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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM GRETA HOLTZ; EUR/ERA AMY CARNIE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN RU USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE 
 
REF: A. A) USEU TODAY 03/11/05 
     ¶B. B) STATE 43096 
     ¶C. C) USEU TODAY 03/16/05 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In meetings with USOSCE Ambassador Stephan 
¶M. Minikes, EU officials said: 
 
--in light of growing Russian intransigence on democracy 
issues, the EU is preparing a strategy on how to respond to 
the Russian challenge in OSCE; 
 
--Russia is blocking democracy promotion in the Council of 
Europe (CoE), also, and the EU is preparing for the May CoE 
summit, which is set to address relations between the two 
organizations; 
 
--while the EU has several options on the table, the EU 
remains reticent about a full-fledged EU border monitoring 
operation because of likely Russian objections; 
 
--the EU is raising the Moldova/Ukraine border issue with 
Ukraine at all levels; 
 
-- the EU agreed with the need to speak out often in the OSCE 
on developments in Belarus * not with the expectation that 
it will influence the regime, but as a signal of support to 
democratic forces and lower-level officials. 
 
--the EU will discuss internally the advisability of 
reappointing in 2006 the three Personal Representatives of 
the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) on Tolerance; 
 
--getting the Kazakhs to live up to OSCE standards in 
exchange for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 is "back on the EU 
agenda." 
 
During EU deliberations on the future of the OSCE and 
relations between it and the CoE, we must ensure the EU keeps 
in mind the OSCE's value as an important venue for continued 
U.S. engagement with OSCE participating states.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶2. (U) On March 11, The EU hosted a U.S. delegation headed by 
USOSCE Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes for the biannual U.S.-EU 
"COSCE" consultations on the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Minikes also had meetings with 
two top officials in EU HighRep Javier Solana's Council 
Secretariat:  Pieter Feith, Deputy Director-General for 
 
SIPDIS 
Political-Military Affairs (see REF A), and Christoph 
Heusgen, Director of the Policy Unit.  The following 
participated in the COSCE consultations: 
 
EU Delegation 
------------- 
 
Luxembourg (current EU Presidency): 
 
Ronald Mayer, Ambassador to the CoE 
Beatrice Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative to the OSCE 
Fabienne Rossler, Attachee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
United Kingdom (successor to Luxembourg in EU Presidency): 
 
Timothy Morris, Head of International Organizations 
Department, FCO 
Annabelle Malins, Team Leader for OSCE/CoE Section, FCO 
 
European Commission: 
 
Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and CoE, DG External 
Relations 
Michael Meyer-Resende, Desk Officer, Human Rights Unit, DG 
External Relations 
 
EU Council Secretariat: 
 
Alison Weston, OSCE and CoE Desk Officer 
 
U.S. delegation 
--------------- 
 
Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE 
Christopher Davis, Consul General AmConGen Strasbourg 
Greta Holtz, OSCE Coordinator, EUR/RPM 
Stephen Steger, Political Officer, USOSCE Vienna 
Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
EU DEVELOPING STRATEGY ON HANDLING RUSSIA IN OSCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) Minikes reported that Secretary Rice had told Russian 
FM Lavrov during their meeting in Ankara on February 5 of 
deep U.S. concerns over how Russia was treating the OSCE, 
especially as a founding member of the organization, and 
urged Russia to be more supportive and positive.  Minikes 
said that, in effect, Russia was trying to deny the benefits 
of democracy to about 200 million people living in the CIS, 
and that the U.S. and EU could not allow Russia to speak for 
these countries.  Minikes said the U.S. and EU needed to 
create a situation in which Russia,s national interests no 
longer were served by its present policy in the OSCE.  Just 
making the argument that Russia,s interests were better 
served by closing the &democracy gap,8 he said, was not 
enough. 
 
