This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM KMPI LE IZ SY EG KPAL FR
SUBJECT: DAS CARPENTER'S MARCH 9 CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR 
FRENCH OFFICIALS ON MIDDLE EAST REFORM 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff,  reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: During March 9 discussions with 
visiting NEA DAS Scott Carpenter, senior French officials 
expressed full GoF support for U.S. objectives on reform in 
the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA), but 
stressed their continued desire to keep our messages separate 
and stay focused on the Barcelona Process.  President 
Chirac's Middle East advisor voiced strong support for U.S. 
reform objectives and disdain for Arab governments (namely 
Syria) who had used the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
pretext for oppression.  Carpenter heard a less helpful 
message from MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, 
who stressed GoF intent to make the Barcelona Process the 
EU's priority, and linked the success in the region of reform 
initiatives to the degree to which the U.S. continued to 
pressure Israel.  Laboulaye also suggested that democracy in 
the Arab world meant that secular dictatorships could be 
replaced by Islamic fundamentalist governments, citing Iraq 
as a cautionary example and advising that the U.S. might have 
to rethink its stance on Hizballah and Hamas.  Laboulaye 
conceded, with unusual candor, that the GoF had long relied 
on secular dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in the 
region, partly to protect Arab Christian populations.  In a 
separate meeting, MFA representatives briefed DAS Carpenter 
on the scope of EU and French bilateral assistance to the 
region, noting that, of the MFA's 128 million euros in annual 
assistance to the region, 40 percent was for education, while 
10 percent was devoted to governance.  While GoF officials 
were keen to exchange views on the reform issue, they did not 
offer a concrete response to Carpenter's proposal that the 
U.S. and EU accelerate consultation on BMENA and consider 
setting up a coordination mechanism in Brussels.  In a 
separate press roundtable, DAS Carpenter clarified U.S. 
reform objectives and stressed the need for partnership to a 
receptive audience of 14 French and Arab journalists.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
¶2. (SBU) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Scott Carpenter 
visited Paris March 8-9 and met separately March 9 with 
Presidential Advisor on the Middle East Dominique Boche, MFA 
Political Director (P-equivalent) Stanislas de Laboulaye, and 
MFA Director (A/S-equivalent) for the Near East and North 
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault.  The Thibault discussions 
consisted of a roundtable session, at which MFA Policy 
Planning Director Pierre Levy and several officials from the 
Directorates of European and Middle East/North African 
Affairs and Directorate General of International Cooperation 
offered perspectives on French views on reform and bilateral 
and EU programs in the region.  Thibault also hosted a 
working lunch for Carpenter, attended by the French G-8 
Sous-Sherpa and Director (U/S-equivalent) for Economic 
Affairs Alain Le Roy and MFA action officer on Middle East 
reform issues Brigitte Curmi.  Attending Carpenter's meetings 
on the U.S. side were DCM Alex Wolff, Political 
Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, EUR/ERA action officer 
Louis Bono, and Political Officer Uzra Zeya (notetaker). 
 
 
STRONG SUPPORT FROM ELYSEE 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Carpenter opened his discussion with Presidential 
Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche by stressing U.S. 
interest in working with Europe to promote economic, 
political and social reform in the BMENA region.  Carpenter 
described U.S. bilateral efforts via the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and emphasized that the U.S. 
was not seeking to supplant the Barcelona Process or deny its 
accomplishments.  At the same time, with the U.S. and Europe 
spending billions in assistance to the region, we shared a 
common interest in better information sharing and 
coordination between U.S. and European programs.  Boche 
responded to Carpenter's presentation by asserting that 
France "totally shares" U.S. objectives for reform in the 
BMENA region.  Conditions were ripe for an evolution towards 
democracy throughout the region, which had been in 
development for years.  The Arab public was now rejecting the 
"archaism" of the past, and all the governments of the region 
had problems of popular legitimacy.  Boche added that a 
number of Arab regimes remained "barricaded behind a myth" of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, citing Syria as an example of a 
country which "never fired a bullet against Israel in 30 
years," but used Israel as a pretext to maintain a state of 
emergency and repress its own people and those of Lebanon. 
Boche also noted that a number of "sacred cows" had 
disappeared in recent months, noting that in Egypt, for 
example, the press had crossed the red-line of not discussing 
President Mubarak's family.  Boche cited Jordan, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Iraq as other examples of 
positive democratic developments, and concluded that a 
democratic evolution was taking place nearly everywhere in 
the BMENA region. 
¶4. (C) At the same time, Boche cautioned that the U.S. and 
Europe should be careful to ensure that their reform efforts 
were not viewed as the imposition of outside models on the 
Arab world.  For this reason, it was important to preserve a 
"diversity of messages and messengers" and avoid the 
impression of a "Western front" pushing reform on the region. 
 The U.S. and Europe each had their own policies and means to 
pursue reform and should continue to do so, while both 
working in the same direction.  The GoF remained intent on 
strengthening the Mediterranean partnership, especially as an 
expanded Europe looked increasingly to the east.  The EU New 
Neighbors policy -- as well as the vast amounts the EU 
already gave the region in terms of direct assistance, 
subsidies, and loans -- all went in the same direction as 
U.S. efforts, but France wanted to preserve the autonomy of 
EU initiatives. 
 
