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Viewing cable 05MUMBAI816, GUJARAT: REACTIONS TO VISA REVOCATION MIXED AS PROTESTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MUMBAI816 2005-03-21 13:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Mumbai
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 000816 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/21/2015 
TAGS: CVIS PREL PHUM PGOV KIRF ASEC IN
SUBJECT: GUJARAT: REACTIONS TO VISA REVOCATION MIXED AS PROTESTS 
CONTINUE 
 
REF: A)  NEW DELHI 2095; B) MUMBAI 756 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Angus Simmons, Consul General, U.S. Consul 
General Mumbai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The BJP continued its criticism of the USG decision to 
revoke the visa of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in a 
series of actions in Gujarat over the weekend.  The Chief 
Minister himself said the USG had ulterior motives at a public 
rally and in a discussion with a U.S. journalist.  Protesters 
targeted several symbols of U.S. presence in western India in 
what observers in Gujarat told us were isolated incidents on an 
otherwise calm weekend.  Reactions to the decision in Gujarat 
were mixed.  The NGO community wholeheartedly applauded the USG 
move, while political parties and Gujarat businessmen were in 
general critical.  Our contacts expect that the decision will 
strengthen Modi in the short run and give him welcome ammunition 
against the growing opposition to his rule within his own party. 
 Opinions are divided about what the decision will mean for 
Modi's long-term political fortunes, however.  Business leaders 
do not expect bilateral commercial and economic ties to suffer, 
although in our view the isolated violence against U.S. symbols 
and the image of a Chief Minister as an outcast may dampen U.S. 
investors' interest in the state.  End summary. 
 
USG Has Ulterior Motives, Modi Tells the Faithful 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (SBU) The BJP party held an open-air rally on Sunday, March 
20, in Ahmedabad to protest the USG decision (ref A) to prevent 
Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi from traveling to the U.S. 
Contacts in Gujarat estimate that anywhere from 10,000 to 13,000 
people attended the gathering.  By all accounts, the turnout was 
far less than had been anticipated.  The BJP, Modi's party, had 
expected up to 30,000 participants, according to one of our 
sources.  Tejas Patel, a member of the BJP faction in the state 
assembly and an outspoken critic of Modi, told us that many of 
the participants were police officers who had received orders to 
attend the event.  National BJP leader Advani and other party 
leaders spoke at the rally.  Our contacts confirmed press 
reports that many of Modi's opponents from within the Gujarat 
BJP did not attend the rally.  One BJP contact estimated that 
only about 27 of the 127 members of the legislative assembly 
(MLAs) from the BJP were in attendance. 
 
3. (U) At the rally, Modi did not address the 2002 riots in any 
detail, but claimed that the USG had other motives for denying 
him a diplomatic visa and revoking his B1/B2 visa.   He said the 
USG objected to a law he promoted that would restrict religious 
conversions in Gujarat.  (Note: The bill, passed in March 2003, 
has not become a law as the GOG Home Department has yet to frame 
the operative guidelines. End Note.)   He also argued that the 
USG felt threatened by an economically strong Gujarat.  "The USG 
is worried that Gujarat is helping India become a major economic 
power," he told the gathering.   Modi also drew parallels to the 
USG action and the invasion of Iraq, saying "the US has a record 
for building a case for some years against a country and then 
attacking it."  BJP chief Advani said the affair would be a 
major setback for Indo-US relations.  He also said that the BJP 
would be organizing similar rallies in other states. 
 
Modi Summons U.S. Reporter to his Office 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Anand Giridharadas, Mumbai-based stringer for the 
International Herald Tribune and the New York Times, told 
Pol/Econ Chief that he had interviewed Modi shortly after the 
news broke.  Giridharadas was in Ahmedabad on March 18 and had 
tried, unsuccessfully, for several days to get an interview with 
the Chief Minister.  After the news broke he was contacted and 
invited for a 10 minute interview at Modi's office. 
Giridharadas said he was ushered past several rings of heavily 
armed guards before coming into personal contact with the Chief 
Minister.  He said he had the impression that Modi was isolated 
and "living in his own world."   Modi told him that a conspiracy 
of NGOs opposed to his policies had weighed in with the USG to 
prevent him from traveling to the U.S.  Giridharadas said that 
when asked what role the killings of 2002 could have had on the 
USG decision, Modi flatly denied that anything had happened that 
would have led to the visa denial.  Giridharadas said he planned 
to report on his brief encounter with the Chief Minister within 
the framework of a general article on the issue. 
 
