This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001551 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN PK

SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREATS MARR SUCCESSFUL KASHMIR POLLS 
  REF: NEW DELHI 749 
  Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The February J&K municipal elections  produced largely positive results.  Participation, among the  most important criteria for defining a ""successful"" election  in the state, greatly exceeded expectations (even in areas  with a history of alienation from New Delhi), proving again  that Kashmiris will defy terrorist threats and separatist  boycott calls to shape how they are governed, even if they do  not consider their votes necessarily as ""a vote for India.""  Compared with other J&K polls since 2002, there were few  casualties.  There were also few reports of irregularities. 
However, during the campaign, many candidates withdrew, and  many newly-elected councillors from the Valley have since  resigned, gone into hiding, or fled to Jammu following  insurgents' threats, depriving the exercise of some of its  shine.  How these local bodies will function remains unclear. 
 End Summary. 
  Another Solid Electoral Exercise 
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¶2.  (C) Observers continue to watch elections in J&K more  closely than in many other Indian states for a number of  reasons, including: to gauge the credibility of an electoral  process that has often been flawed in the past; to take stock  of voter enthusiasm and participation as indications of  Kashmiri alienation and attitudes towards India; to monitor  popular attitudes towards the separatists; and to assess  insurgent behavior.  While budgetary restrictions prevented  us from observing the three week February municipal polls  firsthand, we have spoken with many who did.  These were the  first elections at this level in 27 years, and as such  represented the best barometer of grassroots voter behavior  in the Valley since the insurgency began in 1989.  Among the  more significant observations from this exercise: 
 
-- In the third major electoral exercise since the  Legislative Assembly elections in 2002, the voting process  was again credible.  There were few reports of  irregularities, and those that were noted paralleled those  present elsewhere in India (such as names missing on voters'  lists, while some ""mobile voters"" voted early and often).  Even National Conference (NC) President Omar Abdullah, who  had complained to the press of ""rigging,"" recently played  these allegations down to D/Polcouns.  We have also seen no  further support for JKLF leader Yasin Malik's allegations  that coercion by the security forces was behind high turnout  rates. 
 
-- Voter participation was higher than at any time since  1989.  This was not a result of greatly increased pro-India  sentiment in the Valley, although there is much anecdotal  evidence that Kashmiris increasingly yearn for normalcy. 
With each successful election, Kashmiris have fewer reasons  to reject the electoral process as illegitimate, as they see  their influence over who governs them.  As a journalist from  the ""Daily Excelsior"" put it to us, Kashmiris for the most  part treated the elections not as a political exercise  related to the status of Kashmir, but as a developmental  issue, which ""provided the silent majority the justification  it needed to take part,"" and put those who opposed it on the  wrong side of democracy.  After seeing the size of the  turnout in the first round, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference  (APHC) hardliner SAS Geelani adopted a variant of this view,  maintaining that the elections were about ""developing civic  amenities."" 
 
-- Polling ranged from the low teens to mid-20 percent even  in separatist bastions such as Shopian, ""Srinagar's ""Gaza""  (Maisuma), and the areas around the Hazratbal shrine and the  APHC HQ, where turnout has been in the low single digits  since 1989.  One Srinagar-based correspondent called these  turnout rates ""a vote against the separatist leadership,""  which had tried to make the election into a ""plebiscite on  attitudes towards India, and the people did not buy it."" 
 
-- Journalists in the Valley tell us that threats and  intimidation from insurgents were much more responsible for  keeping Kashmiri voters away from polling stations than the  calls by Hurriyat leaders for a boycott, although only  Geelani, the two JKLF factions, and Shabir Shah really were  active in urging a boycott (the moderate Hurriyat issued  several calls, but little more).  As ""Pioneer"" Srinagar  correspondent Kurshid Wani put it, ""whatever boycott there  was was not under the influence of the APHC but rather due to  the insurgents.""  Hurriyat leader Prof AG Bhat conceded that  the 2003 split in the APHC contributed to the high turnout,  as voters would not listen to a divided leadership. 
 
