 
requirements of the IMO's ISPS Code and have made great 
efforts to comply with them.  ISPS is not just a paper 
exercise between Rabat and the IMO, and coordination between 
local port committees and administrators in Rabat is 
excellent.  Even the Wali (governor) of the province of 
Safi, several times removed from the process of ISPS 
implementation, demonstrated in a meeting with Econoff that 
he was aware in intricate detail of what was required of 
Safi and Jorf Lasfar ports and the status of the works 
underway. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Port authorities say the ISPS upgrades have helped 
them control theft and deter stowaways.  They seem to have 
significant funding, as evidenced by the recent purchase of 
several million dollars worth of scanning equipment and the 
upgrades in fencing, gates and other physical infrastructure 
Econoff witnessed at the ports of Jorf Lasfar, Safi and 
Agadir.  And despite the "don't worry we have a second gate" 
approach to the ISPS Code taken by the commandant at Jorf 
Lasfar, the vast majority of Moroccan authorities get the 
message on port security. 
 
¶24. (SBU) What remains is to create a solid system for 
personnel access control, and to train security personnel to 
use it.  The creation of an ID or badging system is 
essential, and training in perimeter control would also be 
useful.  As any system is only as good as the people 
operating it, anti-corruption training would be a good 
complement.  Post will work with port authorities to explore 
ways we may be able to assist.