This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, EAP/K, EAP/ANP AND NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC AS KN IAEA
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA WANTS MORE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: A. STATE 32567 
 
     ¶B. CANBERRA 354 
 
Classified By: CDA BILL STANTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (A, B AND D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: In a February 25 courtesy 
call on DFAT Secretary L'Estrange, North Korean Ambassador 
Chon engaged on the question of whether North Korea would 
return to the Six-Party Talks (6PT).  According to DFAT, Chon 
launched into the DPRK's "standard diatribe" about the U.S. 
"hostile intent."  Chon told L'Estrange that his government's 
lack of willingness to return to the 6PT was a result of its 
perception that the U.S. desired regime change, making it 
pointless to continue negotiations.  Our DFAT contact said 
the GOA and FM Downer in particular were wrestling with the 
question of what more the GOA could do bilaterally and what 
more the international community could do collectively to 
bring North Korea around to surrendering its nuclear program. 
 The GOA is interested in continuing U.S.-Australian 
discussions begun in Canberra in July 2003 on proposals to 
interdict all forms of North Korean criminal activity. 
Embassy would appreciate further guidance and encourage 
another visit to Australia by an Illicit Activities 
Initiative delegation.  See para 5.  End Summary and Action 
Request. 
 
NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR: STANDARD LINE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Polmiloff presented Ref A points on February 25 to 
DFAT Korea Section Chief Bill Brummitt, outlining the U.S. 
view on North Korea's February 10 statement announcing that 
it was suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks 
and that it possessed nuclear weapons.  Brummitt thanked us 
for the U.S. points which he said matched the GOA's outlook. 
He related that North Korean Ambassador Chon Jae Hong had 
paid a courtesy call that morning on Michael L'Estrange, the 
new DFAT Secretary (Deputy Secretary Equivalent), at the 
Ambassador's request.  The call had turned into a substantive 
discussion as L'Estrange told Chon that Australia wanted the 
DPRK to return to the 6PT without conditions; the GOA viewed 
the February 10 statement as part of an unproductive DPRK 
pattern.  Chon's response, Brummitt reported, was nearly a 
verbatim recitation of the February 10 statement, asserting 
that North Korea's need for nuclear weapons was driven by the 
USG's "hostile policy" toward the DPRK.  Chon linked 
President Bush's statements in his inaugural address calling 
for the spread of democracy with Secretary Rice's 
confirmation hearing statements about "13 outposts of 
tyranny" and concluded that the USG's goal for North Korea 
was regime change.  If that was the U.S. policy, Chon told 
L'Estrange, there was no point in holding further Six-Party 
Talks. 
 
CHON: BOTH SIDES MUST MOVE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Brummit, Secretary L'Estrange had 
replied to Chon that it was good to keep communicating, even 
if the GOA and DPRK disagreed.  When Chon asserted that 
Pyongyang appreciated the fact that the GOA's view was a bit 
different from that of the U.S.,  L'Estrange had curtly 
retorted that it was not: the GOA view was exactly the same 
as that of the U.S. and, in fact, the entire international 
community wanted North Korea to return to the 6PT without 
conditions.  Trying to illustrate that the DPRK wanted to "be 
friends" with the entire world, Chon suggested that 
L'Estrange go back and look at the footage of how Secretary 
Albright had been received in Pyongyang in 1999.  Chon argued 
that the lack of trust between the U.S. and DPRK had been 
overcome in 1994 through simultaneous movement by both sides. 
 "This is the only way out," Chon asserted, adding that at 
the third round of the 6PT in June 2004, the four countries 
other than the U.S. had agreed to offer "inducements" for 
North Korea to take its first steps.  According to Chon, 
while the U.S. had not wanted to provide any up-front 
benefits, it had not opposed the others' efforts at the time. 
 Chon accused the U.S. of "backpedalling" once the delegation 
returned to Washington. 
 
WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE TO PRESSURE THE DPRK? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked by Polmiloff about the GOA's ideas for getting 
the North Koreans back to the 6PT, Brummitt said that FM 
Downer was personally engaged on this issue.  The two 
questions were: what more could the GOA do bilaterally, and 
what more could the international community do collectively? 
Brummitt thought there was little else that the GOA could do 
bilaterally, beyond further travel restrictions on North 
Koreans.  Polmiloff recalled that FM Downer had recently 
suggested to a visiting U.S. delegation that aid which served 
to prop up North Korea's infrastructure should be withheld 
(Ref B).  Polmiloff also suggested that the GOA look at 
applying appropriate pressure on third countries that bought 
North Korean missile technology or other illicit exports, if 
such exports came to Canberra's attention.  Brummitt 
acknowledged that Australia could perhaps keep a more 
vigilant look-out for North Korean activity in the South 
Pacific.  He expressed interest in holding further 
discussions with Washington on more and better ways to 
interdict North Korean criminal activity.  Brummitt also 
related that in early February DFAT had been considering 
sending another delegation to Pyongyang to urge resumption of 
the 6PT, but the February 10 announcement had killed that 
idea.  He said the GOA would consult with the U.S. if the 
delegation proposal were revived at a future date. 
 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶5.   (C) We should take advantage of the GOA interest in 
doing more to choke off North Korea's illegal sources of 
income.  We believe another visit to Australia by an Illegal 
Activities Initiative delegation would be a good way to 
resume bilateral consultations on how to increase pressure on 
Pyongyang's criminal activities. 
 
STANTON