This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PINS PINR RO NATO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT PROPOSES NEW NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY - INCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF "PREEMPTIVE" 
ANTI-TERROR STRIKES 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS L. DELARE FOR REASONS 1.4 A, B, 
 AND D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Traian Basescu is scheduled to 
propose within the next month a national security strategy 
for Parliamentary approval reflecting the findings of the 
February 28 meeting of the inter-ministerial Supreme Council 
of National Defense (CSAT).  Responding to five principal 
threats to Romania's national security, the CSAT'S proposed 
security strategy includes a controversial provision 
explicitly authorizing the use of extraterritorial 
"preventive action" to combat "structured international 
terrorism."  "Bad governance," including "corrupt state 
institutions" are among other threats to national security. 
The CSAT also reaffirmed the GOR's commitment to the NATO 
alliance and underscored the importance of a "coherent, 
strategic program" to promote GOR interests in the Black Sea 
region.  So far, the preemptive strategy seems to have only a 
weak endorsement from Foreign Minister Ungureanu.  This may 
have repercussions if the assertive Basescu interprets lack 
of enthusiasm as opposition.  End Summary. 
 
Preempting International Terrorism? 
----------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) President Basescu presided February 28 over the 
first meeting during his presidency of Romania's Supreme 
Council for National Defense (CSAT), an inter-ministerial 
body whose members include the Prime Minister, Ministers of 
Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior, and heads of the 
intelligence services. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to the communique, the CSAT agreed that 
Romania needs a new national security strategy and identified 
five principle threats facing Romania: "structured 
international terrorism. . ., proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, totalitarian regimes that support 
terrorism, crises occurring in Romania,s strategic proximity 
(frozen conflicts or politically unstable situations), and 
bad governance, of which an important element is the level of 
corruption within the state institutions."  Referring to 
anti-terror measures, the CSAT communique states that 
&Romania must decide whether it, along with its allies, 
takes action preemptively outside the national borders or 
limits itself to a reactive policy.8  The communique notes 
that a &final decision8 on this issue will be adopted 
within thirty days and states that Basescu, "in his capacity 
as CSAT president, argued for preventive action" against 
international terrorism. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Mircea Geoana, FM in the former Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) government and current Senate Foreign Policy 
Commission President, publicly criticized CSAT's "radical and 
brutal" change to Romania's national security strategy, and 
cautioned in a newspaper interview against involving Romania 
in &distant conflicts" aimed at fighting terrorism.  Basescu 
rejoined March 7 that Romania should modernize its national 
security strategy, adopted in 2001, to reflect current 
realities.  Citing Romania's engagement in Iraq, he observed 
that Romania's military presence there is not, in fact, 
grounded in the current national security strategy that 
focuses on "reaction" to terrorism rather than preventive 
measures.  On the other hand, FM Razvan Ungureanu stated in 
testimony before Geoana's Foreign Policy Commission that 
discussions about possible GOR reactions to international 
terrorism are &mere intellectual exercises.8  In a March 7 
news conference, Ungureanu asserted that his mandate includes 
implementing a direct and forward leaning foreign policy 
leaving us a bit confused as where the FM really stands on 
what may be a key foreign policy position. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Most media reaction to the CSAT communique focused 
on the possibility of "preventive action."  Media analysts' 
response to the possibility of the GOR taking preemptive 
extraterritorial action against international terrorism 
mostly followed partisan lines.  For example, a commentator 
in independent but frequently pro-PSD national daily 
newspaper "Adevarul" described Basescu as the leader of a 
weaker country that joins "the hooligan with the biggest club 
(the U.S.)."  A headline in the same newspaper observes that 
the "Mouse (Romania) Marches Next to the Elephant (U.S.)." 
 
NATO Alliance, Secret Police Archives, Black Sea 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶6. (SBU) The CSAT reaffirmed the importance of aligning 
Romanian and NATO policy and underscores that Romania is a 
"European ally with a transatlantic vocation."  According to 
the CSAT communique, Romania will remain engaged in the 
gradual extension of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, 
training of the future Iraq army, and expansion of NATO's 
role in combating terrorism and WMD proliferation. 
The CSAT communique notes that the Council "analyzed the 
development of the Romanian-U.S. strategic partnership."  The 
CSAT concluded that Romania must develop a "coherent 
strategic program" to promote national interests in the Black 
Sea region.  The communique also states that Romania will 
participate in efforts to promote democracy and &European 
values8 to the Western Balkans.  The CSAT communique also 
urged the intelligence services to implement a long overdue 
provision of law governing the disposition and custody of 
communist era secret police archives, including files kept on 
individuals by the notorious "Securitate." 
 
The Next Step 
------------- 
¶7.  (C)  Romanian law requires parliamentary approval of the 
national security strategy and, according to sources close to 
Basescu, the Presidency will submit its proposed national 
security strategy within the next month, likely reflecting 
the points underscored by CSAT and intended to replace and 
update the strategy Parliament approved in 2001.  If former 
FM Geoana's reaction is an accurate barometer, evocation of 
"preemptive" anti-terror measures could release a storm of 
parliamentary opposition from the former ruling party, the 
PSD, as well as the extreme nationalist Greater Romania Party 
(PRM). 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment.  The CSAT's "preemptive provision" reflects 
Basescu's personal imprint and demonstrates that the 
president will continue to play a proactive and engaged role 
in developing Romania's foreign policy.  One Basescu adviser 
asserted to us that the president raised this topic with the 
express intent of generating a genuine debate on national 
security issues.  Other themes addressed by CSAT - 
declassification of secret police archives, the centrality of 
the NATO alliance, and heightened attention to the Black Sea 
region - gibe with Basescu's recent public statements and 
campaign pledges.  Additionally, the communique's linkage of 
"bad governance" and "the corruption of state institutions" 
echoes Basescu's presidential campaign assertion that 
corruption threatens national security.  According to a 
Basescu adviser as well as media analysts, the president is 
impatient that the government is moving too slowly with 
reforms, including passing legislation that would criminalize 
tax evasion.  Thus, the CSAT reference to "bad governance" 
may also be an unsubtle exhortation to PM Calin 
Popsescu-Tariceanu's government to step up the fight against 
corruption.  End Comment. 
 
¶9.  (U) Amembassy Bucharest,s reporting telegrams are 
available on the Bucharest SIPRNET Website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest 
DELARE