¶4. (C) Our EU interlocutors replied that, while we needed to 
be tough with the Russians, we also needed to get to a 
"positive atmosphere" with the Russians to keep them from 
withdrawing into a shell.  Heusgen said the EU was working on 
a strategy paper on how the EU should react to the Russian 
challenge in the OSCE.  He said the strategy, which would be 
discussed at the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) in 
the coming weeks, needed two tracks:  (1) how to save the 
OSCE; and (2) alternatives to the OSCE for cases in which 
Russia remained intransigent.  Minikes warned that there 
would be a limit to what the EU could and should do without 
involving the U.S. via the OSCE.  Heusgen agreed, but 
reiterated that the EU had to be "ready to act" if necessary. 
 (NOTE: We have since heard that the EU aims to have the 
strategy agreed in time for the EU-Russia summit in May.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
---------------------------- 
RUSSIA ALSO A PROBLEM IN COE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Mayer, the Luxembourg Ambassador to the Council of 
Europe (CoE), said Russia was attempting to water down CoE 
human rights promotion and election monitoring, just as in 
the OSCE.  The May 16-17 CoE Summit in Warsaw would focus, 
among other things, on improving coordination and lessening 
unproductive overlaps between CoE and OSCE; Russia might try 
to hijack this reform discussion to move some OSCE activities 
to the CoE and vice versa, in order to weaken both 
organizations' democracy and human rights oversight.  Minikes 
thanked Mayer for raising the CoE-OSCE issue, and pointed out 
that in discussing relations between the two organizations 
member states should not forget that the U.S. is a member of 
OSCE and not of CoE; thus, the U.S. might oppose any CoE-OSCE 
division of labor that lessens the OSCE,s role in the OSCE 
region.  Russian behavior must be dealt with effectively in 
both organizations. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
MIXED SIGNALS ON EU INVOLVEMENT IN GEORGIA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) After having gone over EU internal discussions on 
Georgia border monitoring with EU Council Deputy Director 
General Pieter Feith (REF A) on March 10, Minikes delivered, 
at the March 11 COSCE, REF B demarche points urging the EU to 
establish an EU BMO in Georgia.  The EU COSCE interlocutors 
confirmed that the EU still had all its options on the table, 
including a full-fledged EU-flagged BMO, but implied they did 
not want to risk damaging relations with Russia by moving too 
quickly.  Both Feith and EU Council Policy Unit Director 
Christoph Heusgen, in separate meetings, seemed more forward 
leaning.  Heusgen especially emphasized the EU's 
determination to step in if the OSCE could not.  Heusgen, a 
German, claimed he had seen a German MFA paper urging the EU 
move in if the OSCE BMO is brought to a definitive end. 
(NOTE: Our impression of continued EU indecision on this 
issue was later affirmed (REF C) by the March 15 decision of 
the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to send the 
question of an EU-flagged Georgia BMO back to the 
working-group level for further discussion.  END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UKRAINE NEEDED TO SOLVE MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Minikes pointed out that Ukraine needed to be engaged 
to resolve the Moldova/Transnistria problem, especially since 
Russia remained uncooperative.  Kirsch replied that the EU 
was raising with the Ukrainian government at all levels the 
need to patrol the Ukraine/Moldova border and clamp down on 
smuggling and trafficking.  Dubois said the European 
Commission was offering more support for patrolling and 
monitoring as well as pushing better monitoring of 
cross-border trade flows.  Nonetheless, Kirsch suggested, a 
lack of working-level cooperation from Ukraine called into 
question the Ukrainian leadership's willingness to expend 
political capital on the issue.  Minikes said high-level 
engagement with the Ukrainians would be necessary to get 
Ukraine truly engaged.  Heusgen said the EU would appoint a 
Special Representative for Moldova, former Dutch Ambassador 
Adriaan Jacobovits, on March 16. 
 
