This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091521Z Mar 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S ELECTION -- WHAT'S A SUCCESS? 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Eric T. Schultz under Section 1.4 
 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The March 31 parliamentary election cannot 
deliver a change of government, which under Zimbabwe,s 
constitution is appointed by President Mugabe.  That said, 
the stakes are high for both parties.  ZANU-PF's objective is 
an election that secures it a 2/3 majority of 100 seats, 
including the 30 President Mugabe appoints, which would 
enable it to amend the constitution.  It is also hoping that 
the elections will open the door for broader international 
re-engagement, the main reason the ruling party has moderated 
its behavior and rhetoric compared to past elections. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: For the MDC, measures of success 
are more complicated, with various outcomes offering 
different post-election possibilities.  However, the two key 
numbers are 51 seats, which would allow it to retain its 
current block on unilateral constitutional change, and 76, 
which would give it an outright majority in Parliament and 
could precipitate real political change.  The MDC will also 
be looking to the West to continue to pressure the Mugabe 
regime, arguing that regardless of the election outcome, it 
would have done better on a level playing field.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ZANU-PF Success: 2/3 Majority and Greater Acceptance at Home 
and Abroad 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The 2005 election has been a prominent ZANU-PF 
priority for several years now.  Initially, the party's 
imperative was to crush the MDC and reduce its representation 
as much as possible and by all means possible.  However, the 
nation's continued economic deterioration and the party's own 
factionalism, combined with regional and international 
pressure, have led it to adjust its election objectives.  The 
party,s main goal is now to secure a two-thirds majority in 
Parliament and to do so in a way that improves the party,s 
image domestically, regionally, and internationally. 
 
¶4. (C) A two-thirds majority would allow the ruling party to 
amend the constitution at will, without negotiating with the 
MDC.  This would give ZANU-PF near total control over 
Zimbabwean politics and allow it to secure its hold on 
Zimbabwe post-Mugabe.  ZANU-PF starts with a 30-seat 
advantage, the seats appointed by President Mugabe under the 
current constitution.  The party therefore needs to win only 
70 of the 120 contested seats, something which many in 
ZANU-PF believe it will do easily given its control of state 
machinery and media and its ability to influence voters 
through handouts and propaganda. 
 
¶5. (C) A two-thirds ZANU-PF majority could allow the MDC to 
maintain a voice, something the ruling party appears to have 
decided is an acceptable price to pay for the resumed 
international re-engagement it sees as crucial to national 
recovery.  In that regard, ZANU-PF appears to have taken a 
deliberate, calculated gamble that it can win without the 
widespread violence of the 2000 parliamentary and especially 
the 2002 presidential elections and that the absence of 
violence will force the international community to recognize 
the election,s legitimacy.  However, the lack of violence 
has given the opposition grounds for optimism and has made 
the elections far more unpredictable than anyone would have 
predicted even a month ago. 
 
--------- 
MDC Success Hinges on Optics, Retaining Leverage 
--------- 
 
¶6.  (C) With its domestic and international image dented by 
the failure of its final push in 2003, followed by several 
by-election defeats, the MDC months ago had "conditionally 
suspended participation" in the election, and many were 
concerned that it was slipping toward political oblivion. 
With the opening of campaign space, greater access to media, 
and a buoying re-entry into the race, MDC leaders now hold 
conflicting views of their party's prospects.  While some 
fear the opposition may lose half its 52 seats (the MDC won 
57 in 2000 but has lost some in subsequent by-elections), 
most say it has a meaningful chance to take half the 
contested seats, with an outside chance at an overall 
majority absent intimidation and vote-rigging.  The 
leadership has been careful not to publicly offer explicit 
targets as potential indicators of success, in part over fear 
that rising expectations could set the bar too high and make 
apparent failure more likely. 
 
¶7.  (C) As with the ruling party, the MDC's parliamentary 
delegation strength ) and the leverage that representation 
affords ) will be a central indicator of success.  However, 
for the MDC there is not one single number that signals 
success but a variety of numbers that signal measures of 
success: 
 
-- The MDC wins fewer than 51 seats.  ZANU-PF would have its 
two-thirds majority and the MDC,s future could be at risk 
since it will have little political leverage.  The extent to 
which it is able to convince domestic, regional and 
international audiences that the results were fraudulent 
could mitigate the scale and scope of the ruling party,s 
victory.  Still, the MDC might remain one of Africa's most 
robust oppositions, with enough intellectual firepower and 
popular support to exert meaningful influence on 
policy-making.  Significantly, with close to 50 seats, it 
would likely remain viable in the run-up to the 2008 
presidential and local government elections. 
 
