This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, EAP/ANP, AC/ISN, NP/CBM AND NP/RA, 
OSD FOR DCOOPER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015 
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL MNUC ETTC AS TH
SUBJECT: PSI: AUSTRALIA UNWILLING TO PRESS FOR IMMEDIATE 
THAI ENDORSEMENT OF THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
 
REF: A. STATE 39747 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 1772 
     ¶C. 04 CANBERRA 2249 
     ¶D. CANBERRA 0016 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLCOUNS TAMARA FITZGERALD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND 
 D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) officials balked at the U.S. request (Ref A) for 
the GOA to endorse Washington's message calling upon Thailand 
to publicly support the Proliferation Security Initiative 
Statement of Interdiction Principles (PSI SOP) in order to 
participate in the March 21-22 Operational Experts Group 
(OEG) meeting in Omaha.  DFAT officials told us that, in 
their view, Thai endorsement of the principles prior to the 
meeting was "not required" because the GOA was already 
satisfied with Thailand's level of commitment to the PSI thus 
far.  Citing familiar views on the need to account for "Asia 
Pacific nuances" in working on sensitive security issues with 
ASEAN countries, the officials said the GOA would continue to 
press Bangkok to endorse the Principles as soon as the RTG 
could, but Australian encouragement to do so would not 
include language making it a condition for participation in 
the OEG meeting.  They understood, however, that the U.S. 
demarche in Bangkok contained this indication of 
conditionality.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) We presented Ref A information points on March 8 to 
DFAT PSI Action Officer Lucinda Bell, in the absence of more 
senior officials.  She expressed surprise that the U.S. would 
ask the GOA to formally encourage Thai endorsement of the SOP 
as a condition of participation at the March OEG meeting, 
commenting that Australia's position on the need for Thailand 
to be involved was well-known (Ref C).  We re-engaged with 
Counterproliferation Section Director Peter Sawczak upon his 
return on March 10.  Sawczak and Bell said Canberra's 
position was that it was not necessary for Thailand to 
endorse the Principles in advance of the Omaha OEG meeting. 
The GOA was "quite happy with the distance Thailand has 
travelled thus far on PSI."  Furthermore, there were no other 
"door knockers" in the Asia Pacific seeking to join the PSI, 
and this was a region of significant proliferation concern. 
 
¶3.  (C) We stressed the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
the OEG by having participants operate from a common base of 
understanding, as well as the unhelpful precedent Thailand's 
attendence in Omaha could set for other countries wanting to 
participate.  Sawczak rejoined that if the only ones allowed 
in were those who could readily support the SOP, "all you've 
got is a regional European meeting."  That said, he 
continued, Australia was "not interested in compromising the 
operational effectiveness of the OEG in any way."  Sawczak 
said the GOA regarded Bangkok's level of commitment and 
interest as "sufficient to engage in PSI activities."  In 
addition, Thailand's involvement would help Singapore to feel 
less exposed within ASEAN. 
 
¶4.  (C) Sawczak stated that during the Eighth PSI OEG in 
Sydney in December 2004 (Ref D), Canada, Germany, Singapore 
and Japan had told the GOA they fully supported Thailand's 
inclusion.  Canberra supported the USG's desire for Thailand 
to endorse the SOP and would continue to engage with Thai 
officials to this end, he emphasized, but the GOA did not 
intend to use language withholding support for Thailand's 
participation if it did not publicly endorse the principles 
prior to the Omaha meeting.  Bell related that Australia's 
most recent engagement with the RTG on PSI had been in early 
February when Australian Emboffs had been told that some Thai 
agencies still had legal concerns.  Sawczak suggested that 
the U.S. might be able to do more to address specific RTG 
concerns.  Per Ref A background, we reviewed U/S Bolton's 
conversations in Tokyo in early February with Thai officials 
when he had addressed their legal concerns. 
 
¶5.  (C) While expressing understanding for the USG's 
"orthodox position" on participation, Sawczak stressed that a 
more flexible approach with Thailand could have a "knock-on" 
effect within ASEAN and was the best way to garner "sensible 
regional participation" in the wider Asia Pacific.  While 
Sawczak thought Thai officials were worried about how China 
and others might view Thailand's participation in PSI, he 
viewed their legal concerns as sincere.  In contrast, the GOA 
believed other ASEAN nations used legal arguments as an 
excuse not to participate in PSI.  He reiterated that the GOA 
would continue to engage with the RTG on its commitment to 
PSI. 
STANTON