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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI2301, INDIA WARMING TO SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE, AND F-16S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI2301 2005-03-28 13:18 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIA WARMING TO SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE, AND F-16S 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: After initial knee-jerk negative reactions 
in the media, Indian responses to the March 25 announcement 
of the administration's new strategy for South Asia have 
become more positive, with the MEA going to unprecedented 
lengths to shape coverage and senior Indian officials largely 
neutral to favorable.  Although the PM expressed "great 
disappointment," the MEA convoked senior foreign affairs 
correspondents at midnight on March 25 to ensure that the 
initiative was properly understood and received positive 
spin.  Defense Minister Mukherjee commented that India was 
open to the offer, and two senior military officers 
downplayed any effect on the regional balance of power. 
Former Foreign Secretary Shashank called the initiative a 
positive development that should be seen in the larger 
context of US-India collaboration.  Media commentary has 
predictably focused on F-16s, but the potential for US-India 
civil nuclear cooperation has been well received.  As debate 
unfolds, the following positive themes are emerging: 
 
-- India gets more than Pakistan does; 
-- Dr. Rice has had a stronger impact on US-India ties than 
any Secretary in history; 
-- An unprecedented breakthrough in US-India relations; 
-- US to help India become a world power; 
-- Not to worry about F-16s, Sukhois are better; 
-- Pakistan has ballistic missiles, so it matters less if 
F-16s carry nuclear weapons; 
-- F-16 issue is not new; "we knew it was coming"; 
-- India needs to get beyond its Pakistan obsession; and 
-- The US does not sell F-18s to other countries, but may to 
India. 
 
2.  (C) Negative commentary has come primarily from 
traditionally anti-American journalists, but some appear to 
have drawn on GOI sources, stressing the aircraft's nuclear 
delivery capabilities, its uselessness in anti-terrorist 
operations, its adverse impact on the security environment in 
South Asia and potential to fuel a new arms race, and its 
high cost (diverting funds from economic and social needs). 
Offers of cooperation are "fig leaves" and "sweet 
assurances," and India should be careful about Washington's 
efforts to wean India from its independent foreign policy and 
"old friends" and time-tested suppliers.  The opposition BJP 
predicts a negative affect the Indo-Pak peace process and on 
US-India relations.  The early spin has been more positive 
than we expected and has helped to shape the terms of the 
debate.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) Aware of the negative symbolism associated with F-16s 
in the Indian body politic and political class, as well as 
the potential for the initiative to land with a thud, MEA 
Spokesman Navej Sarna convoked senior correspondents to an 
unprecedented midnight briefing following the March 25 
announcement of the Administration's South Asia Initiative in 
Washington in order to ensure that it was properly understood 
and accurately reported in the media.  Highlighting that the 
USG "intends to upgrade the US-India Strategic Partnership," 
he stressed the potential for civilan nuclear energy 
cooperation, space cooperation, as well as the participation 
of US firms in the RFI for the MRCA.  One participant told us 
that "not even during the Kargil War were we called to the 
MEA after midnight." 
 
GOI Comments 
------------ 
 
4.  (U) Thus far, the only formal GOI comments have come from 
the PM, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, and two senior 
military officers.  The PMO issued a statement on March 25 
recording the PM's "great disappointment" in the decision, 
but has carried no other remarks.  Mukherjee confirmed on 
March 27 that the GOI would actively consider the US offer, a 
statement that contrasted significantly to his utterances as 
recently as December 2004, when he highlighted the potential 
for F-16s to fuel an arms race in South Asia.  On March 27, 
Air Force Chief SP Tyagi brushed off the news, telling the 
media that the offer was not new, confirming Indian Air Force 
(IAF) interest in expanding its fleet, and indicating that 
the reaction in the IAF more broadly was sober.  On March 27, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command Vice Admiral 
Madanjit Singh emphasized that the F-16s would not alter the 
balance of air power in the region. 
 
Positive 
-------- 
 
5.  (U) Terming the offers of combat aircraft and civilian 
nuclear reactors an "unprecedented breakthrough in Indo-US 
relations," noted strategic commentator K. Subrahmanyam 
gushed in the "Times of India" on March 28 that no US 
Secretary of State had ever had as much impact on bilateral 
 
SIPDIS 
ties as Dr. Rice did in her recent 24 hour visit to Delhi. 
"Hindustan Times" Foreign Editor Pramit Pal Chaudhuri 
reported that the "US Powers India's Global Push," 
emphasizing the "concession of access to civilian nuclear 
technology," a "defense cooperation agreement that includes 
joint production," and institutional means to translate the 
civil space dimensions of the NSSP into reality, concluding 
that the initiative was a "historical shift in its policy 
towards India."  Chaudhury commented that the F-16s 
represented no threat to India's air superiority, and that 
worries about the aircraft's nuclear capabilities were 
misplaced, as the USG would not provide these models. 
Editorially, the HT took called the move a "Promissory Note," 
urging the GOI to keep a clear head and "to see which of the 
many promises it can get Washington to deliver on, and fast." 
 Suggesting that India could also be responsible for a 
failure to live up to the initiative's potential, the editors 
warned that the legendary Indian bureaucracy could smother a 
US offer to allow India to co-produce. 
 