¶5. (C) Carpenter and Boche agreed that there was harmony 
between U.S. and French views on reform, and that we need not 
put our efforts under one umbrella.  Boche added that we 
needed to show the region that there was no incompatibility 
between the G-8 BMENA initiative and the Barcelona Process, 
as Arab governments must understand that they could be 
friends of the U.S. and Europe.  Carpenter agreed, noting 
that we should dispel suspicions of U.S.-European conflict on 
reform efforts.  In closing, Boche stressed that reform 
efforts would have to be accompanied by engagement on 
addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was 
already the case under the second term of President Bush.  He 
concluded that events on the ground were changing quickly, 
and that it was already "another world" since Arafat's death 
last November. 
 
SUPPORT, MIXED WITH CAUTION FROM MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In a separate meeting with MFA Political Director 
Stanislas de Laboulaye, DAS Carpenter described in more 
detail the U.S. desire to accelerate and regularize 
high-level consultation with the EU on BMENA efforts, while 
stressing that the U.S. is not seeking to supplant the 
Barcelona Process.  Carpenter cited a number of upcoming 
events which offer context for the U.S. and EU to move such 
dialogue forward, such as the U.S-EU ministerial and summit, 
the Barcelona Process ten-year anniversary in November, and 
the next Forum for the Future in Bahrain.  Carpenter 
concluded that when the U.S. and Europe speak with the same 
voice, we can achieve greater progress; there was also room 
for the U.S. and Europe to emphasize different aspects of the 
same message, such as rule of law within the larger context 
of democratization.  Laboulaye responded by stressing, first, 
that the U.S. and France had moved closer on the reform 
issue, with the U.S. becoming less "ideological" and the GoF 
"more accepting" of the idea that the status quo in the Arab 
world was not the answer.  Clearly, things in the region were 
moving, Laboulaye asserted, though it was unclear whether 
this was due to U.S. intervention in Iraq; what was important 
now, was for the U.S. and Europe to try and ensure that 
change underway moves in the right direction. 
 
¶7. (C) Laboulaye stressed that the Barcelona Process would be 
the GoF's "absolute priority" on reform efforts.  He 
described the record of the Barcelona Process, after ten 
years, as highly positive, as the EU had put lots of money 
into the same sectors identified in the BMENA initiative. 
The main problem in the Barcelona Process was that it was 
always weak on the political side, as momentum was always 
"sapped" by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In addition, 
political enthusiasm had always been low on the Barcelona 
Process, and the EU, ten years ago, was not the political 
union which it is today.  For these reasons, France, together 
with Spain under the UK EU presidency, would seek to overhaul 
and revitalize the Barcelona constitution and convention, to 
make the Mediterranean understand why it was so important, 
and remind newer EU members what the region meant to the EU. 
In stressing Barcelona, Laboulaye concluded that the GoF 
wasn't underestimating the importance of BMENA; he conceded 
that BMENA was in fact one of the main factors which prompted 
the revitalization of the Barcelona Process in the first 
place. 
 