Public Protests Against USG Decision 
------------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The rally was the most visible of the public protests 
against the decision.  An estimated 150 persons protested in 
front of the Consulate in Mumbai on March 19.  The Mumbai police 
temporarily detained about 60 persons after attempts were made 
to break through barriers erected by the police.  There was no 
damage to USG property or injury to personnel.  In Ahmedabad 
about ten protesters tore down a sign in front of the center 
that schedules visa interviews with the Mumbai Consulate.   In 
the Gujarat city of Surat about 150 protestors forced their way 
into a Pepsi warehouse and destroyed a large number of bottles. 
Our contacts told us, however, that such events were isolated 
and not reflective of the general mood.  One NGO observer told 
us that the decision had no relevance for the lives of most 
people in Gujarat.  Only if the GOG decided to use the issue to 
reheat communal tensions would the average Gujarati begin to 
reflect on the issue, he predicted.  A businessman in Ahmedabad 
told us that most protests had remained isolated events and had 
not been front-page news within Gujarat itself. 
 
Reactions:  Applause and Heated Criticism 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Reactions among our contacts varied from strong 
condemnation to full-hearted support for the decision.  Not 
surprisingly, reps from NGOs and faith-based groups that deal 
with human rights and religious freedom issues whole-heartedly 
applauded the USG decision.  Catholic priest Joseph Appavoo from 
the Khaira Social Service Society, a Gujarat faith-based NGO 
focused on rural development, told us that the action sent a 
clear signal to India that the international community had not 
forgotten the 2002 bloodshed in Gujarat.  Echoing comments made 
by other NGO reps, Appavoo said it would now be far more 
difficult for the GOG, or others in Gujarat, to hope that the 
issue would go away. 
 
7. (C) Spokesmen from political parties in western India were 
generally critical of the decision in their public statements. 
In private discussions with the Consulate, however, many critics 
of Modi within the BJP and in the opposition complimented the 
USG for what they believed was a principled decision.  The 
Congress party, in opposition in Gujarat, officially criticized 
the decision at both the national level and in Gujarat. Congress 
national spokesperson Anand Sharma told the media: "We have not 
changed our opinion of Mr. Modi's politics, which we've 
enunciated often enough.  However, we take strong exception to 
the US denying diplomatic visa to a duly elected state chief 
minister."  Arjun Modhwadia, leader of the opposition Congress 
faction in the Gujarat parliament, echoed his party spokesman's 
statement, saying that the Gujarat Congress opposed the 
decision.  However, Gujarat Congress leader Shaktisinh Gohil 
told us that the party was happy to see Modi get such a public 
rebuke.  "But my state unit has publicly had to toe the national 
party line," he told us.  A prominent member of the Shiv Sena 
party who had been marginalized in recent months spoke briefly 
at the BJP-supported rally held on March 20, yet the party has 
not issued an official statement on the decision. 
 
Business Leaders Generally Critical 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Business leaders in Gujarat were generally critical of 
the decision.  Govind Baldva, manager of a textile company and 
also chairman of the Gujarat chapter of the Indo American 
Chamber of Commerce, said that chamber members felt that the USG 
had taken an unwise decision.  The Gujarat business community 
was hoping to forget the events of 2002 and instead concentrate 
on improving bilateral economic ties.  The visa decision had 
demonstrated that the riots and their aftermath were an issue 
that simply would not go away, Baldva said. 
 
9. (SBU) Rajan Vasa, Chairman of Contech BPO Services Pvt. Ltd., 
told EconOff that he was concerned with possible political 
fall-out and the perception of the US as "arrogant and 
autocratic" in its decision-making.  "The US comes to decisions 
and never has to justify any of them."  He reported that this is 
the "wide-spread feeling of my friends and business partners" 
and that the "US needs to justify its reasoning in revoking 
Modi's visa."  Amol Sheth, Managing Director of Anil Products 
Ltd., stated that he had spent the weekend talking with fellow 
businessmen and "70 percent believed that the US had an 
obligation to grant Modi a visa" because he is an elected 
official.  Sheth stated that most businessmen felt that the US 
should have been more sensitive about this issue.  Sheth 
predicted "maybe 10 days of protest" against American companies. 
 
