This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2010 
TAGS: KCRM PTER PGOV PREL BG BG
SUBJECT: KIBRIA CASE UPDATE 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 0810 
     ¶B. DHAKA 0917 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reason 1.4 d. 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  Late March 22 the BDG passed us the 
confession statements and the inter-agency commission's 
report on the Kibria attack to pave the way for A/Legatt's 
meeting with the suspects, perhaps as early as next week. 
Police say they have completed the murder portion of the case 
but still want FBI help in tracing the origins of the grenade 
used in the attack.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On March 21, A/Legatt Trung Vu, P/E counselor, RSO, 
and conoff met for two hours at the Ministry of Home Affairs 
with Joint Secretary Mohammed Muhsin, DIG (Crime) ABM Bazlur 
Rahman, DIG (CID) Mohammed Shamsul Islam, Sylhet DIG AKM 
Mahfuzul Haque, MHA Legal Adviser Khan Saifur Rahman, and MFA 
Americas DG Shameem Ahsan.  The Sylhet DIG, who chaired the 
inter-agency commission that probed the Kibria killing, and 
the legal adviser were new and energetic participants in 
this, our third meeting with MHA on possible FBI involvement 
in the Kibria case. 
 
Update 
------ 
 
¶3. (C) The BDG officials stated: 
 
-- Ten persons, all from Habiganj and most of them BNP 
affiliated, conceived, planned, and executed the 
assassination of Awami League (AL) leader Shah Kibria to 
enhance BNP parliamentary prospects in this strong Awami 
League area.  Eight of the suspects are in custody, including 
the alleged ringleader, Habiganj district BNP vice-president 
AKM Abdul Quaiyum, and the alleged thrower of the grenade, 
Joinal Abedin Mumin.  Four of the arrestees, including Mumin, 
have made confessions to the magistrate. 
 
-- Mumin was promised the taka equivalent of about 830 
dollars for his role.  He received 15,000 taka in advance but 
was arrested before he could collect the balance.  He quickly 
confessed due to his acute emotional stress resulting from 
the fact that the casualties from the grenade he threw 
included his elder brother and brother in law. 
 
-- There is no question of a coerced confession since the 
magistrate meets alone with the suspect and asks him four 
times whether the confession is truthful and complete. 
 
-- There is no estimate on the total cost of the operation. 
 
-- When police froze Quaiyum's bank accounts, they discovered 
large sums he had apparently collected on behalf of a local 
cultural organization.  Police also found posters Quaiyum had 
already printed for his campaign for parliament. 
 
-- Quaiyum has not been brought to a magistrate because, as a 
former magistrate himself, he knows the dire implications of 
a confession.  (Note: On March 20, the High Court, in 
response to a habeas corpus write filed by Quaiyum's wife, 
instructed the BDG to explain in two weeks why Quaiyum should 
not be produced before the court to determine the legality of 
his detention.  Mrs. Quaiyum charged that neither she nor 
Quaiyum's lawyer have had access to him since his arrest. 
DIG Haque told us she had spoken to her husband by phone soon 
after his arrest.) 
 
-- A MHA committee will decide where the case will be tried, 
but they expect that a "sensational" case like this will be 
referred to a speedy tribunal.  Bail in cases like this is 
unlikely. 
 
-- Police have talked to a total of 45 witnesses, including 
16 primary. 
 
-- The murder investigation is closed, but the investigation 
of the grenade used in the attack continues. 
 
-- Since the two absconding suspects, involved with the 
planning of the attack, may have fled the country, police 
will pursue an Interpol arrest warrant. 
 
¶4. (C) Asked about reports that a Dhaka-based "mastermind" 
might be behind the attack, DIG Haque said "so far" the 
mastermind is Quaiyum.  None of the suspects, he said, has 
indicated any involvement beyond Quaiyum.  Muhsin downplayed 
mastermind speculation as a media fancy.  Asked if police had 
found any indication of AL involvement in the attack, Haque 
replied, "No."  Muhsin interjected that police had not 
pursued that angle because of their emphasis on finding the 
attackers. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Asma Kibria, widow of the slain AL leader, has again 
rejected the police investigation of her husband's killers as 
incomplete.  "I didn't see the investigation report," she 
told reporters on March 20.  "The chargesheet on the basis of 
that investigation must be complete and partial."  She 
reiterated her call for an FBI investigation to unravel the 
"true story" about who actually instigated the attack. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶6. (C) The FBI help now desired, the BDG officials said, is 
tracing the origin of the Arges grenade used in the Kibria 
attack, in part because, they noted, Arges grenades have been 
used in several recent incidents in Bangladesh.  They 
confirmed that they have no serial or lot number of the 
grenade, only recovered fragments.  Asked if it was true that 
the Bangladesh army used Arges grenades, they asserted that 
they understood, from press reports, that the army had 
dropped the Arges from its inventory in the early 1990s and 
had destroyed remaining stockpiles.  Police have not, 
however, raised this matter with the army. 
 