¶8.  (C) Laboulaye also emphasized the need to work in close 
partnership with Arab governments, and to be careful that 
external pressure does not result in stiffening of government 
positions.  Laboulaye cited Egypt as an example of the latter 
trend, and commented that coaxing or "nudging" Arab 
governments worked better than stiff outside pressure. 
Laboulaye also stressed the "absolute centrality" of the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue to reform efforts, describing this 
as a difference between the U.S. and France from the start. 
At the same time, Laboulaye commended March 1 remarks by 
Secretary Rice at the London Conference, asserting that the 
 
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Secretary's remarks would help reform efforts "tremendously," 
 
SIPDIS 
as long as we follow through on them.  He added that putting 
pressure on Israel remained "key" to the success of the BMENA 
initiative.  Carpenter agreed that the ongoing momentum in 
relaunching the roadmap could only help reform efforts, but 
pointed out that, at the recent Forum for the Future in 
Rabat, only a few governments raised the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue and that -- increasingly -- governments in the region 
are seeing internal reform as a key objective, independent of 
the conflict. 
 
¶9.  (C) Laboulaye sounded a cautionary note on the "Shi'a 
ascendancy" in Iraq, describing this as a major worry for 
Iraq's neighbors, despite the Iraqi elections success. 
Laboulaye was unsure whether Iraq would play for better or 
worse for the region or for France, noting that French 
nationals who had gone to Iraq to fight jihad were returning 
to France and were more capable than those who had pursued 
similar training in Afghanistan.  Laboulaye also described 
Iraq within a larger trend of secular dictatorships in the 
Arab world being replaced by religious-oriented governments. 
He conceded that, in the past, French policy in the Arab 
world had been built upon favoring secular dictators, such as 
Bourguiba, Arafat, or even Mubarak.  These governments served 
as "instruments" of French influence, in addition to having 
close ties with the French intellectual class and offering a 
means to protect Christians in the region.  Now, with such 
secular regimes being increasingly a thing of the past, the 
question remained to what degree Islamists would replace 
them.  With Hamas enjoying broad support in the Palestinian 
territories and Hizballah bringing out one million in the 
streets of Beirut, Laboulaye suggested that we needed to 
rethink our approach to both groups.  He added that we should 
recognize that civil society in the Arab world is Islamic in 
nature; we couldn't say we want to deal with civil society 
and ignore this reality.  With over 5 million Muslims in 
France, this was a domestic issue for the GoF; increasingly, 
French Muslim youth were having closer ties with their 
countries of origin, and those who might have become 
communists in the past were turning towards Islamism, in 
rejection of French and western society.  France faced a 
basic problem in how to adapt to the new Arab world, and 
Laboulaye questioned whether this new neighborhood was the 
one we really wanted.  Carpenter responded by stressing that 
the lack of political openness which fueled Islamic extremism 
was exactly why we needed to pursue the reform agenda 
underway; he stressed further that U.S.-led reform efforts 
were generational and not bent on toppling regimes. 
 
THIBAULT: APPROACH REGION WITH DETERMINATION AND DELICACY 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) MFA A/S equivalent for Middle East/North Africa 
Jean-Francois Thibault, accompanied by a panel of MFA 
officials from the Cooperation and European and Middle East 
Directorates, offered Carpenter an overview of French views 
on regional reform, combined with specific briefings on 
French and EU cooperation programs.  Like Boche, Thibault 
stressed that France shared "exactly" U.S. values on regional 
reform, and shared the U.S. view that greater democratization 
would mean greater longterm stability in the region. 
Thibault added, however, that while U.S. and French 
objectives were largely the same, there was a difference in 
some of our perceptions.  In the Gof view, we needed to 
approach the reform issue with determination and "delicacy," 
due to the fragility of Arab society and the difficult 
process of introspection already underway in the region. 
Thibault also stressed the need for a diversity of messages 
and messengers, and to be aware of Arab and Muslim 
sensitivities to the perception of a "Western front" against 
them.  Newly-appointed MFA Director for Policy Planning 
Pierre Levy added that the GoF agreed with the U.S. that the 
status quo in the Arab world was not sustainable any more; at 
the same time, the region was in France's neighborhood, so 
regional stability remained a strategic priority.  Carpenter 
responded to Thibault saying that, while he understood the 
need for a diversity of messengers, it made no sense to have 
a diversity of messages.  Dissonance would only create 
confusion and the sense that we could be played off against 
one another. 
 