 
10. (SBU) Our business contacts did not expect the decision to 
have a lasting negative impact on business and economic 
relations between the U.S. and Gujarat. Contech's Vasa stated 
that the "ground reality" is no different than before the visa 
revocation occurred.  "Politically, things may be going on, but 
business is fine."  He stated categorically that no one will 
"re-think doing business with the US."  He did say, however, 
that if the USG does not reconsider its decision about 5-10 
percent of businesses could face problems.  The impact would be 
seen in partnerships and joint ventures with companies that wish 
to sell US products as there may be a move to boycott these 
products.  He cited the protests against Coke and Pepsi over the 
weekend as an example (he also noted, however, that these 
protests were fairly small).  Although Vasa had many US 
customers, he did not believe the decision would impact his 
business. 
 
Consensus: Modi Will Reap Short-Term Political Benefits 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
11. (C) No one we spoke to, including Modi's opponents 
themselves, felt that the denial would weaken the Chief Minister 
in the short term.  Our contacts from across the political 
spectrum were united in the conviction that the Chief Minister 
would use the USG decision to his own advantage.  If the USG was 
hoping to weaken Modi, we often heard, then the visa revocation 
was the wrong strategy.  Pro-Modi BJP activist Paresh Patel told 
us:  "The action by USG would only strengthen our CM, because 
now this has become an issue of Gujarat pride."   Gujarat 
Congress leader Shaktisinh Gohil said Modi was cunning 
politician who would capitalize on the incident for his own 
benefit. "Anything happens to him, he says it is happening to 50 
million Gujaratis.  How much political mileage BJP will gain out 
of this, is a bit difficult to say right now," he said.  Our 
contacts said they expect that Modi will use the confirmation of 
his position by the national BJP leadership to crack down on the 
inner-party opposition that has been steadily growing in recent 
months. 
 
Long-Term Impact Not Clear 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Comments varied, however, over the long-term 
repercussions of the decision on Modi's political fortunes.  The 
decision did not alter the basic political logic in Gujarat, we 
often heard.  The national leadership of the BJP has no 
alternative to Modi, one argument went.  As an autocratic ruler, 
Modi insures that no viable alternative to himself can arise. 
Congress remains weak, divided, tainted by a reputation of 
corruption and without an effective leadership sufficiently 
astute to turn the visa issue into a political liability for 
Modi. 
 
13. (C) Other contacts, however, felt that the visa denial would 
weaken Modi in the medium- to long-term.  The USG decision hat 
proved that Modi's attempts to ignore and forget the 2002 riots 
would not be successful.  Modi and the BJP will be compelled to 
address the issue of responsibility for the bloodshed, but they 
could not do this without pointing figures at themselves.  Being 
unable to travel to the U.S. is a serious political stain on the 
vest of any member of the Indian elite, we heard, and the USG 
move makes Modi even more of an outcast on the national 
political stage.  Several contacts said the effect of the USG 
decision would be intensified if other western governments 
follow the USG initiative and ban Mod from their countries.  The 
combined effect of these trends will make Modi more of a 
liability to the BJP leadership and weaken the Chief Minister's 
position as a result, we heard. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (C) We expect the protests to die down in the coming days. 
Our discussions showed that it is too early to judge the 
long-term effect of the USG decision on Modi's political future. 
  We agree with the assessment that the USG decision will 
strengthen the position of the Chief Minister in the short term. 
 Even before the decision had been announced the growing 
opposition to Modi (ref B) in Gujarat had not yet become strong 
enough to seriously threaten the Chief Minister.  Modi will be 
astute enough to use the USG decision as a tool against his 
opponents.  In the short run, we also expect that the decision 
will impair our contact work with the GOG and with the BJP in 
Gujarat.  As mentioned in ref A, however, we do not expect 
negative long-term consequences at the national political level. 
 
 
15. (C) We do not expect the decision to seriously weaken 
bi-lateral economic and business relations.  We share the 
assessment that Gujarati businessmen are far too pragmatic to 
allow political events to get in the way of their commercial 
relations.  At the same time, the negative rhetoric, the attacks 
on symbols of U.S. presence in Gujarat and the image of a Chief 
Minister as an international outcast may dampen U.S. investors' 
willingness to invest in Gujarat.  We expect, however, that the 
GOG will likely increase its already significant efforts to 
re-brand Gujarat as a market-oriented and business-friendly 
state. 
 
16. (C) Despite their optimism that the USG decision will 
invigorate their efforts to bring those responsible for the 2002 
riots to justice, some NGOs working on human rights and 
religious freedom issues may face difficult times ahead.  It is 
not unlikely that a GOG that holds them at least partially 
responsible for the USG decision will find subtle ways to hinder 
their work.  End comment. 
 
 
 
SIMMONS