¶7. (C) P/E counselor noted that the Ambassador and Home 
Secretary Farooq had agreed last week that Agent Vu and an 
 
SIPDIS 
interpreter (the Bangla-speaking conoff present at the 
meeting) could interview the suspects in Habiganj.  To 
prepare for the interviews, it would be helpful if the BDG 
could provide Agent Vu with copies of the confessions, any 
other case documents, and the report recently submitted by 
DIG Haque's commission.  For the sake of time, hand-written 
Bangla documents were fine.  Muhsin, clearly uncomfortable 
with the request, ended up calling a brief recess to consult 
with his colleagues.  When they returned, he accepted in 
principle both the interviews and the request for 
documentation. 
 
¶8. (C) After considerable back and forth among Muhsin and the 
forward-leaning legal adviser, it was agreed that: 
 
-- Vu's interviews would have the status of a regular prison 
visit but no other legal standing.  Any information of value 
to emerge would be referred to the police for appropriate 
follow-up.  After the suspects are transferred from police 
remand to Habiganj prison on March 23, Vu's visit would 
require the concurrence of prison officials and perhaps the 
magistrate. 
 
-- The requested documents could be provided immediately on 
an informal or confidential basis.  Getting court certified 
copies of the documents would take weeks. 
 
-- At issue are four two-page confessions and a 20-page 
commission report, plus about 100 pages of annexes.  There 
are no written records of the interrogation. 
 
-- Muhsin would be in touch with us March 22 to advise 
whether, based on consultation with seniors, he'd be 
available to provide the documents informally. 
 
BDG Delivers 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) On March 22, Foreign Policy Adviser Reaz Rahman called 
the Ambassador to reiterate PM Zia's assurances that Agent Vu 
would have full BDG cooperation, including access to all 
reports and people and support for his travel to Habiganj to 
interview suspects.  The BDG's only request, he said, was 
that any subsequent press releases on the FBI role in the 
case would be developed jointly by those persons 
participating in bilateral meetings.  The Ambassador agreed, 
adding that the Embassy had issued its own release on March 
21 (before the meeting at MHA) to correct inaccurate reports 
on the FBI's role appearing in the local media. 
 
¶10. (C) MHA Joint Secretary Muhsin subsequently called P/E 
counselor to invite him to collect the requested documents 
later at MHA.  When P/E counselor met with Muhsin that 
evening to collect the documents, Muhsin stressed the 
confidentiality of the documents and his hope that the media 
 
SIPDIS 
would not learn that they had been passed to the USG. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) We will translate and digest the case documents as 
soon as possible to pave the way for Agent Vu's travel to 
Habiganj, perhaps as early as next week.  Meeting with 
Quaiyum would be significant since his refusal thus far to 
confess and his incommunicado status suggest to some he has 
knowledge of senior BNP leadership involvement in the attack. 
 Cynics, like the Kibria family, might argue that if the BDG 
actually allows Vu to meet with Quaiyum, it would mean that 
he and the BDG have come to an understanding.  In either 
event, the turnaround in BDG responsiveness is striking. 
Compared to our prior meetings, this time BDG officials -- 
especially the new participants -- were informative and 
constructive. 
¶12. (C) By local standards, the police appear to have done 
some solid work in quickly identifying and building a case 
against Kibria's killers, which underscores our view that the 
police can solve such cases when told to do so.  That they 
consider the case closed, and thereby reject the notion of a 
VIP mastermind, is not surprising.  As is customary in 
Bangladesh, confessions in this case are central to the 
investigation and prosecution of suspects.  According to the 
legal adviser, there is no legal provision for recanting or 
modifying a confession and any attempt by a defendant to do 
so is viewed as duplicity. 
THOMAS