------------------------------- 
MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON BELARUS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Secretary Rice had aptly characterized Belarus as an 
&outpost of tyranny,8 Ambassador Minikes said.  Since the 
October 17 elections, repression of independent civil society 
and democratic political parties appeared to have only 
intensified.  The OSCE,s means of influencing the regime 
were limited, but we needed to keep the pressure on by 
limiting official contact, actively monitoring abuses, and by 
publicly condemning Belarusian repression whenever possible. 
In this last respect, Ambassador Minikes appealed to the EU 
to be more outspoken at the OSCE on developments in Belarus, 
not with the expectation that doing so would influence the 
regime, but as a signal of support to democratic forces and 
lower-level officials.  The EU agreed with Ambassador 
Minikes,s assessment; publicly highlighting the regime,s 
abuses was one of the most useful tools at our disposal for 
promoting democracy in Belarus.  Another was leadership.  In 
that respect, the EU asked if the U.S. had made any decision 
about who we would support as a successor to Ambassador 
Heykin, who would be stepping down as the OSCE,s Head of 
Office in Minsk in July.  Ambassador Minikes said that we had 
not settled on a particular candidate, but agreed on the need 
to find a strong one. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION ON CORDOBA CONFERENCE, TOLERANCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Minikes stressed that combating intolerance was not a 
sideshow but one of the most important tasks the OSCE had 
taken on in recent years.  In that vein, the U.S. hoped the 
June 8-9 Cordoba Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms 
of Intolerance would focus on what remained to be done, in 
the media, legislative, and other arenas, to oppose the 
forces of intolerance.  The U.S. looked forward, Minikes 
said, to the progress reports at Cordoba from the OSCE CiO's 
three Personal Representatives on Intolerance; Minikes said 
the EU should urge Belgium, set to be the CiO in 2006, to 
reappoint the Personal Reps if, as expected, their work could 
not be completed in 2005.  Kirsch responded that she would 
bring the issue of a possible reappointment before the EU 
"COSCE" Working Group on the OSCE, and urge the EU to come to 
a common position on the matter.  Kirsch said the Luxembourg 
EU Presidency would be represented at Cordoba by ForMin 
Asselborn, and that several other EU delegations would likely 
also be led by ministerial-level officials. 
 
----------------------------------- 
LEVERAGING KAZAKH CIO-SHIP IN 2009? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Minikes reported that he would visit Kazakhstan again 
in mid-April. He said he would press the Kazakh government on 
what it was willing to do so that, by the time of its 
proposed OSCE CiO-ship in 2009, Kazakhstan would adequately 
reflect OSCE human-rights and democracy standards in its 
domestic policy.  Minikes warned that a 2009 CiO-ship for 
Kazakhstan should not be an automatic, done deal; Kazakhstan 
should only be given the CiO-ship if it is clearly on the 
right track toward upholding OSCE values.  Morris said the 
Kazakh CiO-ship was "back on the EU agenda, although I can't 
predict how the EU position will turn out."  He admitted that 
the EU had been sending mixed signals on the issue, and said 
the UK position was that the EU should more clearly state 
that a 2009 CiO-ship was "not yet certain." 
 
---------------------------- 
SELECTION OF NEW OSCE SECGEN 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Minikes said a new Secretary General of the OSCE 
needed to be named soon, no later than May.  Minikes urged 
his EU interlocutors to intervene with the Slovenian CiO on 
the need actively to build consensus around a candidate: 
"we've told the CiO that building consensus is a contact 
sport, not a spectator sport; it would be helpful if the EU 
could underline that message." 
 
------------------------ 
COE CONVENTION ON KOSOVO 
------------------------ 
¶12. (SBU) Mayer urged the U.S. to push NATO to agree to CoE 
inspections of detention centers in Kosovo per the CoE 
Convention on the Prevention of Torture (CPT).  He said NATO 
was withholding approval of CPT Commission visits of KFOR 
detention centers, thus keeping the CPT from "doing its job 
in Kosovo."  Minikes said he would report Mayer's concerns 
back to Washington, but that the proper venue for raising 
this issue is NATO. 
 
----------------------------- 
COE: U.S. DEATH PENALTY CASES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Mayer closed the meeting by raising current death 
penalty cases in the U.S. that are of particular concern to 
the CoE.  Mayer said the stated desire to be put to death of 
serial killer Michael Ross, facing execution in Connecticut 
on May 11, might be due to the "psychological" effects of 
death row.  He noted that the CoE had written the governor on 
January 28 asking for clemency.  Mayer also noted the case of 
Daryl Atkins.  He said the CoE and the EU were troubled by 
the fact that Atkins now tests at an I.Q. of 76, above the 
minimum of 70 required for the death penalty.  When he 
committed his crime, Mayer said, Atkins' I.Q. was 59. 
Minikes thanked Mayer for his comments and assured him that 
the death penalty was the subject of constant vigorous debate 
in the U.S. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
COMMENT: U.S. SHOULD ENGAGE EU TO SAFEGUARD OSCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶14. (C) As the EU deliberates internally on the future of the 
OSCE and the relations between OSCE and CoE, we must continue 
to remind the EU of the OSCE's unique value as an 
organization which provides a venue for U.S. influence in 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.  While we 
should welcome EU and CoE engagement on democracy, human 
rights and election observation in the OSCE region, these 
should supplement, and not replace, OSCE engagement on these 
fronts.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶15. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Minikes. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.