6.  (U) JNU Professor and strategist C Raja Mohan observed 
that India will have difficulty saying "no" to the 
"extraordinary US offer" to assist India become a world 
power.  The US initiative offered potentially big ticket 
items, which the GOI should take a long hard look at.  The 
prospect of long-term relationships with US firms, and 
co-development would provide the first steps to position 
India to become an outsourcing hub for military R&D and 
weapons production. 
 
7.  (U) Writing on March 28, "Times of India" Foreign Affairs 
correspondent Indrani Bagchi (and Chaudhury's wife) stressed 
that discussion of the F-18 was particularly noteworthy, 
inasmuch as these aircraft "had not been sold to any other 
country, even to NATO allies."  As such, they offered unsual 
potential to ally the Indian aerospace industry with the most 
advianced US aviation firms in the world. 
 
Other Commentary Evolving, Some Negative 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) In the few days since the news hit, reportage has 
calmed down, even in media with strong anti-American views. 
"Hindu" foreign policy writer Siddharth Varadarajan on March 
27 slammed the announcement for "fueling the arms race," 
adversely affecting the security environment in South Asia, 
and pushing the region to more guns over butter.  Drawing on 
unnamed MEA sources, he suggested that "privately, the mood 
is not so optimistic" as early spin suggested, and that 
senior UPA leaders considered it a "deeply unfriendly act." 
By the next day, the paper's defense writer Sanjay Dikshit 
acknowledged that the USG has grabbed the initiative, and 
that the final decision a MRCA "lies with the defense 
services," and that the "generousity of the US offer had put 
India in a diplomatically difficult position."  Editorially, 
however, the "Hindu" evinced no change in its hardline, 
anti-US position, calling the initiative "a dubious move," "a 
vague concept that India must be wary of," and an attempt by 
the US to draw India and Pakistan away from Iran, concluding 
that the the GOI "must remain firm in pursuing its 
independent foreign policy." 
 
BJP Largely Critical 
-------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Illustrating the extent to which the BJP in 
opposition has reverted to old think to flog the government, 
former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha predicted on March 27 
that an F-16 sale would have an adverse impact on the 
Indo-Pak peace process, as well as on US-India relations more 
broadly.  Calling the South Asia Initiative "a bunch of 
promises," Sinha stressed that the Administration was being 
naive in expecting Pakistan to use F-16s to use against 
terrorist hideouts along its border with Afghanistan.  He 
urged the government to protest strongly and questioned 
Defense Minister Mukherjee's comment that the GOI would even 
consider the American offer. 
 
10.  (U) Since the announcement, however, coverage in the 
pro-BJP "Pioneer" has also evolved.  After March 26 headlines 
screamed that the US was "fueling an arms race in South 
Asia," by March 28 the paper was reporting that "India is not 
too concerned about Pakistan getting F-16s," and that it was 
"not likely to drastically alter India's well thought out 
acquisition plans."  Citing Air Marshall SC Tyagi, the paper 
reported that in view of the indigenization of the 
Russian-made SU-30 MKI, India "should not get unduly 
disturbed over President Bush's proposal." 
 
Think Tanks 
----------- 
 
11.  (C) Former Foreign Secretary Shashank referred to the 
initiative as a positive development which should be seen in 
the larger context of US-India partnership.  Going beyond the 
NSSP, he said Indians must look beyond the hyphenated 
Indo-Pak relationship, and internalize that the United States 
was taking India more seriously.  Speaking with a number of 
think tank experts and retired GOI officials and military 
officers after a March 28 speech by Foreign Minister Natwar 
Singh on non-proliferation, Poloff was struck by their 
interest in correcting minor factual mistakes in press 
articles and the possibility of technology transfer, rather 
than in criticizing the decision itself.  MG (ret) Ramesh 
Chopra, formerly of the Indian Army Intelligence Directorate, 
waved away the story as "inconsequential" in light of the 
large package offered to India and echoed the "breakthrough" 
language. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C) It is clear that the GOI is not worked up about 
the F-16, and that there is considerable interest in the 
shift in USG policy towards India.  In contrast to other 
eras, public reaction has been unusually measured, 
although we are witnessing only the first days of what 
will almost certainly be a long debate and decision making 
period.  Many of the main actors have not yet been heard 
from, but the initial reaction has been more positive than 
we had expected, given the unsually negative connotations 
the word "F-16" conjures up in India.  This is a tribute to 
both the broad-based and imaginative nature of the 
Secretary's proposals, and to MEA, which has established a 
 
SIPDIS 
positive framework in which the debate can take place. 
MULFORD