-- The MDC wins at least 51 but fewer than 57 seats.  Some in 
the opposition would see taking fewer seats than in 2000 as a 
disappointment.  However, the party would retain its blocking 
minority for constitutional amendments, giving it leverage 
against the ruling party and creating an impetus for 
negotiations.  Moreover, the MDC would have fought back from 
near oblivion on an unequal playing field and would gain 
valuable momentum for 2008, and will have established its 
staying power as a factor in Zimbabwean politics. 
 
-- The MDC wins at least 57 (the number it won in 2000) but 
fewer than 61 seats.  This result would stem the momentum the 
ruling party generated over the past two years with its 
by-elections successes.  The MDC would retain blocking 
leverage and a significant voice in Parliament.  However, the 
country's imbalance of power would be largely unaffected as 
the ruling party, with its extra 30 appointed seats, would 
still control the legislative and executive branches. 
 
-- The MDC wins at least 61 but fewer than 76 seats.  Taking 
a majority of contested seats but less than an absolute 
majority in the Parliament would represent a moral victory 
for the opposition, and would bolster its claim to have won 
the mantle of democratic legitimacy from ZANU-PF.  However, 
this outcome is unlikely and would still not change the 
imbalance of power. 
 
-- The MDC wins 76 or more seats.  With an absolute MDC 
majority in the Parliament, the government would be unable to 
pass any legislation without MDC assent and it could force 
legislative gridlock with unpredictable consequences.  This 
outcome is highly unlikely. 
 
¶8. (C) For the MDC, another key measure of success will be 
the perceived stature of the party's leadership as it emerges 
from the campaign.  MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai is not 
running for a seat but is coordinating the party's campaign 
in pivotal Masvingo province and is cutting a high campaign 
profile nationally.  The personality and judgment he projects 
will reflect strongly on the party's image, with considerable 
implications for the party's influence at home and abroad and 
for its chances in the pivotal 2008 presidential election.  A 
strong MDC showing, in the face of unequal odds and coming 
after years of systematic repression by the GOZ, would almost 
certainly enhance Tsvangirai,s stature as a credible 
political leader within Africa. 
 
--------- 
Election Conduct and International Role 
--------- 
 
¶9.  (C) International reaction to the conduct of the election 
will key for both parties.  Although there have already been 
improvements in the election environment (refs A and B), key 
variables, such as the level of violence/coercion and the 
integrity of election administration, have yet to play out. 
Moreover, the playing field remains skewed in the incumbent 
ruling party's favor and the historical legacies of past 
flawed elections ) residual fear and apathy ) cannot be 
remedied in the short term by any amount of adjustments to 
the election rules. 
 
¶10. (C) Observers no doubt will reach different conclusions 
on the election's freeness and fairness, driven by their 
different weighting of factors and different political 
agendas.  In this regard, the ruling party will be content 
with a regional stamp of approval, both to sell the election 
result to its domestic audiences and as a potential bridge to 
wider international engagement.  Assuming it gets regional 
endorsement for a ZANU-PF victory, the ruling party can be 
expected to step up its "charm offensive" and further warm 
its public and private rhetoric toward the West in the 
election's wake. 
 
¶11. (C) For its part, the MDC, regardless of how it fares, 
will attempt to leverage its influence with Western countries 
to counter a regional stamp of approval.   Accordingly, no 
matter how many seats it wins, it will argue that election 
irregularities prevented it from winning more and will press 
for continued international pressure on the regime, both for 
leverage in any post-election negotiations and in the run-up 
to the presidential election of 2008. 
 
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Success for Zimbabwe? 
-------- 
 
¶12.  The MDC and ZANU-PF each measure election success as a 
zero-sum game, and to some extent it is.  In the broader 
analysis, however, the election's success must be measured 
with regard to trends in the election environment, and the 
extent to which this election reflects the will of the 
Zimbabwean people.  In the same vein ) and perhaps most 
importantly from our perspective ) the election must be 
judged by its impact on Zimbabwe's dysfunctional political 
dynamic.  Because it will not yield a change in government, 
this election is not a pivotal event by itself but just the 
latest development in a complex drama that will not likely 
reach its climax until the presidential election of 2008 or 
beyond.  The outcome will set the stage for the next phase of 
this struggle and is thus of no small importance.  However, 
we should avoid over-emphasizing this event and thereby play 
into Mugabe,s argument that this vote will &resolve8 
Zimbabwe,s crisis of political legitimacy. 
SCHULTZ