-- The governing PDP did fairly well in South Kashmir, while  the NC did well in Srinagar and parts of Central and North  Kashmir, but neither party emerged from the fray much  stronger vis-a-vis the other.  As usual, Congress did poorly  in the Valley.  PDP and Congress together did very well in  Poonch/Rajouri (where turnout was 79 percent).  The BJP did  well in the Jammu region. 
-- Large numbers of women (30 percent of total turnout was  female) and young people participated, both as candidates and  voters. 
  Security Dominates the Aftermath 
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¶3.  (C) Terrorist intimidation, however, has taken some of  the shine from the results: 
 
-- During the campaign, large numbers of candidates withdrew  their names from consideration, and many newly-elected  councillors from the Valley have reportedly resigned, gone  into hiding, or fled to Jammu as a result of threats from  insurgents.  Reliable data are difficult to obtain, but a  well-connected journalist in Jammu told us that ""scores"" of  candidates resigned during the campaign, resulting in  unopposed contests, particularly in terrorist-infested areas  in South Kashmir, that 91 persons were elected unopposed, and  that there were no candidates at all in 35 wards (of 890  total statewide).  Many of these resignations took the form  of advertisements in the vernacular press, in which  candidates apologized for running for office.  Since the  results were declared, 10-15 more councillors have resigned,  but initial reports of mass resignations appear to have been  overblown. 
 
-- Terrorists killed relatively few (five) candidates,  political workers (five), and their relatives and friends,  and few injuries were reported.  However, the assassination  of a 75-year old councillor expected to be elected the Mayor  of Srinagar cast a pall over the relatively high (by  post-1989 standards) turnout in Srinagar (some 20 percent) 
and led to an uptick in resignations from successful  candidates.  Many unsuccessful candidates are reportedly also  lying low or have gone into hiding. 
 
-- The J&K government has gone to some lengths to address  these security concerns after Omar Abdullah threatened to  withdraw all NC representatives from municipal bodies to  protest their vulnerability.  Since then, at least one  Personal Security Officer (PSO) has reportedly been assigned  to each elected councillor.  Many observers predict that  security will be a major factor in how well the local  councils function, because so many councillors (444 in the  Valley alone) will potentially be exposed.  Fears are  reportedly most pronounced in Srinagar, Anantnag, and  Pulwama, but are present elsewhere as well.  PDP General  Secretary Sadiq Ali told us the assignment of PSOs has 
  SIPDIS  assuaged concerns somewhat, while unusually harsh winter  conditions in the state have diverted attention.  He expected  concerns to resurface with warmer weather. 
 
-- Journalists speculate that councillors from the Valley who  have fled to Jammu are likely to trickle back by the end of  the Winter Session of the Legislative Assembly when the  Durbar moves to Srinagar in May.  Press reports of 400  departures for Jammu have not been corroborated. 
  Comment 
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¶4.  (C) These elections are another important success for the  J&K government.  Although likely to try to reduce the  effectiveness of these elected bodies, the terrorists cannot  be unaware of the strong popular support Kashmiris in  particular showed for these polls.  The relatively small  number of casualties during the process is very positive, but  it is unclear what this means.  The optimistic reading is  that jihadi commanders in the Valley received and heeded  instructions from Pakistan not to disrupt the polls, but it  is also possible that the terrorists merely altered their  strategy -- and seek to disrupt the democratic process in an  ex post facto manner via intimidation, rather than widespread  and indiscriminate murder as was the case in the fall 2002  state elections, during which some 800 politicians, election  workers, and civilians were killed. 
 
¶5.  (C) It will not be clear until later in the year whether  councillors' security will be as much of an issue as appears  to be the case at present, and whether these civic bodies  will be as successful in practice as was the process that  constituted them.  Mufti (and the GOI) now must ensure that  they have the funds and the authority to act on issues voters  entrusted to them, lest an opportunity to demonstrate the  positive results of the democratic process for Kashmiris is  lost.  Given the rhetorical emphasis Mufti and the GOI are  now placing on economic development in J&K (while leaving  dialogue with the separatists for another time), it would be  a major mistake for the state and central government not to  put their money where their mouth is. 
MULFORD