¶11. (U)  On EU assistance programs to the region, European 
Cooperation Directorate action officer Stephane Crouzard 
reported that MEDA II (years 2000-2006) disbursements had 
increased progressively since 2000 and were now 115 percent 
of allocations.  Egypt and Morocco were the top recipients in 
EU funding, with Morocco the "star pupil" and Egypt receiving 
some 700 million euros in European Investment Bank Facility 
loans in 2004, out of some 2 billion euros in loans which the 
EU provided the region annually.  Crouzard described the EU 
Neighborhood Policy as a means of accelerating reform 
efforts, as the country-specific action plans were intended 
to last only three years.  On French bilateral assistance to 
the region, MFA Cooperation officials reported that France 
provided the region some 715 million USD per year in 
assistance, of which some 128 million euros was controlled by 
the MFA.  Some 80 percent of the 128 million in 
MFA-controlled assistance went to Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Egypt and Lebanon.  40 percent of the MFA-directed assistance 
to the region was allocated for education, while some 10 
percent was allocated for governance.  One MFA official 
described the creation of a new "office for Governance," 
within the MFA Directorate General for Cooperation as a 
revolutionary development for the GoF.  French governance 
programs focused largely on "twinning" French government or 
administrative bodies to counterparts in the region, to help 
in the overall modernization of regional governments, while 
building local capacity.  French assistance programs also 
promoted human rights, via programs for strengthening rule of 
law, judicial reform, penal reform, and improving access to 
and administration of justice. 
 
¶12. (C) During a more informal working lunch, Thibault asked 
Carpenter his impressions of Iraq, specifically why the Iraqi 
Transitional Government was taking so long to form, and what 
would happen in Kirkuk.  Citing the deepening of Kurdish 
nationalism, Thibault picked up a point raised earlier by 
Laboulaye that perhaps what resulted from democracy in the 
Middle East was not always what we wanted.  Thibault cited 
Lebanon, and specifically the massive March 8 demonstration 
organized by Hizballah, as another example.  The GoF had long 
counseled the need to deal cautiously with Hizballah and see 
it not only for its unacceptable behavior, but for its 
political importance.  Lebanon was the oldest democracy in 
the Middle East and France wanted to see Lebanese democracy 
succeed.  To do so, Thibault suggested, we needed to try and 
separate Hizballah from Syria and Iran and hope that 
Hizballah would be interested in its own political future 
within Lebanon.   Carpenter said that it would be a mistake 
to read too much into the Hizballah numbers.  To protest when 
your life is at risk is one thing; to do so with the aid and 
encouragement of two friendly governments is another. 
 
¶13. (U) During a May 9 press roundtable, Carpenter clarified 
the distinctions between MEPI and BMENA programs and stressed 
the U.S. desire to accelerate reform efforts in partnership 
with Europe and the region.  The audience of some 14 French 
and Arabic-language journalists appeared receptive to 
Carpenter's presentation and asked largely non-polemical 
questions seeking greater detail on U.S. efforts, for 
example, to promote the rights of women and enhance dialogue 
between NATO and the region.  The briefing also offered the 
opportunity for Carpenter to dispel misperceptions, such as 
rumors that the U.S. had sought to quash the most recent UNDP 
Arab Human Development report. 
 
¶14. (C) Comment: Carpenter's visit took place at an opportune 
moment, as the French press is increasingly (and grudgingly) 
conceding that the Bush administration deserves some credit 
for the "Arab springtime" taking place in the region.  FM 
Barnier, in recent press remarks, has also sought to stress 
that liberty is a European, not just American, value.  French 
officials were eager to invite DAS Carpenter to Paris and 
took care to offer him a packed, high-level schedule.  At the 
same time, GOF officials were largely unresponsive on 
Carpenter's specific proposal to enhance U.S.-EU consultation 
on BMENA in Brussels.  We view this as more typical of the 
GoF style of consulting, which is to state the French 
position and tell us what is wrong with ours first, before 
moving on to a new course of action.  As French officials 
told us, the GoF's top priority will be to focus on 
revitalizing the Barcelona Process, not on improving EU 
coordination with us.  While we don't expect the GoF to lead 
the charge to support greater U.S.-EU consultation on BMENA 
in Brussels, we don't anticipate the GoF opposing the idea 
either.  As for the difference in tone and emphasis between 
the MFA and Presidency, we see this as reflecting different 
aspects of the French position: the GoF is convinced the 
status quo in the Arab world can't last, but for reasons of 
pragmatism more than principle, and is worried about what 
comes next.  End comment. 
 
¶15. (U) This message was cleared by DAS Carpenter. 
Leach