This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: 2/14/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CASC TZ
SUBJECT: CUF, CCM Partisans Clash in Stonetown 
Environs 
 
Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason 
1.4(b) 
 
REF: A) Dar es Salaam 342, B) Dar es Salaam 317 and 
previous 
 
¶1. (U) Summary:  CUF and CCM party activists clashed 
after the two opposing parties held separate rallies 
in the environs of Zanzibar  Stonetown March 6. 
Various accounts by the press and political party 
leaders report that 14-26 people were injured in the 
melee, one critically.  In addition, mobs torched 
several houses and vehicles, and looted shops.  The 
Embassy  Consular section has issued a Warden 
Notice describing the March 6 confrontation and 
reiterating cautions contained in the Consular 
Information Sheet that political demonstrations on 
Zanzibar can turn violent with little warning. 
Emboffs are urging leaders of both parties to 
publicly instruct their followers to refrain from 
violence.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (U) On the afternoon of March 6, the ruling CCM 
party and the opposition CUF held rallies at 
separate locations in the eastern environs of 
Zanzibar  Stonetown.  The Embassy FSN employee who 
is stationed on Zanzibar attended the CUF rally, 
where CUF Secretary General Seif Sharrif Hamad 
shared the platform with other CUF leaders.  While 
the FSN could not attend the simultaneous CCM rally 
held two kilometers away, the FSN had attended other 
recent CCM events featuring the CCM  Urban District 
Chair Borafia as speaker, the same leader who 
addressed the CCM  March 6 rally.  The FSN noted 
that, while neither party  speakers had advocated 
violence, or incited party activists to attack their 
rivals, the language used at recent political 
rallies has been more confrontational than 
conciliatory.  Speakers at the CUF rally denounced 
alleged incidents of CCM party malfeasance during 
the ongoing voter registration exercise, and urged 
their followers to be  repared to defend 
themselves gainst CCM malfeasance.  The tone of 
the nearby CCM rally was likely very similar  n 
past rallies, CCM leader Borafia has attacked CUF 
party rivals by name. 
 
¶3. (C) The violence occurred after the rallies ended 
and groups of excited, slogan-chanting activists 
from both parties began to go their separate ways. 
In separate meetings on March 7 and 8, the CCM 
Organizing Secretary Kidawa Saleh and CUF Secretary 
General Hamad gave symmetrical but contradictory 
accounts of what happened next.  According to the 
CCM version of events, the CUF rally ended first, 
and CUF militants, acting on direct instructions 
from their leaders, went to the site of the CCM 
rally and ambushed CCM activists who where heading 
for home.  CUF  Hamad said that the CCM rally ended 
first and that CCM militants, who had received 
special training in attack methods from Zanzibar 
CCM government, fought 
with the activists who were 
departing the CUF rally.  Hamad said the CCM 
militants then torched homes of several CUF leaders 
and burned two vehicles parked by the home of one of 
Hamad  neighbors, apparently because  UF Guards 
deterred them from attacking Hamad  residence 
directly.  According to various accounts by the 
press, party leaders, and Embassy FSN, the toll from 
the clashes were:  14-26 people injured, one of them 
critically, some shops looted, two to three vehicles 
burned, and several homes partially burned. 
 
¶4. (U) We are attempting to sort through the 
contradictory accounts to determine what actually 
did happen on March 6.  Embassy FSN had followed a 
group of CUF activists as they departed the CUF 
rally that afternoon.  He reported that they were 
very agitated, and that they were singing CUF 
slogans and insulting the Chairman of the Zanzibar 
Electoral Commission.  Eventually, however, the 
group of CUF activists turned to the right, and 
Embassy FSN very prudently turned left, so he did 
not view the subsequent violent clashes first hand. 
A few days later, Embassy FSN viewed the burned 
houses and confirmed that all had had some damage, 
some of it substantial, but that no structure had 
been burned to the ground.  In a March 7 meeting, 
the CCM  Kidawa said that 14 people had been 
hospitalized, all of them CCM supporters.  At a 
meeting held on March 9, several donor-country 
diplomats said that CUF leaders had told them that 
CUF activists often avoid the public hospitals if 
they have been hurt in a clash with the CCM, and 
typically seek treatment privately. 
¶5. (U) The violence occurred in the Stonetown 
environs, away from the major tourist sites, and 
there is no indication that foreigners were targeted 
in any way.  As a precaution, CONS issued a warden 
notice, informing American visitors to Zanzibar of 
the March 6 violence and reiterating the caution, 
already contained in the Consular Information Sheet, 
that political demonstrations on Zanzibar have 
sometimes turned violent with very little advance 
warning. 
 
¶6. (C) By happenstance, AF/E Deskoff Susie Pratt was 
visiting Tanzania March 4-9.  Poloff accompanied her 
to previously-scheduled meetings with leaders of 
both the CCM and the CUF in the days immediately 
following the March 6 clashes.  On March 9, poloff 
also attended a previously scheduled meeting of 
diplomats from missions that are contributing to 
Zanzibar  ongoing project to establish a Permanent 
Voters Register.  Poloff and deskoff urged leaders 
of both the CUF and the CCM to instruct their 
followers, unambiguously and often, to refrain from 
violence during the electoral campaign.  Deskoff 
asked leaders of both parties to consider making a 
joint statement against violence.  (The Secretaries 
General of the CCM and CUF have met periodically, 
although not recently, and their joint statements 
were a calming influence during the 2003 Pemba by- 
elections.)  Poloff also exchanged information on 
the March 6 clashes with the diplomatic group, and 
asked that the diplomatic community continue to urge 
all sides to refrain from violence. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: We believe that the violent 
incidents of March 6 were spontaneous, and not 
planned by any party  leadership.  The violence may 
have resulted simply from the unfortunate decision 
to grant the rival parties permission to hold 
simultaneous rallies at sites separated by a mere 
two kilometers.  It is likely there were many 
separate clashes, beginning soon after the two 
rallies ended and continuing into the night, which 
involved relatively small groups of party activists 
who sought out targets of opportunity, such as 
Hamad  house, or each other.  In her discussions 
with the diplomatic group, Poloff noted that we 
could waste many unproductive hours attempting to 
determine which party  activists attacked first, 
and who was most to blame for the violence of March 
¶6.  Clearly, each party would like the diplomatic 
missions to make a statement condemning the other. 
Given the ambiguity of the situation, the diplomatic 
community would do best to avoid taking sides, and 
to continue to urge both the CCM and the CUF to 
condemn violence unequivocally.  End comment. 
 
Owen