This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL MASS IN NSSP
SUBJECT: PM: PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON F-16S 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2301 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Since Reftel, comments from senior GOI 
officials and governing coalition politicians on the 
Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative continue to 
trickle out.  The focus of remarks on March 28 was almost 
exclusively on F-16s to Pakistan, rather than the larger 
issues the proposal raises.  Utterances ranged from careful 
to negative, with the PM taking the high road -- that it was 
premature to comment and that the offer would be discussed 
with Washington.  Defense Minister Mukherjee said the sale 
was "inappropriate and ill-timed," and would adversely affect 
the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue.  Foreign Minister Natwar 
Singh said the F-16 matter was for the Defense Ministry to 
decide, while Congress Party spokesman Anand Sharma said the 
offer was "unfortunate," but "the government's 
responsibility."  Former BJP/NDA Foreign Minister Jaswant 
Singh termed the offer "strange."  The Communists are howling 
with outrage, and congresses by three major Left parties in 
the next two weeks could turn up the heat on the GOI. 
 
¶2.  (C) Today's fixation on the F-16s is unfortunate, but a 
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting on the evening of 
March 29 may provide a more considered GOI position.  These 
public statements provide early context and frame the issue, 
but the political process will decide the huge issues at 
stake here, which in the best case could redefine India's 
strategic orientation and international partners.  The 
Ambassador has conducted daily PD briefings -- today with 
editors, columnists, and foreign correspondents -- to ensure 
that our positive story is being covered.  Positive editorial 
comment continues.  We will be reporting extensively on the 
political, military, economic, and public diplomacy 
dimensions of this process as it unfolds in the weeks and 
months ahead.  End Summary. 
 
PM: Premature to Comment 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) Following his March 25 expression of "great 
disappointment" at the prospect of sale of F-16s to Pakistan, 
the PM parried the issue on March 28, saying it was 
"premature to comment."  He said he did not know the terms 
and conditions of the offer, or what India would be getting, 
but advised that the issue would be discussed with Washington. 
 
Mukherjee: Ill-timed 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) Expanding on March 26 remarks, Defense Minister 
Pranab Mukherjee called the US F-16 decision "inappropriate 
and ill-timed" given that India and Pakistan were involved in 
a Composite Dialogue (CD).  Speaking in Calcutta, a bastion 
of communist strength, he argued that the aircraft were not 
used for fighting terrorism, but for waging full-fledged war, 
and asserted that a sale would have an adverse impact on the 
CD and on Indo-Pak relations, and "might jeopardize" 
confidence building measures. 
 
Congress and Natwar: Let Defense Decide 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Congress spokesman Anand Sharma made the first public 
statement for his party on March 28, calling the announcement 
"unfortunate and disappointing," and suggesting that the US 
was violating its own policy and global norms and undermining 
international law and US law.  Calling the offer "worrying," 
and highlighting Pakistan's record as a proliferator, he 
hoped that the US Congress would take this into account. 
Asked whether the UPA government should accept the offer of 
F-16s and F-18s, Sharma took a pass, saying that Congress 
wanted to improve Indo-US relations, but that it was "for the 
government to decide."   On March 28, Foreign Minister Natwar 
Singh parried a question on F-16s, commenting, "The Defense 
Ministry has to decide.  Ask them." 
BJP: Strange 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (U) On March 29, former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh 
termed the offer of F-16s to Pakistan "strange."  Observing 
that New Delhi was not begging for arms, he argued that India 
has emerged as a power to be reckoned with on its own 
strength, and not because of any patron or sponsor.  He 
slammed the UPA government's handling of the issue, because 
the PM and Mukherjee were speaking in discordant voices. 
Jaswant found "no logic" in the position that the US was 
offering weapons to India and Pakistan because of an 
improvement in relations between them. 
 
Communists Howling 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (U) The CPM Politburo warned the government on March 28 
to reject the aircraft offer outright.  Washington was trying 
to draw India into a strategic military relationship, and was 
fueling an arms race in South Asia for the benefit of the US 
arms industry.  Questioning the reliability of the US as a 
supplier, the CPM insisted that India pursue an independent 
foreign policy and forge closer relations with other 
countries, including China. 
 
¶8.  (C) The F-16s and the larger issue of closer relations 
with Washington are expected to come up at three important 
conferences/congresses of Left parties which support the UPA 
coalition from the outside in the next several weeks.  The 
most important will be the CPM National Congress April 6-11 
in New Delhi.  The pro-Moscow CPI congress will take place in 
Chandigarh March 29-April 3, followed by another conference 
by the Forward Bloc April 4-5 in New Delhi. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) It is unfortunate that Mukherjee and governing party 
politicians in recent days have focused on the F-16s to 
Pakistan issue rather than on the larger Initiative, but a 
more considered opinion may emerge from a CCS meeting 
scheduled for late on March 29.  These public remarks are of 
course merely the early salvos in what is likely to be a long 
period of debate and decision making.  They are useful, 
however, in providing early context and for framing the 
issue, but the domestic political process will be much more 
important in deciding the huge issues at stake here, which in 
the best case could redefine India's strategic orientation 
and international partners. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador has conducted daily PD briefings -- 
today with editors, columnists, and foreign correspondents -- 
to ensure that our positive story is being covered. 
Editorial opinion in the major national dailies continues to 
be largely positive, with the "Indian Express" arguing on 
March 28 that the Indian political class risked missing the 
main point -- the rare US offer to help make India a world 
power -- and that New Delhi should consider the offer 
seriously "to test American intentions," concluding that "if 
the GOI were to scoff at this idea, it would indicate myopia 
of a very high order."  Mission will be reporting extensively 
on the political, military, economic, and public diplomacy 
dimensions of this process as it unfolds in the weeks and 
months ahead. 
MULFORD